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The financial markets are full of puzzles. In the aggregate market, stocks earn 
returns that cannot be justified by individual risk aversion (the equity premium 
puzzle); stock prices fluctuate much more than the underlying dividend 
process (the excess volatility puzzle); and stock returns can be predicted by 
many variables, such as dividend-to-price ratios or book-to-market ratios (the 
predictability puzzle). In the cross-section of stock returns, when stocks are 
sorted into different groups according to certain economic variables, including 
prior returns (the momentum puzzle), book-to-market ratio (the value premium 
puzzle), and size (the size puzzle), one group tends to earn higher average 
returns than another. At the individual trading level, a large body of evidence 
suggests that investors are reluctant to take losses (the disposition effect), 
tend to hold under-diversified portfolios (the under-diversification puzzle), and 
trade more than can be justified on rational grounds (the excessive trading 
puzzle).  None of these facts can be explained by the traditional consumption-
based asset pricing models; they are thus labeled as anomalies. 
 
This study explores how models incorporating prospect theory preferences 
can improve our understanding of asset prices at both the aggregate market 
and individual stock levels. Chapter 1 studies a market-selection problem in an 
economy populated by Epstein-Zin investors and prospect theory investors. 
This chapter answers the questions of whether prospect theory investors can 
 survive and have price impact in the long run, and thus, this chapter lays down 
the foundation for using prospect theory preferences to understand financial 
markets. Chapter 2 examines the implications of prospect theory preferences 
for the disposition effect, the momentum effect in the cross-section of stock 
returns, and the correlation between returns and volumes. Chapter 3 first 
provides strong empirical evidence for volatility clustering in the dividend 
growth rate process and then incorporates this feature into an asset pricing 
model with prospect theory investors to explore its implications for the 
aggregate stock market. 
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CHAPTER 1 
MARKET SELECTION: LOSS AVERSION vs. EPSTEIN-ZIN PREFERENCES 
 
1.1 Introduction  
The traditional consumption-based asset-pricing approach assumes that 
agents' preferences are consistent with Savage's notion of subjective 
expected utility. As is well-known, when combined with rational expectation 
equilibrium, this approach has difficulty in closely matching the financial 
market data (e.g., Hansen and Singleton, 1983; Mehra and Prescott, 1985; 
and Hansen and Jagannathan, 1991). In response to this difficulty, 
researchers have used more realistic and sophisticated preference 
specifications to model people's behavior in an attempt to better understand 
the financial phenomena. Prospect theory, particularly the loss-aversion 
feature of prospect theory, is one of these new specifications and has proven 
itself as a successful complement to the expected-utility framework in 
explaining asset prices and trading behavior (See Barberis and Thaler, 2003). 
The literature has labeled this new approach relying on prospect theory as the 
loss aversion/narrow framing approach (Barberis and Huang, 2007, 2009). 
 
However, most models adopting the loss aversion/narrow framing approach 
are conducted in a representative agent framework (e.g., Benartzi and Thaler, 
1995; Barberis and Huang, 2001, 2007, 2009; Barberis, Huang and Santos, 
2001; McQueen and Vorkink, 2004; Grünea and Semmler, 2008), which 
makes it very hard to interpret the results in these models. In reality, it is highly 
likely that investors who are not loss-averse trade against investors who are, 
thus attenuating their effects. This concern has led Barberis and Huang (2009, 
  2
p 1567) to caution that one should interpret the equity premium obtained in 
their representative-agent model as an upper bound on the equity premium 
that we would obtain in a more realistic heterogeneous-agent economy. 
 
Formally, the following questions are left unanswered in the literature: What 
are the impacts of loss-averse investors on asset prices in an economy with 
arbitrageurs, whose preferences do not exhibit loss aversion? Do loss-averse 
investors maintain a significantly large share of the whole economy wealth in 
the long run, so that their pricing impacts persist? Without a formal model, it is 
hard to give a definite answer to both questions. This paper fills this gap by 
providing such a model. 
 
I develop a heterogeneous-agent model with two (classes of) investors and 
two tradable assets (a risk-free bond and a risky stock). Both investors have 
recursive preferences. The first investor, labeled EZ-investor, has Epstein-Zin 
preferences (Epstein and Zin, 1989) and she represents rational investors or 
arbitrageurs. The second investor is called LA-investor, and he has a recursive 
preference representation proposed by Barberis and Huang (2007, 2009).1 
The LA-investor departs from the EZ-investor in the way in which he evaluates 
his investment in the stock market: he derives utility from investing in the stock 
both indirectly, via its contribution to his lifetime consumption, and directly, via 
its resulting fluctuations in his financial wealth, and he is more sensitive to 
losses than to gains (loss aversion). 
                                                 
1Throughout this paper, I will use she/her to refer to the EZ-investor and use 
he/him to refer to the LA-investor. 
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I choose Epstein-Zin preferences to represent arbitrageurs partly because 
they help me to separate out the impact of loss aversion on the LA-investor's 
wealth dynamics (survival) and asset prices, as under Barberis and Huang's 
(2007, 2009) representation, the difference between the LA-investor's 
preference and Epstein-Zin preferences is summarized by only one parameter. 
However, there are also two substantive reasons. First, Epstein-Zin 
preferences allow the separation between the risk-aversion parameter and the 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution parameter (EIS henceforth). These two 
parameters presumably have very different roles in determining investors' 
survival prospects, as the existing market-selection literature suggests that 
portfolio decisions, which are more related to risk aversion, and saving 
behaviors, which are more related to EIS, affect survival in different ways. 
Second, Epstein-Zin preferences deserve more serious investigation on their 
own, as the recent literature, such as the long-run risk models (Bansal and 
Yaron, 2004), has shown that Epstein-Zin preferences help to explain many 
salient features of the financial market. 
 
My findings can be summarized as follows. On the one hand, if investors only 
differ in whether deriving loss-aversion utility, then the LA-investor will lose out 
over time and have no impact on asset prices in the long-run for economies 
with empirically relevant parameter values (see Subsection 1.4). When the EZ-
investor is more risk tolerant, this selection mechanism is stronger in the 
sense that it does not require the EZ-investor to control a large fraction of 
wealth to significantly attenuate the effect of loss aversion on prices (see 
Subsection 1.4.2). On the other hand, when multi-dimensional heterogeneity in 
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preferences is recognized, say, when the LA-investor and the EZ-investor 
have different EIS parameters or time-patience parameters, the first result can 
be easily overturned. For instance, in a calibrated economy, a difference in the 
time-patience factor as small as two percent can justify the long-run 
dominance of the LA-investor in the financial market. Therefore, by providing 
these two results, my paper develops a framework to quantify the effect on 
survival and asset prices of the difference in investors' preferences. 
 
The first result is obtained through the endogenous difference in investors' 
equilibrium portfolio choices. It is well-known that as an investor's utility 
approaches the log utility, his/her expected wealth growth rate increases. 
Under empirically plausible parameter values, the EZ-investor is more risk 
averse than the log utility, but the nature of loss aversion makes the LA-
investor act as if he is more risk averse than the EZ-investor and therefore 
further from the log utility. Of course, loss aversion also causes the LA-
investor's saving behavior to be different from the EZ-investor's. It might be 
thought, therefore, that this loss-aversion-induced difference in savings might 
allow the LA-investor to survive. However, my paper demonstrates that this is 
not the case in a calibrated economy. 
 
The reason is as follows. Whether the LA-investor saves more or less than the 
EZ-investor depends on the value of EIS. When the common EIS of both 
investors is greater than one, the substitution effect is the dominant force 
determining the investor's saving behavior. The presence of loss aversion 
makes the LA-investor's future prospect less attractive relative to that of the 
EZ-investor, thereby causing him to save less, which in turn further hurts his 
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survival prospects. When the common EIS is less than one, the income effect 
dominates, and because the presence of loss aversion reduces the LA-
investor's future prospects, the income effect implies that he consumes less or 
saves more than the EZ-investor. However, the difference in their savings 
declines with the wealth share controlled by the EZ-investor. This is because 
as the EZ-investor controls more wealth, her lower saving rate raises the risk-
free rate, which in turn increases the current consumption of the LA-investor, 
as the risk-less asset is his primary investment vehicle given the kink at his 
preferences. As a result, when the LA-investor's wealth erodes because of his 
adverse portfolio decisions, his saving rate decreases as well, which further 
drags down his wealth accumulation. 
 
The second result --- that the LA-investor can survive if he has a different EIS 
parameter or time-patience parameter than the EZ-investor --- is obtained 
through the endogenous difference in investors' saving behaviors. The 
intuition is straightforward: When the LA-investor has a larger EIS parameter 
or time-patience parameter, his saving rate is larger than that of the EZ-
investor. This favors his long-run survival. The point of my paper is to quantify 
this effect. For example, in a calibrated economy, when the EZ-investor's EIS 
takes a value of 0.5, it is sufficient for the LA-investor to have an EIS of 0.7 to 
dominate the market, as this difference in EIS generates a difference in saving 
rate of almost two percent. Similarly, the LA-investor's disadvantage for 
survival induced by his portfolio decisions can be overturned if his time-
patience parameter increases by two percent. This result echoes Yan (2008) 
who shows that in a dynamic model populated with CRRA investors, a slight 
difference in the patience parameter makes it possible for an investor with 
  6
incorrect beliefs to dominate the market, even if his beliefs persistently and 
substantially deviate from the truth. 
 
This paper contributes to two strands of literature. The first one is the market 
selection literature, which studies what kind of investors will survive and have 
a price impact in a dynamic economy populated by different types of investors. 
The basic idea is an application of natural selection to financial markets. So far, 
this literature has primarily focused on selection over beliefs and not over 
preferences.2  Although the idea of market selection dates back to the early 
1950s (Alchian, 1950; Friedman, 1953), rigorous analysis is only recent. De 
Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldman (1991) are the first who cast doubts 
on the idea of market selection. They rely on partial equilibrium analysis and 
show that investors with incorrect beliefs can survive. Blume and Easley (1992) 
show that incorrect beliefs can be an advantage for survival in models with 
endogenous asset prices but exogenous savings decisions. Sandroni (2000), 
Blume and Easley (2006) and Yan (2008) endogenize both savings and 
portfolio decisions and show that only investors with beliefs closest to the 
objective probabilities will survive in economies with bounded aggregate 
endowment or relative risk aversion. Kogan, Ross, Wang, and Westerfield 
(2009) demonstrate that in economies with unbounded endowment or relative 
risk aversion, investors with incorrect beliefs may survive. 
 
                                                 
2One exception is Condie (2008), who studies the market selection problem 
for an economy populated with ambiguity averse investors and expected-utility 
investors. 
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Investors in all of the above models have time-separable utility functions. 
Borovička (2009) has recently studied the belief-selection problem in an 
economy with Epstein-Zin preferences and found that agents with distorted 
beliefs are not driven out of the market for an empirically relevant range of 
parameters. Other studies on market selection consider issues related to 
incomplete markets (Coury and Sciubba, 2005; Sandroni, 2005; Blume and 
Easley, 2006; Gallmeyer and Hollifield, 2008; Cao, 2009), imperfect 
competition (Palomino, 1996; Kyle and Wang, 1997), and asymmetric 
information and learning (Mailath and Sandroni, 2003; Sciubba, 2005; Cogley 
and Sargent, 2009). Instead of studying belief selection, my paper studies 
preference selection in frictionless and complete-market economies, and it is 
the first study on the market-selection problem between loss aversion and 
Epstein-Zin preferences. 
 
The second strand of related literature considers the role of loss aversion in 
determining trading behavior, asset prices and trading volumes. Loss aversion 
is a key feature of prospect theory proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
and means that investors are more sensitive to reductions in the value of their 
financial wealth than to gains. Berkelaar, Kouwenberg and Post (2004), 
Gomes (2005) and Kyle, Ouyang and Xiong (2006) study the optimal portfolio 
choice problem under loss aversion. Benartzi and Thaler (1995) were the first 
to use loss aversion to explain the equity premium puzzle. Barberis, Huang 
and Santos (2001) extend Benartzi and Thaler's setting to a dynamic model 
and find that combining loss aversion and the house-money effect helps to 
explain the aggregate stock market. Barberis and Huang (2001) find that loss 
aversion is also useful in understanding the value effect in the cross-section of 
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stock returns. Grünea and Semmler (2008) study a production economy and 
find that a model incorporating loss aversion can match data much better than 
pure consumption-based asset-pricing models, including the habit formation 
variant. McQueen and Vorkink (2004) show that loss aversion can generate 
the asymmetric GARCH properties of stock returns. Barberis and Huang (2007, 
2009) propose a preference specification that incorporates both loss aversion 
and narrow framing and study its applications in portfolio choice and asset 
pricing. 
 
All of the above-mentioned asset-pricing models are conducted in a 
representative-agent framework. Gomes (2005) and Berkelaar and 
Kouwenberg (2009) explore the interaction between loss-averse investors and 
expected utility maximizers; here, the former study focuses more on the 
implications of loss aversion for trading volumes, while the later studies asset 
prices and volatility. However, both studies have a finite horizon model and are 
therefore unable to answer the question of whether loss-averse investors 
survive and affect prices in the long run. The model proposed in the present 
paper is suitable for analyzing survival and pricing impact and helps to 
understand under what conditions and to what extent the results obtained in 
the asset pricing models incorporating loss aversion are valid. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Subsection 1.2 outlines 
the model, and Subsection 1.3 characterizes the equilibrium. Subsection 1.4 
discusses the implications for survival and price impact of loss aversion when 
it is the only difference in investors' preferences. Subsection 1.5 discusses its 
implications for survival when investors have different EIS parameters or time-
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patience parameters. Subsection 1.6 concludes.  
 
1.2 The Model 
Consider a pure exchange economy with one consumption good, which is the 
numeraire. Time is discrete and lasts forever: ,...2,1,0t . There are two assets 
--- a risk-free bond and a risky stock --- traded competitively in the market. The 
bond is in zero net supply and earns a gross interest rate of tfR ,  between time 
t  and 1t . The stock is in limited supply (normalized as 1) and it represents a 
claim to a stream of consumption good represented by the dividend sequence 
 0ttD . The stock is traded in a competitive market at price tP . Let 
t
tt
P
DP
tR 111 

   and  ttDPtf   be the gross return on the stock between time  t   
and  1t   and the price-dividend ratio at time t , respectively. 
 
The dividend growth rate 
t
t
D
D
t
1
1
  is i.i.d. over time and follows a distribution 
given by 
                                                      (1) 
 
with HL  0 , 10  H  and HL  1  . I intentionally choose a binomial 
distribution of the dividend growth rate process so that the two tradable assets 
deliver a dynamically complete financial market. By doing so, I ensure that my 
results on survival are driven by the difference in investors' preferences and 
not by the assumed financial-market structure. This concern is important 
because whether the market-selection argument is valid depends crucially on 
the completeness of financial markets (see, among others, Blume and Easley, 
2006; Cao, 2009). 
 
,
y probabilitwith 
y probabilitwith 
1 

LL
HH
t 

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Note that I have followed the literature in assuming that the aggregate 
consumption and aggregate dividends are equal.3 Under this assumption, 
even a representative-agent economy with loss-aversion preferences cannot 
match the historical equity premium,4 as the equilibrium stock returns are not 
volatile enough to scare the loss-averse investor of holding the stock. I have 
conducted an analysis to extend the baseline model to a three-asset setting 
which generates the historical equity premium via a combination of loss 
aversion and narrow framing, and have found that all my main results hold in 
this extended model. To save space, such an analysis is not reported in this 
paper. 
 
The economy is populated by two (classes of) investors, who are distinguished 
by their preferences. The first investor, labeled EZ-investor, derives utility from 
intertemporal consumption plans according to Epstein-Zin preference 
specifications (Epstein and Zin, 1989). The second investor, labeled LA-
investor, is the investor emphasized in the behavioral finance literature, such 
as Benartzi and Thaler (1995), Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001), Barberis, 
Huang and Thaler (2006) and Barberis and Huang (2007, 2009). This investor 
gets utility not only from consumption but also from fluctuations in the value of 
his stock holdings, and he is loss-averse over these fluctuations. 
                                                 
3For consumption-based models, see, among others, Lucas (1978) and Mehra 
and Prescott (1985); for models studying loss aversion, see, among others, 
Gomes (2005) and Berkelaar and Kouwenberg (2009). 
 
 
4See the first economy studied by Baberis, Huang and Santos, 2001, and 
Subsection 1.4.1 below. 
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I use the preference specification developed by Barberis and Huang (2007, 
2009) to describe the LA-investor's preferences. According to this specification, 
the EZ-investor's preference is simply a degenerate case of the LA-investor's 
preference, where the parameter controlling the term related to loss aversion 
is set to be zero. I therefore write down a uniform preference formulation for 
both investors as follows. 
 
Formally, the time t  utility of investor i  (=EZ, LA) is given by 
 
                                      (2) 
 
where 0EZb  and 0LAb . Here,  ,iH  is the aggregator function, which 
combines current consumption tiC ,  and the certainty equivalent of future utility 
to generate current utility tiU , . It takes the form 
 
                                             (3) 
 
where 10  i  is investor i 's time patience factor. Parameter i  determines 
the investor's elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS):  iiEIS  1/1 .  
 
Function  ttii IU |1,   is the certainty equivalent of the random future utility 
1, tiU  conditional on time t  information tI , and it has the form  
 
                                (4) 
 
     ,|, 1,1,,,   titittiitiiti GvEbIUCHU 
   



  ,0 if,
,10 if,)1(,
1
/1
i
iii
i
ii
iii
XC
XCXCH 



   



,0 if],(logexp[
,10 if,)]([
|
/1
it
it
ti UE
UE
IU
ii



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where    tt IEE |  is the expectation operator conditional on information tI  
and where parameter i  determines the investor's risk attitude toward 
aggregate future utility, as the implied parameter iiRA 1  is the investor's 
relative risk aversion coefficient. Both investors entertain the same belief, 
which coincides with the objective probability. 
 
Up to this point, the investor's preference is entirely standard. What is non-
standard is that a new term,   1, titi GvEb , is added to the second argument of 
 ,iH , allowing the investor to get utility directly from investing in the stock. 
This term captures the non-consumption utility that the agent derives directly 
from the specific gamble he is facing by investing in the stock rather than just 
indirectly via this gamble's contribution to the next period's wealth and the 
resulting consumption, since the latter has already been captured by the 
certainty equivalent function,  ttii IU |1,  . To ease exposition, I refer to this 
new term as loss aversion utility, and its components --- parameter ib , 
argument 1, tiG , and function  v  --- are further specified as follows. 
 
First, parameter ib  determines the relative importance of the loss-aversion 
utility term in the investor's preference. For the EZ-investor, 0EZb , meaning 
that she derives no direct utility from financial wealth fluctuations. For the LA-
investor, 0LAb , meaning that, to a certain extent, his utility function depends 
on the outcome of his stock investment over and above what that outcome 
implies for total wealth risk. 
 
Second, variable 1, tiG  defines the gamble that investor i  is taking by investing 
in the stock. Specifically, let tiW ,  be investor i 's wealth at the beginning of time  
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t , and let tis ,  be the fraction of post-consumption wealth allocated to the stock. 
Then this investment portfolio puts the investor to a position of taking a gamble 
represented by 
                                            (5) 
                                        
that is, the amount invested in the stock,  tititi CWs ,,,  , multiplied by its return 
in excess of the risk-free rate, tft RR ,1  . As is standard in the literature (e.g., 
Barberis and Huang, 2001, 2007, 2009; Gomes, 2005; Barberis and Xiong, 
2009), here the risk-free rate, tfR , , is assumed to be the reference point 
determining whether a particular outcome is treated as a gain or a loss: as 
long as 0, tis , the stock's return is only counted as a gain (loss) if it is larger 
(smaller) than the risk-free rate. 
 
Finally, function  v  determines how the investor evaluates the gains and 
losses. I follow Barberis and Huang (2007, 2009) in assuming a piecewise-
linear function of  v :  
 
                                                  (6) 
 
with 1 . This function assigns positive utility to gains and negative utility to 
losses. More importantly, it assigns greater negative utility to losses than 
positive utilities to gains of the same magnitude. This feature is known as loss 
aversion in the literature, and it is the behavioral bias that the LA-investor 
exhibits. Parameter   controls the degree of loss aversion. Specifically, a 
one-dollar loss brings the investor 1  units of negative non-consumption 
utility, while a one-dollar gain brings him only one unit of positive non-
  ,,1,,,1, tfttitititi RRCWsG  
 




,0 if,
,0 if,
GG
GG
Gv 
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consumption utility. 
 
As Barberis and Huang (2007, 2009) point out, the preference specification in 
equations (2)-(6), along many dimensions, improves upon another popularly 
adopted specification which simply attaches a loss-aversion term to the period 
felicity function in the expected-utility framework (e.g., Barberis and Huang, 
2001; Barberis, Huang and Santos, 2001; McQueen and Vorkink, 2005; Grüne 
and Semmler, 2008). First, it admits an explicit value function, making it easy 
to evaluate whether the preference parameters are reasonable. Second, it 
offers an advantage particular to the current paper: the LA-investor's 
preference nests the EZ-investor's preference, and as a result, I can easily 
isolate the impact of loss aversion by simply adjusting the parameters ib   and 
 . 
 
To summarize, the economy is characterized by the following two group of 
exogenous parameters: (i) technology parameters: H , L , H  and L ; and (ii) 
preference parameters: LAb ,  ,   LAEZiiii ,,,  . The technology is defined by 
equation (1), and the preferences are defined by equations (2)-(6). 
 
1.3 Equilibrium 
I consider Markov equilibria in which price-dividend ratios, the risk-free rate, 
and the optimal consumption and portfolio decisions are all functions of a state 
variable and in which the state variable evolves according to a Markov process. 
The Markov state variable t  is the LA-investor's wealth as a fraction of 
aggregate wealth: 
                                                    (7) .
,,
,
tEZtLA
tLA
t WW
W

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Intuitively, t  captures the state of the economy, as it determines the strength 
of the pricing impact of the LA-investor's trading behavior. 
 
Formally, a Markov equilibrium consists of (i) a stationary price-dividend ratio 
function,    R1,0:f , (ii) a risk-free rate function,    R1,0:fR , (iii) a 
pair of consumption propensity functions,5    1,01,0: LA  and 
   1,01,0: EZ , (iv) a pair of stock investment policies,   R1,0:LAs  and 
  R1,0:EZs , and (v) a transition function of the state variable, 
     1,0,1,0:  LH  , such that (i) the consumption policy functions and the 
portfolio policy functions maximize investors' preferences given the distribution 
of the equilibrium return processes; (ii) goods and securities markets clear; 
and (iii) the transition function of the state variable is generated by investors' 
optimal decisions and the exogenous dividend-growth rate process (i.e., 
equation [dividend]). I next go through investors' decision problems and the 
market clearing conditions to construct such an equilibrium. 
 
1.3.1 Investors' Decisions 
It may be helpful to summarize the investors' problem here. Investor i  
chooses consumption tiC ,  and the fraction of post-consumption wealth 
allocated to the stock tis ,  to maximize 
      1,1,,, |,   titittiitiiti GvEbIUCHU   
 
                                                 
5Consumption propensity is the ratio of consumption over wealth. 
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subject to the definition of capital gains/losses in stock investment 
   tfttitititi RRCWsG ,1,,,1,    
 
and to the standard budget constraint 
   ,1,,,1,   titititi MCWW  
where 
                                                 (8) 
 
is the gross return on the investor's portfolio, and functions  ,iH ,  i , and  
 v  are given by equations (3), (4), and (6), respectively. 
 
For brevity, I only derive the first-order conditions characterizing the investor's 
optimal decisions for the case of non-unit elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution (i.e., for the case of 1iEIS , or of 0i  in the aggregator 
function  ,iH ). The first-order conditions for the case of a unit EIS can be 
derived similarly. 
 
The Bellman equation of the investor's problem is 
 
 
Because functions  ,iH ,  i , and  v  are all homogeneous of degree one, 
the indirect value function  ttii IWJ ,,  is also homogeneous of degree one:  
 tfttitfti RRsRM ,1,,1,  
 
        .|,)1(max
,
/1
1,11,,,
,,
,,
iii
titi
tititttiitiisC
ttiiti
GvEbIIWJC
IWJU
   

  17
    ., ,,,, titititittii WAWIAIWJ   
Therefore, 
which implies that the consumption and portfolio decisions are separable. 
 
In particular, the portfolio decision is determined by 
                             (9) 
 
and after defining the consumption propensity as 
,/ ,,, tititi WC  
the consumption decision is made based on             
                                    
                             (10) 
 
The first-order condition for optimal consumption propensity  ti ,  is6 
 
                                                      (11) 
 
Combining equations (10) and (11) delivers 
 
 
which, by the recursive structure, in turn implies 
                                                 
6All of the first-order conditions of the investor's problem are both necessary 
and sufficient, as the objective functions are concave. 
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                                             (12) 
 
Substituting equations (11) and (12) into equation (9) gives the following single 
program, which summarizes the investor's consumption and portfolio 
decisions: 
                             
(13) 
 
As a consequence, solving the investor's partial-equilibrium problem boils 
down to solving a fixed-point problem defined by the first-order condition and 
the value function of the above maximization problem. Specifically, in the 
Markov equilibrium, the investor's consumption policy and investment policy 
are both functions of the state variable t :  titi ss , ,  ., titi    The first-
order condition and the value function of program (13) thus form a system of 
two equations with these two unknown functions  is  and  i . Given the 
equilibrium asset return processes ( 1tR  and tfR , ), these partial equilibrium 
optimal policies can be computed. 
 
It needs certain carefulness to derive the first-order conditions for the portfolio 
choice, as the utility function,  v , the function that the investor uses to 
evaluate gains/losses, is not differentiable everywhere but instead has a kink 
at the origin. As will become clear in the subsequent analysis, it is this non-
differentiability at the origin that is responsible for the non-participation of the 
LA-investor in the stock market. Formally, the investment optimality is 
characterized by the following conditions:7 
                                                 
7To be precise, the conditions apply to the case of non-unit risk aversion, i.e., 
    .1 /111,/11, ii tiitiA     
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                                                     (14) 
 
 
 
              (15) 
 
 
                                           (16) 
 
In particular, as for the EZ-investor, the expressions of ,iFOC  and ,iFOC  are 
the same because 0EZb . Therefore, her first-order conditions are 
independent of the sign of her optimal stock investment  tEZs , : 
                                      (17) 
 
This also makes sense: the non-differentiability of preferences comes from the 
non-differentiability of the loss aversion utility. Since the EZ-investor does not 
derive any loss aversion utility at all, her utility function is differentiable 
everywhere, and the first-order conditions are thus the same for all optimal 
stock investments. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
they are true when 1iRA  or 0i  in the certainty-equivalent function   . 
As for the case of a unit risk aversion, simply replace the first terms with  
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limiting formula,      .lim log/10 xEt tiii exE     
 
 
         
,0for  ,0
][)]([1
,
,1
,1
1
1,
/11
1,
1/1
1,
/11
1,
/1
,















ti
tftti
tfttitittititi
i
s
RRvEb
RRMEME
FOC
iiiiiiii  
         
,0for  ,0
][)]([1
,
1,
,1
1
1,
/11
1,
1/1
1,
/11
1,
/1
,















ti
ttfti
tfttitittititi
i
s
RRvEb
RRMEME
FOC
iiiiiiii  
.0for  ,0 and 0 ,,,   tiii sFOCFOC
    .0][ ,111,/11 1,   tfttEZtEZt RRME EZEZEZ 
  20
1.3.2 Stock Prices and Wealth Dynamics 
In this subsection, I rely on market-clearing conditions to derive the expression 
of price-dividend ratios ttt DPf /  and the evolution of the state variable t . In 
the Markov equilibrium, the price-dividend ratio tf  is a function of the state 
variable t : 
 .tt ff   
The good market-clearing condition is 
                                                          (18) 
 
Using the definition of consumption propensity, I can express the consumption 
levels as products of consumption propensity functions and individual wealth 
levels: 
    . and ,,,, tLAtLAtLAtEZtEZtEZ WCWC    
Then, substituting the above expressions into the good-market clearing 
condition gives 
    .,, ttLAtLAtEZtEZ DWW       (19) 
 
Let tLAtEZt WWW ,,   be the aggregate wealth of the whole economy at time t . 
Recall that the definition of t  in equation (7) implies that   tttEZ WW  1,  and  
tttLA WW , . Therefore, equation (19) becomes 
      ,1 ttttLAttEZ DW    
which implies 
                                   (20) 
 
Because the bond is zero net supply, and the stock has a net supply of one 
share, the aggregate economy wealth is also equal to the stock price plus its 
.,, ttLAtEZ DCC 
     .1 ttLAttEZ
t
t
DW  
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dividend: 
.ttt DPW          (21) 
Combining equations (20) and (21) gives the price-dividend ratio function: 
 
                                      (22) 
 
 
Equation (22) says that the price-dividend ratios in the heterogeneous agent 
economy are equal to a weighted average of two terms:   tEZ tEZ
1  and   tLA tLA
1 . In 
fact, the expressions of these two terms correspond to the price-dividend 
ratios in the representative-agent economies populated only by the EZ-
Investor and by the LA-investor, respectively.8 So, roughly speaking, the price-
dividend ratios in a heterogeneous economy is the weighted average of the 
price-dividend ratios in representative-agent economies, although the weight is 
not simply the wealth share but is instead a rather complicated expression 
related to the wealth share and investors' optimal consumption policies. 
 
Given the price-dividend ratio function  tt ff   and the Markov structure of 
the state variable evolution  11 ,   ttt  , the distribution of stock returns  
1tR  also has a Markov structure and is determined by 
                               
(23) 
                                                 
8To see this, note that, in a representative agent economy, the agent holds the 
whole share of the stock and consumes the entire dividend, which means that    ttttititi DDPW  ,,,   and thus   tititt DP ,, /1/   . 
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I now turn to examine how the state variable, t , evolves over time. The gross 
return to the LA-investor's optimal portfolio is 
 
                                                                             (24) 
 
Therefore, the LA-investor's next period wealth is 
 
                                    (25) 
 
where the second equation follows from tttLA WW ,  and equation (20). 
Applying equation (20) one period forward gives 
                                  (26) 
 
Combining equations (25) and (26) and recalling the definition of 
1
1,
1 
 t tLAWWt   
and 
t
t
D
D
t
1
1
 , I have 
                               
(27) 
 
which implicitly determines the evolution of t :   11 ,   ttt  . 
 
Finally, substituting   tttEZ WW  1, , tttLA WW ,  and equation (20) into the 
stock-market clearing condition,  
    ,11 ,,,,,, tLAtLAtLAtEZtEZtEZt WsWsP     
I link investors' policy functions to the price-dividend ratio function as follows: 
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                           (28) 
 
 
To summarize, computing the equilibrium is involved with solving the seven 
unknown functions,  f  ,  fR ,  LA ,   EZ ,   LAs ,   EZs , and   ,  from 
the system formed by equations (13), (14)-(16), (22)-(24), (27) and (28). 
 
Two remarks are in order. First, although the market is complete in the present 
project, the standard Pareto efficiency technique commonly used in the 
market-selection literature (e.g., Blume and Easley, 2006; Yan, 2008; 
Borovička, 2009; Kogan, Ross, Wang and Westerfield, 2009) cannot be 
applied here, as the LA-investor's preference depends not only on the 
intertemporal consumption plans but also on the endogenous stock return 
process per se, thereby making it necessary to explicitly solve the equilibrium. 
I therefore develop an algorithm based on Kubler and Schmedders (2003) to 
compute the Markov equilibrium and use simulations to analyze the survival 
and price impact of the LA-investor. The details of the algorithm are delegated 
to the appendix. 
 
Second, my analysis ignores the issue of the existence and uniqueness of the 
equilibrium. As is well-known in the literature, it is hard to establish the general 
results on the existence and uniqueness of the equilibria in heterogeneous-
agent models. Therefore, in the present paper, I simply start my analysis 
under the assumption that an equilibrium exists and use numerical methods to 
find this equilibrium. Rigorously speaking, a numerical method can never find 
the exact equilibrium; what it finds, if anything, is the  -equilibrium defined by 
           .1 111 ,,,, ttLAttEZ ttLAtLAttEZtEZt
ss
f 
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  24
Kubler and Schmedders (2003), who interpret the computed  -equilibrium as 
an approximate equilibrium of some other economy with endowments and 
preferences that are close to those in the original economy. 
 
1.4 Implications of Loss Aversion for Survival and Price Impacts 
In this section, I first analyze the representative-agent economies, that is, 
economies populated by homogeneous investors (see Subsection 1.4.1). This 
analysis serves two purposes. First, it verifies the result that loss aversion 
raises equity premiums, which is well-known in the literature (Benartzi and 
Thaler, 1995; Barberis, Huang and Santos, 2001). Second, it provides a very 
useful springboard for my analysis of the heterogeneous-agent economies, as 
it helps to develop the intuition for how loss aversion changes an investor's 
investment and saving behaviors. I then move to the more realistic economies 
populated by both the EZ-investor and the LA-investor and use the algorithm 
in Appendix 1 to numerically compute the equilibrium price functions, 
 f ,  fR , policy functions,  LA  ,  EZ ,  LAs ,  EZs , and the state variable 
transition function,  , . I use simulations to show how loss aversion affects 
the investor's survival and pricing impact via changed portfolio decisions in 
Subsection 1.4.2 and via changed saving behaviors in Subsection 1.4.3. 
 
Before solving the models, I need to calibrate the parameter values. Because I 
am interested in the implications of preferences, I allow the preference 
parameters to vary over a certain range while fixing the four technology 
parameters in equation (1) for all computations and simulations. I interpret one 
period as one year and follow Mehra and Prescott (1985) in setting 
2/1 LH    so that the economy is in booms and recessions with equal 
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probability. Based on the data spanning the 20th century, the historical mean 
and volatility of the log consumption growth process are %84.1   and  %79.3 , 
respectively (see Barberis and Huang, 2009). To match these two moments, I 
set 0579.1H  and 98069.0L . Table 1.1 summarizes my choice of 
technology parameters. 
 
Table 1.1: Technology Parameter Values 
 
 
I take one period to be one year. Following Mehra and Prescott (1985), I 
assume that the dividend growth rate takes a high value or a low value with 
equal probability, so that  5.0 LH  . The dividend growth rate parameters 
( H  and L ) are calibrated to match the historical mean (1.84%) and volatility 
(3.79%) of the log consumption growth rate. 
 
Parameters H L H L
Values 0.5 0.5 1.0579 0.98069
 
 
 
1.4.1 Representative-Agent Economy 
In this subsection, I assume that the EZ-investor and the LA-investor have 
identical preferences; that is,   LAEZ ,   LAEZ ,   LAEZ  and 
bbb LAEZ   . As a result, the economy is the well-studied representative-
agent economy. 
 
In this case, the representative agent has to hold the stock in equilibrium, so 
that the first-order condition in equation (14) with 11,   tti RM  defines the 
optimality of the investor's investment decision. As mentioned in the 
discussions after equation (22), the good-market clearing condition links the 
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price-dividend ratios tf  to the optimal consumption policy t  as follows: 
                                            (29) 
 
Therefore, equations (13), (14) and (29) define a system for three unknowns:  
tf , t  and tfR , . Given the i.i.d. investment opportunities, I conjecture that 
    . ,,,,, , tRfRf ftftt    (30) 
The problem can be easily solved using any non-linear solver. 
 
Table 1.2 reports the equilibrium equity premiums, risk-free rates and 
consumption policies for a variety of combinations of preference parameter 
values. For all combinations, I hold constant the time patience factor  , the 
loss-aversion parameter   and the relative risk-aversion coefficient RA :  
98.0 , 25.2  and 1RA  (or 0 ). These values are standard in the 
behavioral finance literature, such as Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) and 
Barberis and Huang (2009). The choice of   is motivated to match the low 
level of the risk-free rate, while the choice of   is based on the estimation of 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992). When EIS is equal to one (i.e., 0 ) and 
there is no loss aversion (i.e., 0b ), setting 1RA  or 0  reduces the 
investor's preference to an expected log utility, which is an important 
benchmark case that the market-selection literature has been focusing on 
(Hakansson, 1971; De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann, 1991; Blume 
and Easley, 1992). 
 
 
 
 
   .11
t
t
ttttt fDPD 
 
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Table 1.2: Asset Prices and Consumption Policies in Representative Agent 
Economies 
 
Table 1.2 reports the equilibrium equity premiums, risk-free rates and 
consumption policies, assuming that investors are identical in preferences, so 
that   LAEZ , EISEISEIS LAEZ  (or )  LAEZ , RARARA LAEZ    
(or   LAEZ ) and bbb LAEZ  . For all combinations, the following three 
preference parameters are held constant: 98.0 , 25.2  and 1RA  (or  
0 ). The technology parameters are fixed at the values in Table 1.1. Panels 
A, B and C correspond to different values of EIS: 1EIS  ( 0 ), 5.0EIS   
( 1  ) and 5.1EIS  ( 3/1 ). Parameter b  controls the relative 
importance of loss aversion utility in the investor's preferences. 
 
ERt1 − Rf,t  (%) ERf,t − 1 (%)  t (%)
Panel A: EIS  1
b  0 0.15 3.86 2.00
b  0.02 0.79 3.22 2.00
b  0.2 1.41 2.60 2.00
Panel B: EIS  0.5
b  0 0.15 5.79 3.79
b  0.02 0.67 4.76 3.31
b  0.2 1.39 3.29 2.63
Panel C: EIS  1.5
b  0 0.15 3.23 1.40
b  0.02 0.85 2.76 1.62
b  0.2 1.42 2.38 1.80
 
Panels A, B and C correspond to different values of EIS: 1EIS  ( 0 ), 
5.0EIS  ( 1 ) and 5.1EIS  ( 3/1 ). In each panel, parameterb , which 
controls the relative importance of the loss aversion utility in the investor's 
preference, is set at three different values: 0b , 02.0b  and 2.0b . When  
0b , the investor's preference does not exhibit loss aversion, and this 
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economy has been well understood in the literature (e.g., Weil, 1989). When  
0b , the investor's preference exhibits loss aversion; such an economy is the 
focus of behavioral finance, such as Benartzi and Thaler (1995), Barberis, 
Huang and Santos (2001), and Barberis and Huang (2007, 2009). In particular, 
for both positive values of b  in the table, 02.0  and 2.0 , the investor's attitudes 
to independent large monetary gambles are sensible in the sense that both 
parameterizations of the investor's preference satisfy Barberis and Huang's 
condition L (2007, p 217); moreover, when 02.0b , the investor's attitude to 
independent small monetary gambles is also sensible; that is, the 
parameterization corresponding to 02.0b  satisfies Barberis and Huang's 
condition S (2007, p 219).9 
 
Three notable patterns show up in Table 1.2. The first pattern regards the 
equity premium. In all three panels, when 0b , that is, when loss aversion is 
absent in the investor's preference, the equity premium is quite small (0.15%) 
relative to its historical value (6%), which is the well-known equity premium 
puzzle. Once loss aversion is introduced, the equity premiums are raised 
significantly. Say, when 2.0b , the model can generate an equity premium as 
high as 1.4%, which is almost ten times the equity premium corresponding to 
                                                 
9The literature cares about investors' attitudes to independent monetary 
gambles, as it was, in part, the difficulty that researchers encountered in 
reconciling the equity premium with these attitudes that launched the equity 
premium literature in the first place. Barberis and Huang's (2007) condition L is: 
(a)n individual with wealth of $75,000 should not pay a premium higher than 
$15,000 to avoid a 50:50 chance of losing $25,000 or gaining the same 
amount. Their condition S is: (a)n individual with wealth of $75,000 should not 
pay a premium higher than $40 to avoid a 50:50 chance of losing $250 or 
gaining the same amount. 
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an economy populated by only EZ-investors. The increased equity premiums 
still fall short of the empirical value, as in my model, the stock is a claim to the 
smooth aggregate consumption process, and, as a result of the constant 
equilibrium price-dividend ratios (see equation [30]), the stock returns are not 
volatile enough to cause the loss-averse investor to be scared of holding the 
stock.10 As mentioned before, this mismatch between the model-generated 
equity premium and the historical equity premium does not have any impact 
on my analysis. What really matters is that the LA-investor is more reluctant to 
hold the stock than the EZ-investor, which is also an assumption maintained in 
the behavioral finance studies relying on loss aversion to explain the equity 
premium puzzle. 
 
The second pattern concerns the risk-free rate. In all three panels, the risk-free 
rate decreases withb , the parameter determining the relative importance of 
loss-aversion utility in the investor's preferences. This occurs because as the 
investor is more concerned about fluctuations in the value of his financial 
wealth, he is more inclined to allocate wealth to the safe asset to avoid the 
potential painful losses associated with the risky asset. This suggests that in a 
heterogeneous-agent economy populated by both the LA-investor and the EZ-
investor, the bond is more attractive to the former than to the latter. When 
parameter b  is fixed, the risk-free rate also decreases with the magnitude of 
                                                 
10Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) also study the pricing impact of loss 
aversion in a representative-agent economy with dividends equal to 
consumption, and they report an equity premium of 1.26% (see the top part of 
their Table II), which is close to the equity premium generated in my model 
(1.4%). 
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EIS: in a growing economy, a higher EIS makes the investor more likely to 
save, thereby depressing the interest rate. 
 
The third pattern is about the consumption policy. As is well-known in the 
literature, when EIS is equal to one, the investor's saving ratio is optimally 
chosen to be equal to the time patience factor, . Therefore, in Panel A, the 
optimal consumption propensity is independent of the relative importance of 
loss-aversion utility in the investor's preferences; that is, the value of t  is 
independent of parameterb . However, when EIS is different from 1, t  varies 
with b : t  decreases (increases) with b  when EIS is less (greater) than 1 in 
Panel B (Panel C). As is standard in the portfolio choice problem for recursive 
preferences, two forces --- the income effect and the substitution effect --- are 
at play here. The asymmetric treatment of losses from gains in the loss-
aversion utility tends to lower the value, measured in utility terms, of the 
investor's future investment opportunities; that is, a higher b  tends to yield a 
lower tB  in equation (9). This lowered 

tB  has two effects on current 
consumption: it lowers consumption propensity through the income effect but 
raises consumption propensity through the substitution effect. When EIS is 
below 1, the income effect dominates, so that t  decreases with b ; when EIS 
is above 1, the substitution effect dominates, and the relationship between t  
and b  reverses as a result. The different responses of t  to b  in different 
cases of EIS suggest that how loss aversion affects the LA-investor's survival 
might depend on whether EIS is greater than or smaller than 1, as the 
literature suggests that saving behavior is a key determinant on survival. This 
will be examined in Subsection 1.4.3. 
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1.4.2 EIS=1: Portfolio Selection  
In this subsection, I study the heterogeneous-agent economy and fix EIS at 1, 
so that both investors optimally choose to have a constant consumption-
wealth ratio: iti   1, , for i EZ, LA. I assume that the preferences of both 
investors are otherwise identical except that the LA-investor derives loss-
aversion utility, while the EZ-investor does not. So, except that 0LAb , 0EZb , 
all other parameters are the same across investors:   LAEZ , 
  LAEZ  and   LAEZ . The assumption of a common time-patience 
parameter implies that both investors have the same endogenous saving rate. 
The focus of this subsection is therefore essentially how loss aversion 
changes the LA-investor's portfolio decision, which in turn affects asset prices 
as well as the LA-investor's long-run survival in a complete financial market. 
 
I define the survival, extinction, dominance and price impact of the LA-investor 
as follows. 
 
 Definition.  The LA-investor is said to become extinct if 
 
 
to survive if extinction does not occur; and to dominate the market if 
 
 
The price impact of loss aversion at state   is 
 
                 (31) 
 
  a.s.; ,0lim  tt 
  a.s.. ,1lim  tt 
         .0|1| 0|| ,1,1 ,1,1 



ttftttft
ttftttft
RRERRE
RRERRE
tpriceimpac 

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The definition of survival is standard in the market selection literature, such as 
Yan (2008) and Kogan, Ross, Wang and Westerfield (2009). The definition of 
price impact is also intuitive. The common term subtracted in the numerator 
and in the denominator ---  0|,1  ttft RRE   --- is the equilibrium equity 
premium in the traditional representative-agent economy, where all investors 
have Epstein-Zin preferences, which serves as a benchmark level of the 
equity premium. The first term in the denominator,  1|,1  ttft RRE  , 
corresponds to the equity premium obtained in a representative-agent 
economy populated by LA-investors only. The denominator therefore 
measures an upper bound of the additional equity premium relative to the 
benchmark level that one could obtain by introducing loss aversion into the 
investor's preferences. The numerator is the achieved extra equity premium 
when the LA-investor controls   fraction of the aggregate wealth in the 
economy. When 0 ,   0tpriceimpac , and there is no price impact of loss 
aversion; when 1 ,   1tpriceimpac , and loss aversion has a price impact 
as large as in the representative-agent economy with only LA-investors. Since 
the variable tpriceimpac  depends only on the state variable, it has a Markov 
process in equilibrium. I call function  tpriceimpac  a price-impact function. 
 
To illustrate how the LA-investor's wealth share ( t ) and his pricing impact 
( ttpriceimpac ) evolve over time, Table 1.3 reports their distributions at 
times 50t ,  100 , and 1000 years when the LA-investor has initial wealth 
shares of  1.00  , 5.0 , and 9.0  and both investors have a relative risk 
aversion coefficient of 1 (Panel A) or 3 (panel B). The technology parameters 
are fixed at the values in Table 1.1, and the other preference parameters are 
98.0 LAEZ  , 25.2  and  02.0LAb . 
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Table 1.3: Survival and Price Impacts: 1EIS   
 
Table 1.3 reports the distributions of the LA-investor's wealth shares ( t ) and 
his price impacts ( ttpriceimpac ) at times 50t , 100 , and 1000  years when the 
LA-investor has initial wealth shares of 1.00  , 5.0 , and 9.0  as well as both 
investors have a relative risk aversion coefficient of 1 (Panel A) or 3 (panel B). 
Both investors have a unit EIS: 1 LAEZ EISEIS . The other preference 
parameters are 98.0 LAEZ  , 25.2  and 02.0LAb . The technology 
parameters are fixed at the values in Table 1.1. Each entry in Table 1.3 has 
three elements, corresponding, respectively, to the 5%, 50%, and 90% 
percentiles of the distributions of t  or ttpriceimpac . The quantiles are 
estimated from the 5000 simulated sample paths at time t . 
 
Panel A: RAEZ  RALA  1 (EZ  LA  0)
5%, 50% and 95% Quantiles of  t
0  0.1 0  0.5 0  0.9
t  50 . 0632 .0993 .1451 . 3022 .4523 .6677 . 5324 .8070 .9666
t  100 . 0484 .0885 .1720 . 2296 .4059 .6929 . 3928 .6682 .9714
t  1000 . 0066 .0432 .2415 . 0246 .1282 .4603 . 0337 .1592 .5202
5%, 50% and 95% Quantiles of priceimpact t
priceimpact0 . 0257 priceimpact0 . 2301 priceimpact0 . 9160
t  50 . 0156 .0255 .0392 . 0999 .1902 .4590 . 2617 .8369 .9713
t  100 . 0118 .0224 .0480 . 0689 .1575 .5142 . 1491 .4601 .9754
t  1000 . 0015 .0104 .0735 . 0058 .0340 .1964 . 0081 .0437 .2494
Panel B: RAEZ  RALA  3 (EZ  LA  −2)
5%, 50% and 95% Quantiles of  t
0  0.1 0  0.5 0  0.9
t  50 . 0543 .0849 .1242 . 2556 .3964 .5499 . 7752 .8613 .9089
t  100 . 0340 .0654 .1243 . 1646 .2867 .5138 . 6159 .7864 .8963
t  1000 . 0004 .0023 .0155 . 0014 .0083 .0429 . 0039 .0204 .0893
5%, 50% and 95% Quantiles of priceimpact t
priceimpact0 . 0949 priceimpact0 . 6464 priceimpact0 . 9477
t  50 . 0496 .0796 .1205 . 2805 .5195 .6953 . 8732 .9260 .9526
t  100 . 0323 .0602 .1206 . 1655 .3251 .6602 . 7543 .8804 .9457
t  1000 . 0003 .0022 .0137 . 0012 .0073 .0387 . 0034 .0181 .0839
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Each entry in Table 1.3 has three elements corresponding, respectively, to the 
5%, 50%, and 90% percentiles of the distributions of t  or ttpriceimpac . Say, 
the first entry means that if both investors have a relative risk aversion 
coefficient of 1 and if the LA-investor has an initial wealth share of 0.1, then 
after 50 years, the LA-investor's wealth shares will be lower than 0.0632, 
0.0993, or 0.1451 with probabilities of 5%, 50%, and 95%, respectively. These 
quantiles are obtained from simulations. I first use the algorithm described in 
Appendix 1 to solve the equilibrium price-dividend ratio function  f , the risk-
free rate function  fR  and the state transition function  , . For any given 
0 , I then simulate 5000N  economies. For each economy, I simulate a long 
time series  1tt  of 1000T  independent draws from the distribution 
described in equation (1). I then use the solved function  ,  to calculate the 
next-period state 1t  and use functions  f  and  fR  to calculate the 
conditional equity premium as well as the resulting price impact ttpriceimpac  
along the way. Finally I use the cross-sectional empirical distributions of t  
and ttpriceimpac  at a particular time in point t  to represent their population 
distributions. The quantiles of t  and ttpriceimpac  are therefore estimated 
from the 5,000 simulated sample paths at time t . In the following discussion, I 
focus on the 50% quantiles or the second element of each entry. 
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Figure 1.1 Survival and Price Impacts when 1 LAEZ EISEIS  
 
Figure 1.1 graphs the probability density functions (p.d.f.s) of the LA-investor's 
wealth shares ( t ) and his price impacts ( ttpriceimpac ) at times 
1000,100,50t   when both investors have a unit EIS, that is, when  
1 LAEZ EIZEIS . The p.d.f.s are estimated non-parametrically from 5000 
simulated data. At time 0, each investor has half of the aggregate wealth; that 
is, 5.00  . The preference parameters are 1 LAEZ RARA , 98.0 LAEZ  ,  
25.2  and 02.0LAb . The technology parameters are fixed at the values in 
Table 1.1. 
 
Table 1.3 delivers two important messages. First, both t  and ttpriceimpac  
  36
decrease over time. For instance, in Panel A, if each investor initially has half 
of the total wealth at time 0, then on a typical sample path, which is the sample 
path that delivers the median of t , the LA-investor's wealth share shrinks to 
0.45 over the first 50 years and further to 0.13 over the first 1,000. Along the 
way, his price impact gradually declines from 0.23 to 0.19 in year 50 and then 
to 0.03 in year 1000. Figure 1.1 graphically depicts the dynamics of the whole 
simulated probability density functions (p.d.f.s) of the LA-investor's wealth 
shares (the left panel) and his price impacts (the right panel) for the case of 
5.00   and 1 LAEZ RARA . The p.d.f.s are estimated nonparametrically from 
the simulation data in Table 1.3. As time passes, all p.d.f.s shift to the left, 
illustrating how the LA-investor's wealth shares and thus his impact on asset 
prices decrease over time with high probability. 
 
The intuition is straightforward. The rate at which investors' wealth grows 
depends on how close their preferences are to the log utility. In panel A of 
Table 1.3, the EZ-investor is the log investor, while in Panel B, she is more risk 
averse than the log investor. As for the LA-investor, loss aversion adds one 
more layer of risk aversion toward the stock over and above the conventional 
risk aversion shared by the EZ-investor, which causes him to mimic an 
investor who is more risk averse, and hence further from log utility, than the 
EZ-investor. Therefore, the LA-investor vanishes in the long run, and, as a 
result, so does his price impact. 
 
Basically, the above argument relies on two elements: (i) both investors are at 
least as risk averse as a log investor; (ii) the LA-investor behaves in a way so 
that he is more risk averse than the EZ-investor. Both elements are empirically 
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plausible. On the one hand, the literature suggests that it is unlikely that real 
investors are less risk averse than log utility because these investors are 
subject to the St. Petersburg paradox (Samuelson, 1977): they are willing to 
pay an infinite amount of money for a gamble offering zero with a probability 
arbitrarily close to one and paying finite amounts in each state of the world. On 
the other hand, empirical estimates or thought experiments suggest that 
investors are only mildly risk averse, which is why the equity premium puzzle 
literature was launched in the first place.11 The behavioral finance literature 
shows that once loss aversion is incorporated into an investor's preferences, 
the equity premium increases, suggesting that loss aversion alters the 
investor's risk attitude in a way that makes him more risk averse than the EZ-
investor. 
 
The second message conveyed by Table 1.3 regards the speed of the market 
selection process. In terms of wealth shares, the process is slow. For example, 
in all cases, after 50 years, on a typical sample path, the LA-investor loses 
less than 20% of his initial wealth share; even after 100 years, he still reserves 
more than half of his initial wealth share. 
 
However, the effectiveness of the market selection mechanism should be 
judged by how the price impacts and not the wealth shares of the LA-investor 
                                                 
11Kocherlakota (1996, p 52) summarizes that the empirical plausible range of 
the relative risk aversion coefficient is between 0 and 10 by stating that a vast 
majority of economists believe that values for [the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion] above ten (or, for that matter, above five) imply highly implausible 
behavior on the part of individuals. 
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change over time, as what one really cares about is whether the behavior of 
asset prices can largely be captured by models without the LA-investor. 
Although wealth shares and price impacts are closely related in the long run, 
their dynamics might be very different in the short run. As a result, the slow 
declining speed of the LA-investor's wealth share does not mean that the 
market selection mechanism is not effective in eliminating his pricing impacts. 
There are at least two forces that break down the link, and both forces are 
related to the shape of function  tpriceimpac , which, as defined by equation 
(31), associates wealth shares with price impacts. First, it is possible that only 
a small amount of wealth controlled by the EZ-investor is needed to arbitrage 
away a large fraction of the LA-investor's impact on asset prices. This will be 
true when a large part of function  tpriceimpac  is flat. Second, it is likely that a 
small drop in wealth shares leads to a large drop in price impact. This will be 
true when  tpriceimpac  is convex at large wealth shares and concave at 
small wealth shares. 
 
It turns out the effectiveness of the market selection mechanism in terms of 
price impacts varies among risk aversions of the EZ-investor. For instance, 
when each investor has half of the total wealth ( 5.00  ), if the EZ-investor is 
only mildly risk averse ( 1EZRA ), then the LA-investor's price impact is only 
0.23 ( 23.00 tpriceimpac ), but if the EZ-investor has greater risk aversion 
( 3EZRA ), the LA-investor's price impact rises to 0.65 ( 65.00 tpriceimpac ). 
The dynamics of the pricing impact have a similar pattern. Take 9.00  , for 
example. In Panel A of Table 1.3, on a typical sample path, after 100 years, 
the LA-investor's price impact loses half of its initial value and falls from 0.92 
to 0.46. However, in Panel B, when the EZ-investor becomes more risk averse, 
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the LA-investor's price impact drops by less than 10% for the first 100 years.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Price-Impact Function and Investment Policy when  
1 LAEZ EISEIS   
 
Figure 1.2 graphs the price-impact function as defined by equation (31) the 
LA-investor's investment policy function  LAs  when both investors have a unit 
EIS, that is, when 1 LAEZ EIZEIS . Both investors have a common relative 
risk aversion coefficient, which can be either 1 (the solid line) or 3 (the dashed 
line). The other preference parameters are 98.0 LAEZ  , 25.2  and  
02.0LAb . The technology parameters are fixed at the values in Table 1.1. 
 
To understand this result, Figure 1.2 displays the function of  tpriceimpac  in 
the left panel and the LA-investor's investment policy function  LAs  in the right 
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panel for the same preference and technology parameters as adopted by 
Table 1.3. Both functions are increasing in t : as the wealth controlled by the 
LA-investor increases, so do the amount of stock he buys and his price impact. 
Moreover, both functions, in particular, function  tpriceimpac , increase with 
EZRA . As a result, for the same level of t , the price impact of the LA-investor 
is larger when the EZ-investor is more risk averse. This is because a higher 
risk aversion makes the EZ-investor less aggressive in her trading against the 
LA-investor. 
 
The price-impact function  tpriceimpac  has a kink in the middle. Below the 
kink, the function is convex, while above the kink, the function is concave. A 
decline in t  leads to the largest drop of ttpriceimpac  at the kink. Comparing 
Panel (a) with Panel (b), it can be seen that the location of the kink is 
determined by the level of the wealth share at which the LA-investor starts to 
buy the stock. Specifically, because there is a kink in the utility function of the 
LA-investor, he will allocate nothing to the stock if the expected stock returns 
are not high enough. If the LA-investor stays out of the stock market, the 
equity premium is determined by the Euler equations of the EZ-investor, and, 
as a result, it is close to that found in a representative-agent economy 
populated only by EZ-investors, which explains the convexity part of the price-
impact function. Once the LA-investor starts to buy the stock, his Euler 
equations start to determine the equity premium and affect the curvature of the 
price-impact function. Note that the location of the kink approaches 1 as the 
EZ-investor becomes less risk averse. This means if the LA-investor's price 
impact is initially very high, large drops of ttpriceimpac , which occur around 
the kink, come sooner for a smaller EZRA . 
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To summarize, for the unit EIS case, if the LA-investor differs from the EZ-
investor only in terms of loss aversion utility, that is, except for 0LAb  and  
0EZb , the other preference parameters are identical across investors, then 
the LA-investor vanishes in the long run. In addition, the market selection 
mechanism is more efficient when the EZ-investor is more risk tolerant. In the 
following analysis, I will focus only on the dynamics of wealth shares, as the 
relationship between the wealth share dynamics and the pricing impact 
dynamics obtained in this subsection is largely reserved in the case of a non-
unit EIS. 
 
1.4.3 EIS ̸  1: Saving Behavior 
The analysis in Subsection 1.4.1 suggests that when EIS is not equal to 1, 
loss aversion can change the investor's saving behavior, which might affect 
the investor's wealth accumulation and survival prospects. In this subsection, I 
investigate this possibility in the heterogeneous-agent economy. Again, I 
assume that the preferences of both investors are identical except that 0LAb   
and 0EZb . 
 
When 1 LAEZ EISEIS , the intuition in the representative-agent economies 
implies that the LA-investor consumes more than the EZ-investor, which hurts 
his survival prospects. Because the previous subsection shows that in the 
absence of different saving behaviors, the LA-investor already loses to the EZ-
investor; then, this extra force coming from saving should cause the LA-
investor to vanish at a faster speed. This is indeed the case, as verified by 
Figure 1.3, which plots the distributions of t  in years 50, 100, and 1000, for 
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the case of 5.1 LAEZ EISEIS , when each investor has half of the total wealth 
at time 0. The distributions are obtained in the same way as in Figure 1.1, and 
the technology parameters are fixed at the values in Table 1.1, while the other 
preference parameters are 98.0 LAEZ  ,  1 LAEZ RARA  , 25.2  and  
02.0LAb . Indeed, the p.d.f.s of t  shift to the left as time passes, suggesting 
that the LA-investor is losing his wealth share and price impact over time.  
 
Figure 1.3 Survival and Price Impacts when  5.1 LAEZ EISEIS   
Figure 1.3 graphs the probability density functions (p.d.f.s) of the LA-investor's 
wealth shares ( t ) at times 1000,100,50t  when 5.1 LAEZ EIZEIS . The 
p.d.f.s are estimated non-parametrically from 5000 simulated data. At time 0, 
each investor has half of the aggregate wealth; that is, 5.00  . The 
preference parameters are 1 LAEZ RARA ,  98.0 LAEZ  , 25.2  and  
02.0LAb . The technology parameters are fixed at the values from Table 1.1. 
  43
 
When  1 LAEZ EISEIS  , the analysis in Subsection 1.4.1 suggests that the 
LA-investor saves more than the EZ-investor and thus favors his survival. As a 
result, two forces are at play here: portfolio decisions are against the LA-
investor's wealth accumulation, while consumption decisions benefit it. It thus 
becomes nontrivial to explore whether the saving force is strong enough to 
reverse the result in the previous subsection. Table 1.4 presents the 
distributions of  t   and  ttpriceimpac   for the case of  5.0 LAEZ EISEIS  . 
The other parameter values are identical to those used in Table 1.3. Again, 
Panel A has a relative risk-aversion coefficient of 1, while Panel B has a 
relative risk-aversion coefficient of 3. Comparing Table 1.4 with Table 1.3, one 
can find that the results are almost identical, implying that in calibrated 
economies, the difference in saving behaviors induced by a small EIS is not 
large enough to help the LA-investor survive in the long run. 
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Table 1.4: Survival and Price Impacts:  5.0EIS   
Table 1.4 reports the distributions of the LA-investor's wealth shares ( t ) and 
his price impacts ( ttpriceimpac ) at times 50t , 100 , and 1000  years when the 
LA-investor has initial wealth shares of 1.00  , 5.0 , and 9.0  and both 
investors have a relative risk aversion coefficient of 1 (Panel A) or 3 (panel B). 
Both investors have an EIS of 5.0 : 5.0 LAEZ EISEIS . The other preference 
parameters are 98.0 LAEZ  , 25.2  and 02.0LAb . The technology 
parameters are fixed at the values in Table 1.1.  Each entry in Table 1.4 has 
three elements, corresponding, respectively, to the 5%, 50%, and 90% 
percentiles of the distributions of t  or ttpriceimpac . The quantiles are 
estimated from the 5000 simulated sample paths at time t . 
Panel A: RAEZ  RALA  1 (EZ  LA  0)
5%, 50% and 95% Quantiles of  t
0  0.1 0  0.5 0  0.9
t  50 . 0645 .0942 .1479 . 3153 .4572 .6899 . 6380 .8726 .9708
t  100 . 0503 .0988 .1802 . 2425 .4413 .7732 . 4859 .8585 .9844
t  1000 . 0096 .0636 .3630 . 0375 .2037 .9159 . 0663 .3528 .9987
5%, 50% and 95% Quantiles of priceimpact t
priceimpact0 . 0314 priceimpact0 . 2628 priceimpact0 . 7364
t  50 . 0195 .0293 .0488 . 1266 .2246 .5017 . 4236 .6982 .8866
t  100 . 0150 .0309 .0615 . 0889 .2115 .6143 . 2497 .6815 .9305
t  1000 . 0028 .0192 .1554 . 0111 .0714 .7628 . 0201 .1489 .9913
Panel B: RAEZ  RALA  3 (EZ  LA  −2)
5%, 50% and 95% Quantiles of  t
0  0.1 0  0.5 0  0.9
t  50 . 0576 .0902 .1314 . 3466 .4692 .5715 . 8387 .8899 .9207
t  100 . 0432 .0782 .1415 . 2718 .4271 .5907 . 7938 .8746 .9257
t  1000 . 0011 .0072 .0437 . 0063 .0370 .2189 . 0445 .2752 .7487
5%, 50% and 95% Quantiles of priceimpact t
priceimpact0 . 1096 priceimpact0 . 5197 priceimpact0 . 8985
t  50 . 0612 .0981 .1475 . 3762 .4912 .5855 . 8378 .8884 .9193
t  100 . 0453 .0843 .1601 . 3030 .4522 .6031 . 7941 .8731 .9243
t  1000 . 0011 .0074 .0458 . 0064 .0387 .2492 . 0467 .3064 .7508
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To better understand the effect of savings, Figure 1.4 plots the consumption 
policies for both investors in its left panel for the parameter configuration of 
Panel A of Table 1.4. Figure 1.4 also plots the equilibrium risk-free rate 
function in its right panel because, as suggested by the analysis in Subsection 
1.4.1, the risk-free rate is the LA-investor's favored asset and thus largely 
determines his future utility. Two notable observations emerge. First, the 
difference in the endogenous saving ratios of the two investors is small. The 
maximum difference is 64 basis points, which is achieved when the LA-
investor controls the total wealth. This small magnitude of the difference in 
saving ratios partly accounts for its difficulty in overcoming the disadvantage 
coming from the portfolio positions of the LA-investor in terms of wealth 
accumulation. The second observation is that as the LA-investor's wealth 
share decreases, so does the difference in the saving ratios of the two 
investors. This further weakens the effect of the saving difference on changing 
the LA-investor's survival prospect, as once his wealth-eroding investment 
positions start to reduce his wealth share, he also saves less, making his 
situation even worse in terms of wealth accumulation. The reason underlying 
the second observation is the following. As  t   decreases, the EZ-investor 
controls more wealth, and because she saves less relative to the LA-investor, 
the risk-free rate increases, which in turn raises the LA-investor's future 
income because he tends to invest in the risk-free rate and, as a result of 
anticipating this rise in the permanent income, he consumes more. 
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Figure 1.4 Consumption Policy and Risk-Free Rate when 5.0 LAEZ EISEIS   
 
Figure 1.4 displays the consumption policies for both investors and the 
equilibrium risk-free rate function when both investors have a common small 
EIS, that is, when 5.0 LAEZ EIZEIS . The preference parameters are 
1 LAEZ RARA ,  98.0 LAEZ  , 25.2  and  02.0LAb . The technology 
parameters are fixed at the values in Table 1.1. 
 
One might think that an increase in the relative importance of loss-aversion 
utility in the LA-investor's preference might change the LA-investor's survival 
prospects, as the difference in investors' saving ratios increases with LAb , as 
suggested by the results in the representative-agent economies. To address 
this concern, Figure 1.5 depicts the dynamics of the distributions of  t   in 
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Panel (a), as well as the consumption policies of both investors in Panel (b), 
for an economy that is otherwise identical to the one in Panel A of Table 1.3 
except with a larger value of LAb  ( 2.0LAb ). To increase the chance of the LA-
investor's survival, Panel (a) assumes that the LA-investor has %90  of the total 
wealth at time 0. Panel (b) indeed shows that the increase in LAb  enlarges the 
difference in the two investors' saving behavior, with a maximum of 3.5 
percent achieved at 1t . However, Panel (a) suggests that the LA-investor 
still vanishes in the long run, as the p.d.f.s shift to the left as time passes. This 
occurs for two reasons. First, the increase in LAb also aggravates the 
disadvantage of the LA-investor in his portfolio positions, as he is now more 
risk averse and deviates more from the log utility than the EZ-investor. Second, 
although the maximum difference in saving ratios is impressive, this difference 
shrinks sharply, as the LA-investor loses wealth over time. Instead of raising 
LAb , another possibility for the LA-investor to beat the EZ-investor is to 
decrease EIS or to increase  , the parameter that determines the LA-
investor's sensitivity to losses. Actually, this does not work for the same 
reason as in the case of raising LAb . To save space, such an analysis is not 
reported here. 
 
In sum, if the LA-investor differs from the EZ-investor only in a way such that 
he derives loss-aversion utility, then for empirically relevant parameter values, 
he will lose his wealth share in the long run, and his price impacts diminish 
along the way. 
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Figure 1.5 Survival and Consumption Policies when 2.0LAb  and  
5.0 LAEZ EISEIS   
 
 
Figure 1.5 depicts the probability density functions (p.d.f.s) of the LA-investor's 
wealth shares ( t ) at times 1000,100,50t , as well as the consumption 
policies of both investors when  2.0LAb  and 5.0 LAEZ EISEIS . The other 
preference parameters are 1 LAEZ RARA , 98.0 LAEZ   and 25.2 . The 
technology parameters are fixed at the values in Table 1.1. The p.d.f.s are 
estimated non-parametrically from 5000 simulated data. At time 0, the LA-
investor has a wealth share of 90%; that is, 9.00  . 
 
1.5 Multi-Dimensional Heterogeneity in Preferences 
So far, my analysis has assumed that the LA-investor and the EZ-investor are 
different only in one dimension: the LA-investor derives loss-aversion utility, 
while the EZ-investor does not. However, it is highly likely that they are also 
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different in other dimensions. This raises the question of how robust the result 
that the LA-investor vanishes in calibrated economies is to the introduction of 
additional differences in the investors' preferences. 
 
Before examining the effect of the multi-dimensional heterogeneity of 
preferences on survival, I briefly discuss what kind of heterogeneity might be 
plausible in reality. In principle, on top of loss-aversion utility, investors can be 
different in the following three dimensions: risk aversion (parameter ), EIS 
(parameter  ), and time preference (parameter  ). As discussed in the 
previous section, risk aversion might not be a good candidate, as the very 
reason why the literature introduces loss aversion is to increase the LA-
investor's risk aversion, which serves to generate a high equity premium. 
Therefore, to make the analysis empirically relevant, any perturbation of the 
risk-aversion parameter     should not reverse the order of the investors' risk 
attitude and would not change the survival prospects of the LA-investor. 
However, in the existing literature, researchers have not reached a consensus 
regarding the reasonable value for the EIS or the time discount rate. Some 
studies estimate the EIS to be well above 1 (e.g., Hansen and Singleton, 1982; 
Attanasio and Weber, 1989; Guvenen, 2001; Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002), while 
others estimate it to be well below 1 (e.g., Hall, 1988; Epstein and Zin, 1991; 
Campbell, 1999). Similarly, the calibrations of the time-patience parameter   
are widely dispersed, ranging from 0.89 (Campbell and Cochrane, 1999) to 1.1 
(Brennan and Xia, 2001). Therefore, in the following, I investigate the effect of 
a differing EIS or a differing time-patience factor on the LA-investor's survival. 
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1.5.1 Different EIS Parameters 
To set the deck against the EZ-investor, I need to assume that the LA-investor 
has a larger EIS than the EZ-investor, so that he would save more than the 
EZ-investor in a growing economy. Specifically, I set 5.0EZEIS , and vary 
LAEIS  to see when the LA-investor will survive for an economy with the 
technology parameters fixed at the values in Table 1.1 and the other 
preference parameters fixed at 98.0 LAEZ  , 1 LAEZ RARA , 25.2  and 
02.0LAb . It turns out that when 7.0LAEIS , the LA-investor starts to 
dominate the economy. The result is driven by the different saving behaviors 
induced by the different EIS. Figure 1.6 displays the dynamics of t  in Panel 
(a) and the consumption policies in Panel (b) assuming that 5.00  . Panel (a) 
shows that the p.d.f.s shift to the right as time passes, suggesting that the LA-
investor tends to dominate the market in the long run. Panel (b) shows that the 
difference in the consumption ratios does not drop much when t  declines 
from intermediate levels of t , because when t  decreases, the EZ-investor 
consumes more as a result of a strong income effect of the raised risk-free 
rate. Therefore, when the wealth share of the LA-investor declines due to his 
portfolio decisions, his advantage in terms of saving behavior will help him. 
 
I have also tried other perturbations, and the result is qualitatively similar, 
although if I start from a larger value of EZEIS , a larger difference between 
LAEIS  and EZEIS  is needed to make the LA-investor survive in the long run. 
For instance, when the EZ-investor has an EIS of 8.0 , the critical level for  
LAEIS  increases to 5.1 . This is because when EZEIS  is large, the EZ-investor's 
saving rate has already been very high in a growing economy, leaving very 
little room for the LA-investor to improve. Whether the differences in investors' 
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EIS parameters are reasonable is an empirical issue and is subjective. The 
point of the present paper is to provide a framework that can be used to 
analyze under what conditions the LA-investor survives and his pricing impact 
persists. 
 
 
Figure 1.6 Survival and Consumption Policies when LAEZ EISEIS    
( 5.0EZEIS  and 7.0LAEIS ) 
 
Figure 1.6 depicts the probability density functions (p.d.f.s) of the LA-investor's 
wealth shares ( t ) at times 1000,100,50t , as well as the consumption 
policies of both investors when  5.0EZEIS  and 7.0LAEIS . The other 
preference parameters are 1 LAEZ RARA ,  98.0 LAEZ  , 25.2  and  
02.0LAb . The technology parameters are fixed at the values in Table 1.1. 
The p.d.f.s are estimated non-parametrically from 5000 simulated data. At time 
0, each investor has half of the aggregate wealth; that is, 5.00  . 
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1.5.2 Different Time Patience Parameter    
I conduct a similar exercise as in examining the effect of different EIS 
parameters. Specifically, I set 98.0LA  and vary EZ  to examine when the 
LA-investor dominates the market in the long run. The survival result is very 
sensitive to the time discount rate: a slight difference in   as small as two 
percent can overturn the effect of the LA-investor's portfolio decisions on his 
survival prospects. To illustrate this sensitivity, I set 5.1 LAEZ EISEIS , which 
means that the deck is set against the LA-investor, as he would consume 
more than the EZ-investor if they had a common  . Other preference 
parameters are fixed at 1 LAEZ RARA , 25.2  and 02.0LAb , and the 
technology parameters are fixed at the values in Table 1.1. The result is robust 
to different relative risk aversions. Figure 1.7 depicts the dynamics of the 
distributions of t  and investors' consumption propensities when the LA-
investor has half of the total wealth at time 0. Panel (a) shows that, as time 
passes, the p.d.f.s of t  shift to the right, suggesting that the LA-investor is 
accumulating wealth at a faster rate than the EZ-investor. Panel (b) displays 
the large difference in the endogenous saving ratios induced by the time-
patience parameter. The minimum of this difference is %88.1 , and the 
maximum is %86.2 . These large magnitudes account for the LA-investor's 
eventual prosperity. 
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Figure 1.7 Survival and Consumption Policies when LAEZ     
( 96.0EZ  and 98.0LA ) 
 
 
 
Figure 1.7 depicts the probability density functions (p.d.f.s) of the LA-investor's 
wealth shares ( t ) at times  1000,100,50t  , as well as the consumption 
policies of both investors when  96.0EZ  and 98.0LA  . The other 
preference parameters are 5.1 LAEZ EISEIS , 1 LAEZ RARA , 25.2  and 
02.0LAb . The technology parameters are fixed at the values in Table 1.1. 
The p.d.f.s are estimated non-parametrically from 5000 simulated data. At time 
0, each investor has half of the aggregate wealth; that is, 5.00  . 
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1.6 Conclusion  
This paper studies the survival and price impact of loss-averse investors in a 
financial economy in which arbitrageurs have Epstein-Zin preferences. I obtain 
two main results. First, if the LA-investor differs from the EZ-investor only in 
the way of deriving loss-aversion utility, then the LA-investor will be driven out 
of the market and thus will have no effect on long-run asset prices for an 
empirically relevant range of parameters. This result is driven by the distorted 
portfolio decisions induced by loss aversion, which makes the LA-investor act 
in a way that is more different from the log investor than the EZ-investor. 
Second, once additional heterogeneity is recognized in investors' preferences, 
for example, when they are heterogeneous with respect to their EIS parameter 
or time-patience factors, then the first result can be easily overturned by the 
different equilibrium saving behaviors induced by this new heterogeneity. 
Therefore, my paper provides a framework with which to quantify the effect of 
heterogeneous preferences on asset prices and the long-run wealth of 
investors in a dynamic financial market. 
 
This research does not end the discussion, however. Several open questions 
remain. First, this paper has assumed a complete market structure. The 
survival result might be very different in an incomplete market, as suggested 
by the existing literature (e.g., Blume and Easley, 2006; Cao, 2009). It would 
thus be interesting to compute how market incompleteness would change the 
results. Second, this paper focuses only on the loss-aversion feature of 
prospect theory and ignores its two other features, namely, diminishing 
sensitivity and probability weighting. The literature has shown that both 
features help to explain certain financial phenomena. For example, Li and 
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Yang (2008) show that diminishing sensitivity can generate price momentum, 
while Barberis and Huang (2008) argue that probability weighting leads to the 
overpricing of positively skewed securities. It would also be interesting to 
examine the survival and price impacts of an investor whose preference has 
all three features of prospect theory. Third, the loss-averse investors are 
homogeneous in my model. It is likely that even loss-averse investors are 
heterogeneous in a number of ways: in the degree of sensitivity to losses 
(parameter ), in the relative importance of loss aversion utility in their 
preferences (parameter b )12 or in the reference levels that determine their 
gains/losses. I leave all these interesting questions for future research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12In fact, the difference between the LA-investor and the EZ-investor in my 
model can be viewed as an extreme case of differing b : 0EZb  and 0LAb . 
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APPENDIX 
 
This appendix sketches the procedure used to numerically solve the model in 
Chapter 1. I focus on the non-unit EIS case ( 0i ), and the solution 
procedure for the unit EIS case is slightly different. The algorithm is developed 
based on Kubler and Schmedders (2003) and is summarized as follows: 
 
Step 0: Define a finite grid on [0,1]. Choose two continuous functions,   0EZ   
and   0LA , as initials for the investors' consumption policy functions. These 
initials define the initial for the price-dividend ratio function,  0f , through 
equation (22). Then on each grid point t , go through steps 1-4. 
 
Step 1: Given functions   nEZ   and   nLA  , suppose that the LA-investor 
allocates nothing on the stock; that is,      01  tnLAs  . Then use both investors' 
value functions, equation (13), the EZ-investor's first-order equation, (17), the 
state transition functions, and equation (27), to solve five unknowns:  tEZ ,  ,  

tLA,  , tfR ,  , Ht ,1 , Lt ,1 , where Ht ,1  and Lt ,1  are the next-period wealth 
shares when Ht  1  and L , respectively. 
 
Step 2: Plug the solved   tLA,  , tfR ,  ,  Ht ,1   and  Lt ,1   into equations (14) 
and (15) to get  ,LAFOC  and  ,LAFOC . If  0, LAFOC   and  0, LAFOC , then 
set      tEZtnEZ ,1    and      tLAtnLA ,1  . If  0, LAFOC , then go to Step 3; 
otherwise, go to Step 4. 
 
Step 3: Use both investors' value functions, equation (13), the EZ-investor's 
first-order equation, (17), the LA-investor's first-order condition for a positive 
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investment, equation (14), the state transition functions, and equation (27), to 
solve six unknowns:   tEZ ,  ,   tLA,  , tfR , , Ht ,1 , Lt ,1 ,  tLAs , . Set  
    tEZtnEZ ,1   and      tLAtnLA ,1  . 
 
Step 4: Use both investors' value functions, equation (13), the EZ-investor's 
first-order equation, (17), the LA-investor's first-order condition for a negative 
investment, equation (15), the state transition functions, equation (27), to solve 
six unknowns:   tEZ , ,  tLA, , tfR , , Ht ,1 , Lt ,1 ,  tLAs , . Set     tEZtnEZ ,1   and  
    tLAtnLA ,1  . 
 
Step 5: Check whether the following stop criterion is satisfied: 
              ,,,,,max 111    nnLAnEZnnLAnEZ fft  
 
where     is an error tolerance. If yes, then the algorithm terminates, and the 
next step is to set the consumption and investment policy functions and risk-
free rate function as those solved in the last round. Otherwise, increase  n   by 
1 and go to Step 1. 
 
In the implementation of the algorithm, I divide   1,0   into 150 grid points and 
set the tolerance level at 710 . Kubler and Schmedders (2003) provide a 
method to assess the accuracy of a candidate solution by computing the 
maximal relative error in Euler equations. In my computations, the maximum 
errors lie below 610 , suggesting that the algorithm produces reasonably 
accurate solutions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PROSPECT THEORY, THE DISPOSITION EFFECT AND ASSET PRICES13 
 
2.1 Introduction  
One of the mostly studied individual trading behaviors is the disposition effect: 
investors have a greater tendency to sell assets that have risen in value since 
purchase than those that have fallen.14 This effect has been observed in many 
markets, both for retail investors and for professional investors.15 It is puzzling 
because none of the most obvious rational explanations, such as portfolio 
rebalancing or information story, can entirely account for the disposition effect 
(Odean, 1998). As a result, an alternative view based on prospect theory has 
gained favor. 
                                                 
13This chapter is based on a joint paper with Yan Li.  
 
14Shefrin and Statman (1985) coined the term the disposition effect. This effect 
is puzzling because the purchase price of a stock should not matter much for 
an investor's decision to sell it. In addition, tax laws encourage investors to sell 
losers rather than winners to reduce taxes. In a careful further study, Odean 
(1998) finds that the most obvious explanations, namely those based on 
information, taxes, rebalancing, or transaction costs, fail to capture important 
features of the data. 
 
15Odean (1998), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), and Feng and Seasholes 
(2005) find disposition effects in the stock markets of the U.S., Finland, and 
China, respectively. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), Shapira and Veneezia 
(2001), Werners (2003), Garvey and Murphy (2004), Coval and Shumway 
(2005), Locke and Mann (2005), Frazzini (2006), and Scherbina and Jin (2006) 
document the disposition effect in the trading of professionals who trade on 
behalf of their firms; Genesove and Mayor (2001) and Heath et al. (1999) 
document disposition effects in the housing market and in the exercise of 
executive stock options, respectively. Webber and Camerer (1998) and Oehler 
et al. (2002) uncover disposition effects with experimental data. See Feng and 
Seasholes' (2005) Appendix A for more empirical studies on the disposition 
effect. 
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The literature has produced both informal arguments (e.g., Odean, 1998) and 
formal models (Kyle et al., 2006; Hens and Vlcek, 2006; Barberis and Xiong, 
2009), relying on prospect theory to explain the disposition effect. As a 
prominent theory of decision-making under risk, prospect theory was first 
proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and extended by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992). A prospect theory investor evaluates gambles through 
gains and losses, not final wealth levels. The value function used by the 
investor to process gains and losses has a kink in the origin, indicating that 
investors are more sensitive to losses than to gains; this feature is referred to 
as loss aversion in the literature. Moreover, the value function is concave for 
gains and convex for losses, meaning that the investor is risk averse for gains 
and risk-loving for losses, which is known as diminishing sensitivity.16 
 
Aside from using prospect theory to study the underlying cause of the 
disposition effect, recent empirical studies suggest that the disposition effect 
has pricing and volume implications: it can generate momentum in stock 
returns (Grinblatt and Han, 2005; Shumway and Wu, 2007), induce post-
earnings announcement drift (Frazzini, 2006), and contribute to a positive 
correlation between returns and volumes (e.g., Statman et al., 2006). 
 
While existing studies have offered many insightful understandings on the link 
                                                 
16For a review of prospect theory, see Barberis and Thaler's (2003) Section 
3.2.1 or Barberis and Huang's (2008) Section 2. Another salient feature of 
prospect theory is probability weighting: the investor overweights small 
probabilities and underweights intermediate probabilities in computing the 
expectation. We don't incorporate this feature in our model due to the reasons 
discussed in Section 2.2. 
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from prospect theory to the disposition effect, and on the link from the 
disposition effect to return and volume patterns, they have almost always 
investigated these two links separately. On the one hand, the partial 
equilibrium models proposed by Kyle et al. (2006), Hens and Vlcek (2006) or 
Barberis and Xiong (2009) assume an exogenous stock return process, and 
are therefore silent about the pricing and volume implications of the disposition 
effect. On the other hand, Grinblatt and Han's (2005) theoretical model shows 
that the disposition effect can lead to price momentum, but it begins with a 
demand function featuring the disposition effect without exploring whether 
such a demand function can indeed be generated from prospect theory 
preferences. In particular, Barberis and Xiong (2009)'s partial equilibrium 
results suggest that when the expected stock return is high, the disposition 
effect leads to a reversed disposition effect, implying a reversal in stock 
returns and a negative correlation between returns and volumes. The literature 
thus lacks a theoretical foundation to support the intuition from prospect theory 
to the disposition effect and the intuition from the disposition effect to price 
momentum or volume patterns. 
 
Without such a general equilibrium model, the following questions are thus left 
unanswered: Whether the intuitions emphasized in existing studies are 
coherent in a unified framework? Does prospect theory predict the disposition 
effect when stock returns are endogenous? Which component of prospect 
theory drives the momentum, and which drives the reversal? In a calibrated 
economy, how much can prospect theory explain the data? The challenges of 
proposing such a general equilibrium model come from: (i) an investor's 
decision involves solving an optimal stopping time problem with a non-smooth 
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and partially convex objective function, and (ii) the state vector in the general 
equilibrium model is high-dimensional, including the distribution of stock 
holdings and purchase prices (i.e., the reference points) for all investors in 
every possible state of nature. 
 
In this paper, we develop an overlapping-generation (OLG) model to simplify 
an investor's optimal stopping time problem and to reduce the dimensions of 
the state vector, making it possible to simultaneously study the link between 
prospect theory and the disposition effect, as well as the impact of this effect 
on stock prices. In our model, over their lifetimes, investors can trade stocks 
and a risk-free asset in the financial market, and, at the end of their final 
periods, receive prospect theory utility based on their trading profits. The 
behavior of those investors who bought stocks in previous periods can 
potentially exhibit the disposition effect. Our model shows that different 
components of prospect theory make different predictions regarding trading 
behavior, return predictability and volume patterns. 
 
Specifically, the diminishing sensitivity component, which posits that investors 
are risk averse (risk-loving) for gains (losses), or that the value function is 
concave (convex) in the gain (loss) domain, predicts the disposition effect in 
equilibrium, which in turn drives price momentum and a positive correlation 
between returns and volumes (See Subsection 2.4.2).17 However, the loss 
aversion component, which says that investors are more sensitive to losses 
                                                 
17Throughout this paper, we follow the literature in using the terms diminishing 
sensitivity and concavity/convexity interchangeably to refer to the S-shaped 
value function of prospect theory. 
 
  68
than to gains, or that the value function has a kink at the origin, predicts 
exactly the opposite, namely, a reversed disposition effect in individual trading, 
reversal in the cross-section of stock returns and a negative correlation 
between returns and volumes (See Subsection 2.4.3). In a calibrated economy, 
when preference parameters are set at the values estimated by the previous 
studies, the concavity/convexity feature of prospect theory value function 
dominates, so that our model can generate an annual momentum of up to %7  
(See Subsection 2.4.4). 
 
The intuition for the implications of diminishing sensitivity is as follows. When a 
stock experiences good news and increases in value relative to the purchase 
price, these investors will be keen to sell it to lock in the paper gain, due to the 
concavity of the value function of prospect theory in the region of gains. Their 
selling increases volume. The selling pressure, moreover, depresses the stock 
price, generating subsequent higher returns. Similarly, when a stock 
experiences bad news and decreases in value relative to the purchase price, 
these investors are facing capital losses, and they are reluctant to sell, absent 
a premium, because of the convexity in the region of losses. In this case, the 
volume dries up, and the price is inflated, giving rise to subsequent lower 
returns. In this way, our model proves the internal consistency of the existing 
informal arguments which link prospect theory to the disposition effect (e.g., 
Odean, 1998) and which rely on the disposition effect to explain the 
momentum effect (e.g., Grinblatt and Han, 2005) and the positive relationship 
between price changes and volume (e.g., Odean, 1998; Statman et al., 2006). 
 
What's the intuition for the implications of loss aversion? Loss aversion means 
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that prospect theory value function has a kink at the origin, and investors are 
afraid of holding stocks if they are close to the kink. It is well understood in the 
literature that loss aversion can raise equity premiums in equilibrium (e.g., 
Benartzi and Thaler, 1995; Barberis et al., 2001). So in equilibrium, good (bad) 
news will push investors far from (close to) the kink, making them more likely 
to hold (sell) stocks when facing gains (losses). This resulting reversed 
disposition effect, in turn, leads to a negative correlation between returns and 
volumes, as well as reversal in the cross-section of returns: when a stock 
experiences good (bad) news and increases (decreases) in value relative to 
the purchase price, investors, according to the reversed disposition effect, 
want to hold (sell) stocks, which reduces (raises) the trading volume and 
inflates (depresses) the stock price; from that higher (lower) base, subsequent 
stock returns will also be lower (higher). 
 
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to comprehensively study 
the implications of prospect theory for individual trading behavior, asset prices 
and trading volume in a dynamic setting. Previous research on the effect of 
prospect theory in the asset pricing literature has focused primarily on the loss 
aversion component and shown that it can increase the equity premium, i.e., 
the mean of stock returns in excess of the risk free rate (e.g., Barberis et al., 
2001).18 Our model demonstrates that loss aversion also has implications for 
return predictability and the correlation between returns and volumes. In 
addition, our paper shows that the S-shaped value function of prospect theory 
                                                 
18Recently, in a one period (two dates) model, Barberis and Huang (2008) 
show that the probability weighting feature of prospect theory can cause a 
security's individual skewness to be priced in equilibrium. 
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helps explain the disposition effect, the momentum effect and the comovement 
between stock returns and turnovers. Over and above these results, in 
Subsection 2.4.2, we argue that diminishing sensitivity alone, in the absence 
of loss aversion, can raise equity premiums. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the model, 
and Section 2.3 characterizes the equilibrium. Section 2.4 solves the price-
dividend ratios and uses simulated data to analyze the implications of 
diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion for individual trading behavior, asset 
prices and trading volumes. In particular, Subsection 2.4.4 conducts a 
quantitative analysis to evaluate how well our model matches the historical 
data. Section 2.5 concludes the paper. The appendix discusses the 
robustness of our results to certain modeling assumptions. 
 
2.2. The Model 
Let us consider an OLG model with one consumption good. Time is discrete 
and indexed by t . In each period, there are 3 generations (age-1, age-2 and 
age-3), each with a unitary mass. We adopt an OLG setup simply to reduce 
the dimension of the state vector. In the context of the disposition effect, the 
reference points usually relate to the purchase prices, which enter the state of 
the economy via the disposition effect, making the state history dependent. In 
an OLG setup, investors live for a finite period of time, so their purchase prices 
involve only a finite number of periods, effectively reducing the dimension of 
the state vector. The OLG setup should therefore not be interpreted literally. 
Generations should be understood as generations of transactions, not 
generations of people. Since the average holding periods of stocks are six 
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months to one year, one generation corresponds to six months to one year. 
Why are there three generations in each period? First, in order to study the 
disposition effect, which concerns selling decisions, we need at least three 
generations. In the standard two generation models, old investors always sell 
stocks whether facing good news or bad, thereby automatically ruling out the 
disposition effect. On the other hand, one model with more than two 
generations allows some investors to decide when to liquidate stocks which 
they bought in previous periods. Second, if there were more than three 
generations, the state vector would be highly dimensional, making the model 
intractable. In Appendix 2.A.2, we intuitively argue that our results might still 
hold in a setup with more than three generations. 
 
2.2.1 Financial Assets 
There are two traded assets: a risk-free bond and a risky stock. The bond is in 
perfectly elastic supply at a constant gross interest rate 1fR . The stock pays 
a random dividend 0tD  in period t . The dividend growth rate ttDDt 11   is 
i.i.d. over time, and follows a distribution given by 
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The stock is in limited supply (normalized as 1) and is traded in a competitive 
market at price tP . Let 1tR  be the gross return on the stock between time  t   
and 1t , i.e., 
t
tt
P
DP
tR 111 

  . 
Investors can buy or short bonds at any level, but they can not short stocks, 
and if they buy stocks, they can hold exactly 1  unit in each period. We assume 
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that people hold either zero or one unit of stock for several reasons. First, this 
specification is realistic in the sense that the lower (upper) bound of the 
holding position captures the shorting (borrowing) constraints in stock trading. 
Second, the assumption that people buy at most one unit of stock at one time 
captures the idea that they tend to form different mental accounts for the same 
stock bought at different prices. Third, a binary choice in stock holdings 
simplifies an investor's decisions, because otherwise it is very difficult to 
characterize the investor's demand function due to the convexity of the 
Kahneman and Tversky (1992) value function in the loss domain. Finally, a 
binary choice and an OLG setup combine to reduce the complicated optimal 
stopping problem of an age-2 investor owning a stock to a simple problem of 
choosing between an early liquidation and a late liquidation. 
 
2.2.2 Beliefs 
In order to study the impact of the disposition effect on trading volumes, we 
make two assumptions on investors' beliefs. First, investors hold 
heterogeneous beliefs about the dividend growth rate within one period. Due 
to this cross-sectional heterogeneity in beliefs, investors, in particular young 
investors, will make different investment decisions: more optimistic investors 
will purchase a stock, while more pessimistic investors will not. Second, an 
investor's one-period-ahead dividend forecast changes during his lifetime. The 
time-variation in an investor's belief will motivate the selling of a middle-aged 
investor who purchased the stock when he was young. With these two 
assumptions, we ensure that in each period, there is always a group of middle-
aged investors who bought stocks last period and want to sell them this period. 
It is this group of investors that can potentially exhibit a disposition effect. Of 
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course, these two assumptions are just a modelling device, and any other 
trading motives, such as liquidity shocks (e.g., Kaustia, 2008), can also serve 
the same purpose. 
 
As a matter of fact, in the informal arguments that have been used to link 
prospect theory and the disposition effect, investors are often assumed to 
experience belief changes, i.e., time-variation in an investor's beliefs is often 
maintained as the following quotation from Odean (1998, p. 1777) illustrates. 
 
(S)uppose an investor purchases a stock that she believes to have an 
expected return high enough to justify its risk. If the stock appreciates and the 
investor continues to use the purchase price as a reference point, the stock 
price will then be in a more concave, more risk-averse, part of the investor's 
value function. It may be that the stock's expected return continues to justify its 
risk. However, if the investor somewhat lowers her expectation of the stock's 
return, she will be likely to sell the stock. What if, instead of appreciating, the 
stock declines? Then its price is in the convex, risk-seeking, part of the value 
function. Here the investor will continue to hold the stock even if its expected 
return falls lower than would have been necessary for her to justify its original 
purchase. Thus the investor's belief about expected return must fall further to 
motivate the sale of a stock that has already declined than one that has 
appreciated. [Emphasis added as italics] 
 
Formally, in period t , investor i  believes that the dividend growth rate 1t  
follows a distribution given by 
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where tiq ,  is a random variable with uniform distribution on  1,0  and tiq ,  is 
i.i.d. across investors (index i ) and over time (index t ).19 On average, 
investors have the correct beliefs, since the mean of tiq ,  is equal to 21 .  
Investors are forward looking, so that we can apply the standard dynamic 
programming techniques to solve their optimal decision problems. 
 
2.2.3 Preference 
An investor derives prospect theory utility from trading assets in the spirit of 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1992).20 When investor i is born, he is 
endowed with iW ,1  units of consumption good. He can trade when he is young 
and middle-aged, leaving his final wealth as iW ,3  and his capital gains/losses 
as iX ,3 . Let 
i
tE  denote the investor's expectation operator at time t . His time 
t  utility, itU , is then given by 
   ,,3 iitit XvEU                     (3) 
                                                 
19In reality, an investor's one-period-ahead dividend forecasts might be 
correlated. As a robustness check, we also try the following specification to 
capture this correlation:   1,,1, 1   tititi qq   with )1,0( , where tiq ,  
follows a beta distribution and 1, ti  follows a uniform distribution. If 0 ,  
then we return to the specification in the main text in which his forecasts are 
independent over time; if 1 , then an investor's forecasts about dividend 
growth rate are constant over time. 
 
20We also considered a model, similar to Barberis et al. (2001), in which an 
investor derives two kinds of utilities --- the standard consumption utility and 
prospect theory utility --- and obtained similar results. 
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where 
 
,,1
2
,3,3 ifii WRWX                (4) 
    ,0 if
0 if




xx
xx
xv 

     (5) 
 
with 10    and 1 . 
 
Here, the function  v  is the standard value function of prospect theory 
proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). The argument of  v  is the 
capital gain/loss, iX ,3 , not the final period wealth, iW ,3 . Function  v  is 
concave for gains and convex for losses, meaning that investors are risk 
averse in the domain of gains and risk-seeking in the domain of losses; it has 
a kink at the origin, implying a greater sensitivity to losses than to gains of the 
same magnitude. Parameter   governs its concavity/convexity and parameter 
  controls loss aversion. For simplicity, we don't explore prospect theory's 
probability weighting feature in the above preference specification and just 
apply the standard expectation operator itE . The primary effect of probability 
weighting is to overweight small probabilities; it therefore has its biggest 
impact on securities with highly skewed returns. Since most stocks are not 
highly skewed, we do not expect probability weighting to be central to the link 
between prospect theory and the disposition effect. Indeed, Hens and Vlcek 
(2006) find that probability weighting only plays a minor role in determining 
whether prospect theory predicts the disposition effect. 
 
  76
In equation (4), we follow the literature (e.g., Gomes, 2005; Barberis and 
Huang, 2008; Barberis and Xiong, 2009) and define the capital gain/loss as 
ifii WRWX ,1
2
,3,3  .21 That is, we take a reference point as an investor's final 
wealth which he could have earned by investing in bonds when he was young 
and middle-aged.22 The gain/loss from a particular stock sale is calculated as 
the difference between the reference point and the investor's final wealth 
resulting from buying and selling this stock. For example, if investor  i  buys a 
stock at price BP  at age 1 , sells it at price SP  and collects a dividend iD ,2  at 
age 2 , and he then reinvests i
S DP ,2  in bonds, getting back ifSf DRPR ,2  
at age 3 . If he had not bought the stock at age 1 , but had invested BP  in 
bonds and held them till age 3 , then he would have collected Bf PR
2  at age 3 . 
Therefore, the gain/loss from this stock sale is Bfif
S
fi PRDRPRX
2
,2,3  . 
This definition reflects the idea that an investor usually starts considering the 
stock investment as a loss if he could have earned more from investing in the 
riskless bond. 
 
2.2.4 Timeline 
To summarize, in the model, the exogenous random variables are t  and tiq , , 
                                                 
21Two implementations of propect theory have been proposed in the literature. 
The first implementation defines propect theory over annual gains/losses 
(Benartzi and Thaler, 1995; Barberis et al., 2001; Barberis and Huang, 2008). 
Another implementation is to define prospect theoy over "realized gains/losses 
as in Barberis and Xiong (2008, 2009). The two implementations will be 
identical in our setup, because investors are allowed to hold only one unit of 
stock over their lifetimes. 
 
22In Appendix 2.A.1, we further show that our results are robust to taking 
purchase prices as reference points. 
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and the exogenous parameters of the model are 0H , 0L , 1fR , 
10    and 1 . The order of events in each period t  is shown in Figure 
2.1. At the beginning of period t  , age-1 investors are born and receive 
consumption good endowments. The dividend growth rate t  is realized, and 
all investors observe t . The idiosyncratic belief shock tiq ,  is realized, and 
investor i  observes tiq , . All investors trade in the stock and bond market; age-
2 and age-3 investors carry stocks to the market; after trading, age-1 and age-
2 investors hold stocks. At the end of period t , age-3 investors receive 
prospect theory utility and exit the economy. 
 
Period t
Dividend
News 
Age-1 
enter the 
economy
Belief 
shocks qi,t
Investors 
trade: 
age-1&age-
2 buy; 
age-2&age-
3 sell
Age-3 
derive 
utility and 
exit the 
economyt
Time
 
 
Figure 2.1 Timeline 
 
Figure 2.1 plots the order of events in period t . 
 
Our OLG setup can be understood as a stylized way of describing how 
different types of investors existing in real markets interact with each other. 
Our model economy can be linked to reality as follows. The potential buyers, 
namely an age-1 investor and an age-2 investor without a stock, correspond 
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respectively to a new participant and to a wait-and-seer who has been sitting 
in the market for some time. The potential sellers, namely an age-3 investor 
and an age-2 investor owning a stock, correspond respectively to a pure noise 
investor, one who has no discretion with regard to the timing of his trade, and 
to a discretionary liquidity investor, one who can determine when to trade.23 
 
2.2.5 Extension: A Multi-Stock Setting 
So far, we have assumed just one risky asset, but our analysis has 
implications for the cross-section property of stock returns, so long as the 
investor engages in mental accounting or narrow framing (Thaler, 1980, 1985), 
thus deriving prospect theory utility separately from the trading profit on each 
distinct stock. This assumption is always present in the literature relating 
prospect theory to the disposition effect (e.g., Odean, 1998; Barberis and 
Xiong, 2009). Kumar and Lim (2008) also document that narrow framers 
indeed exhibit more of a disposition effect. Formally, we can consider an 
economy with N  stocks, in which each stock has i.i.d. dividend processes with 
distribution given by equation (1), investors hold heterogeneous beliefs about 
the dividend growth rates and experience belief changes in their lifetimes, and 
these investors derive prospect theory utility from accumulative trading profits 
at the level of individual stocks. Then we can still use the conditions that 
characterize the equilibrium in the single stock setting --- more precisely, 
equations (6) through (23) --- to define an equilibrium, stock by stock, in this 
                                                 
23The importance of differentiating a pure noise investor from a discretionary 
liquidity investor has been emphasized in the microstructure literature, for 
example, Admati and Pfleiderer (1988). 
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mutli-stock setting. In Section 2.4, we conduct such an analysis and calculate 
the average returns to the winners-minus-losers portfolio to examine whether 
price momentum exists in our model economies. 
 
2.3 Equilibrium 
We now derive equilibrium asset prices. Let 
t
t
D
P
tf   denote the price-dividend 
ratio in period t . To ease exposition, the investors of age 2 who have (don't 
have) a stock when they enter the market are referred to as age-2-1 investors 
(age-2-0 investors). Let tz  be the mass of age-2-1 investors in period t , i.e., zt  
captures the distribution of stocks. Then in period t , the state of the economy 
is  tttt zfS ,, 1  . In equilibrium, the stock price-dividend ratios will be a 
function of the state vector,  tt Sff  . The three variables t , 1tf  and tz  
affect stock prices because (i) t  and 1tf  affect age-2-1's investment 
decisions through the disposition effect, and (ii) tz  relates to aggregate effect 
on prices of age-2-1 investors as a whole. We construct the price-dividend 
function f  by solving investors' optimal decisions backwards and using the 
market clearing condition. 
 
2.3.1 Age-3 Investors' Decisions 
A typical investor i  of age 3  faces a state vector  tit qS ,, . His decision is 
simple: if he has a stock, he sells it and derives prospect theory utility from his 
trading profit; if he does not have a stock, he just waits until the end of the 
period and receives prospect theory utility. In sum, age-3 investors will sell 
1 − zt  stocks as a whole. 
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2.3.2 Age-2 Investors' Decisions 
A typical investor i of age 2  faces a state vector  1,, ,, titit hqS , where 11, tih  if 
he belongs to age-2-1 and 01, tih  if he belongs to age-2-0. An age-2-1 
investor decides whether to sell the stock, and an age-2-0 investor decides 
whether to buy a stock. 
Let us first look at the age-2-1 investors. If an age-2-1 investor continues to 
hold the stock, what is his expected prospect theory utility? In the next period, 
he will sell the stock at price 1tP , resulting in a gain/loss 
 
  .1with 
,
1
2
11
1
11
1
1
111
2
11








tftfttt
t
t
t
tftftt
fRRfG
DGPRDRDP
  (6) 
 
As a result, his expected utility is 
      ,, 1111,11   ttittit DGvEqSU                                            (7) 
 
where itE  is the subjective expectation operator conditional on investor i 's 
period t  information set  titit qS ,,F . Here, investor i  takes expectation over 
the random variables 1t  and 1tf  according to his subjective belief [equation 
(2)] and the transition law of the state vector [equation (22)]. 
 
If he sells the stock, what is his expected prospect theory utility? Since he sells 
at price tP , then his gain/loss is  
 
  .1with 
,
1
2
01
1011
2




tftft
t
t
t
tftftf
fRRfG
DGPRDRPR
      (8) 
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Therefore, his expected utility is 
 
    .10101   ttt DGvSU                                       (9) 
 
If    ttit SUqSU 01,11 ,   , then investor i  will continue to hold the stock. That is, 
those with sufficiently large belief shocks tiq ,  will not sell their stocks. 
To sum up, the optimal decision of an age-2-1 investor is 
           .111,, 0111101,11 ,, ttitttit GvGvESUqSUtit qSh      (10) 
 
The corresponding indirect value function is24 
    
           .1,,11,,1,,ˆwith 
,1,,ˆ1,,
01,
1
11,,
1,,
t
tit
ti
ttittit
ttittit
GvqShGvEqShqSV
DqSVqSV





 
  (11) 
 
After trading, the fraction of those age-2-1 investors who continue to hold on to 
their stocks is 
 
      ,|1,,1,,1, ,,02 ttitttitzt SqShEzdiqShSH t     (12) 
 
where the second equality follows from the law of large numbers and the 
                                                 
24Note that the indirect value function,  1,, , tit qSV , is different from the value 
function of prospect theory  v . Function  v  corresponds to a standard 
Bernoulli utility function in the choice theory under uncertainty, but function  1,, , tit qSV  is the indirect utility function which has taken into account the 
investor's optimal decisions. 
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expectation is taken over the random variable tiq , , which follows a uniform 
distribution over  1,0 . 
 
Next, let us check the age-2-0 investors. If an age-2-0 investor decides to buy 
a stock, then he will have a gain/loss 
 
  ,1with 
,
11
1
10
1
1
1011
ttfttt
t
t
t
tftt
fRfG
DGPRDP
 






  (13) 
 
and have expected prospect theory utility 
      ., 1110,10   ttittit DGvEqSU                     (14) 
 
If he decides not to buy a stock, then his utility is 0 . So an age-2-0 investor's 
optimal decision is 
        ,110,, 00,, 110,10    tittit GvEqSUtit qSh    (15) 
 
and the corresponding indirect value function is 
           .0,,0,,ˆwith ,0,,ˆ0,, 110,,1,,   tittittitttittit GvEqShqSVDqSVqSV     (16) 
 
After trading, the aggregate stock holding of age-2-0 investors is 
 
        .|0,,10,,0, ,,102 ttitttitzt SqShEzdiqShSH t       (17) 
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2.3.3 Age-1 Investors' Decisions 
A typical investor i  of age 1  faces a state vector  tit qS ,, . If he decides to buy 
a stock, then his expected prospect theory utility is  
       
    ,1,,ˆ,ˆwith 
,,ˆ1,,,
1,1,1
,11,1,1




tit
i
ttit
ttittit
i
ttit
qSVEqSU
DqSUqSVEqSU 
      (18) 
 
and if he decides not to buy a stock, then his expected utility is  
       
    .0,,ˆ,ˆwith 
,,ˆ0,,,
1,1,0
,01,1,0




tit
i
ttit
ttittit
i
ttit
qSVEqSU
DqSUqSVEqSU 
     (19) 
 
Therefore, his optimal decision is 
      .1, ,0,1 ,ˆ,ˆ, tittit qSUqSUtit qSh                                               (20) 
 
So after trade, age 1 as a whole will hold 
 
      .|,, ,,101 ttittitt SqShEdiqShSH                             (21) 
 
2.3.4 Evolution of State Variables 
The state vector tS  evolves according to the following equation 
 
      ,,,,, 11111 ttttttt SHSfzfS                              (22) 
 
where functions  tSH1  [given by (21)] and  tSf  are both endogenously 
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determined. The random process   11 tt  is i.i.d. with distribution 
    2111 PrPr   LtHt   [i.e., equation (1)]. When investors make 
decisions, however, they believe that  t1  evolves according to 
  tiHtit q ,1Pr    [i.e., equation (2)]. Since tS  is in the investors' information 
set, they know the other two variables in 1tS , i.e., tf  and 1tz . 
 
2.3.5 Market Clearing Condition 
The market clearing condition is 
 
      ,11,0, 221  ttt SHSHSH              (23) 
 
which states that the stock holdings from age-1, age-2-0, and age-2-1 add up 
to the total stock supply 1 . An equilibrium price-dividend function f  is 
implicitly determined by equations (6) through (23). 
 
We adopt the equilibrium concept of Radner (1972), known as equilibrium of 
plans, prices, and price expectations. An equilibrium is formally defined as 
follows. 
 
 Definition. An equilibrium consists of decision rules,  tit qSh ,, ,  0,, , tit qSh  and 
 1,, , tit qSh , and a law of motion       ttttttt SHSfzfS 11111 ,,,,     such 
that 
(1) the decision rules maximize investors' expected prospect theory utility 
conditional on their information; 
(2) markets clear:       11,0, 221  ttt SHSHSH  for almost every realization of 
tS ; and 
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(3) the law of motion is generated by decision rules. 
Note that the above definition of equilibrium has implicitly incorporated prices 
into the price-dividend ratio function in the law of motion. 
 
2.3.6 Benchmark Case: Standard Risk Neutral Utility 
Suppose 1  . Concavity/convexity and loss aversion, two distinctive 
features of prospect theory, will vanish, reducing the preferences to a standard 
risk neutral utility representation. This works as a benchmark economy to 
illustrate that all our results are driven by prospect theory preferences. We 
don't use a standard, risk averse preference, such as power utility functions, 
as the benchmark, because risk aversion per se can qualitatively generate a 
disposition effect through portfolio rebalancing, although Odean (1998) argues 
that portfolio rebalancing cannot quantitatively account for the disposition 
effect.25 Risk neutrality removes this contamination and therefore gives 
cleaner results. 
 
When investors are risk neutral, i.e., when 1  , both the price-dividend 
ratio and the mass of age 2-1 investors are constant: 
    LHf LHtf t RER
E
t ff 



2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
1
1


    and 21tz . This result can be obtained by 
examining equations (6) to (23). 
 
                                                 
25If investors sell winners due to portfolio rebalancing, then they will partially 
reduce their position in a winning stock, rather than sell the entire position of 
the stock. Odean (1998) shows that the disposition effect still remains strong, 
even when the sample is restricted to transactions of investors' entire holdings 
of a stock, i.e., to those transactions not motivated by portfolio rebalancing. 
This suggests that portfolio rebalancing cannot entirely account for the 
disposition effect. 
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In fact, the constant price-dividend ratio is consistent with the simple Gordon 
rule:   11  tf ttER DEtP  . Intuitively, the potential buyers of stocks are those age-1 
and age-2 investors who hold optimistic views about next period's dividend 
realization; the marginal buyer's subjective belief, coinciding with the true 
distribution of the dividend process, brings the stock price equal to the sum of 
the discounted expected dividends. In this special case, we have an i.i.d. 
return process, 
 
,1 1111 
 t
t
tt
t f
f
P
DPR   
 
with mean equal to fR . The age-2-1 investors no longer exhibit a disposition 
effect, because half of them, those who have received pessimistic belief 
shocks (i.e., 2/1, tiq ), will always liquidate stocks no matter whether they 
face gains or losses. 
 
For the general cases of 1  or 1 , we have to numerically solve the 
price-dividend function   ,,f  and age-1 investors' stock demand function 
  ,,1H . The basic methodology is as follows: starting from an initial conjecture 
of     ,,0f  and     ,,01H , solve    tSf 1  and    tSH 11  on a grid of tS  from 
equations (6)-(23), and continue this process until       ,,,, ff n  and 
      ,,,, 11 HH n . 
 
2.4 Numerical Results and Intuitions 
In this section we solve equations (6) through (23) for the two endogenous 
functions in the law of motion: the price-dividend ratio function,   ,,f , and the 
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aggregate demand function of age-1 investors,   ,,1H . We then use 
simulations to show that the two components of prospect theory, diminishing 
sensitivity and loss aversion, make exactly opposite predictions regarding 
individual trading behavior, return predictability, and the correlation between 
returns and volume. Specifically, Subsection 2.4.2 demonstrates that 
diminishing sensitivity drives a disposition effect, which in turn leads to 
momentum in the cross-section of stock returns and a positive correlation 
between returns and volume. Subsection 2.4.3 shows, on the other hand, that 
loss aversion predicts a reversed disposition effect and reversal in the cross-
section of stock returns, as well as a negative correlation between returns and 
volume. Subsection 2.4.4 conducts further quantitative analysis to examine 
how successful prospect theory is in explaining price momentum, and 
suggests testable empirical predictions. 
 
2.4.1 Calibrating Technology Parameters 
There are five exogenous parameters in our model: two preference 
parameters (  and ) and three technology parameters ( H  , L  and fR ). 
Since we are interested in the implications of preferences, we allow the 
preference parameters to vary over a certain range. But we calibrate the 
technology parameters as follows. We take one period to be one year, and 
thus set the net risk-free rate to 86.31fR  percent, a choice adopted by 
Barberis and Huang (2001). Since the disposition effect refers to the behavior 
of individual stocks, we choose dividend parameters to match the mean and 
standard deviation of the dividend growth rate of a typical individual stock. 
Barberis and Huang (2001) estimate the moments of individual stock dividend 
growth using the COMPUSTAT database, and based on their results, we set 
  88
28.1H  and 76.0L , such that the mean and volatility of the net growth 
rate of the dividend are %24.2  and %97.25 , respectively. Table 2.1 
summarizes our choice of technology parameters. 
 
Table 2.1   Technology Parameter Values 
 
We take one period to be one year. Dividend parameters ( H  and L ) are 
calibrated to generate a dividend growth rate with the mean and standard 
deviation equal to %24.2  and %97.25 , respectively. 
 
Parameter Values
Risk-free rate
Rf 1.0386
Dividend parameters
H 1.2821
L 0.7628  
 
 
2.4.2 Implications of Diminishing Sensitivity  
We obtain the implications of diminishing sensitivity through comparative static 
analysis with respect to parameter , which governs the curvature of the value 
function. To ensure that our results are completely driven by the 
concavity/convexity component of prospect theory, in this subsection we also 
set parameter  at 1  to remove the loss aversion feature of the preference. 
Table 2.2 presents the main results for a range of values of  : 2.0 , 5.0 , 88.0  
and 1 . In particular, when 1 , the investor is risk neutral, which provides a 
benchmark for highlighting the fact that our results stem from prospect theory 
preferences. The value of 88.0  is the number estimated by Tversky and 
Kehneman (1992). Our results demonstrate that, in a general equilibrium 
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setting, diminishing sensitivity drives the disposition effect, the momentum 
effect and the comovement between returns and volume. We also find that 
diminishing sensitivity alone, in the absence of loss aversion, raises equity 
premiums. 
 
2.4.2.1 Disposition Effects 
We use the following measure to test whether our model can generate a 
disposition effect, 
  
  .00011, 01
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     (24) 
If 1DispEffect , then we conclude that investors exhibit the disposition effect 
in our model. The numerator of DispEffect  is the average fraction of age-2-1 
investors who close their positions facing a capital gain. This term is the 
theoretical analog to Odean's (1998) proportion of gains realized (PGR), i.e., 
the number of gains that are realized as a fraction of the total number of gains 
that could have been realized. Similarly, the denominator of DispEffect  is the 
average fraction of age-2-1 investors who realize losses and corresponds to 
Odean's proportion of losses realized (PLR). Odean uses the difference 
between PGR and PLR to measure the disposition effect. In equation (24), we 
instead adopt a ratio of PGR to PLR to remove the effect of equity premiums 
on the magnitudes of PGR or PLR.26 
 
 
                                                 
26Brown et al. (2006) also use the ratio of PGR to PLR to measure the 
disposition effect when examining Australian stock trading data. 
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Table 2.2   Implications of Diminishing Sensitivity 
 
PGR and PLR are the simulated proportion of gains realized and proportion of 
losses realized. We define PLRPGRDispEffect   , and if 1DispEffect , then a 
disposition effect exists.    LREHREMomEffect tttt    || 11 . WML  is the 
simulated average momentum portfolio return in the multi-stock setting. If 
0MomEffect  and 0WML , then a momentum effect exists.  121 ,tSHtQ   is 
the turnover, or aggregate selling, in period t . Technology parameter values 
are fixed at the values in Table 2.1: 2821.1H , 7628.0L  and 0386.1fR . 
The preference parameter 1  determines loss aversion; in this table, we 
deliberately set   as 1 , so that the investor is not averse to loss. 
 
  0.2   0.5   0.88   1
(i) Disposition Effect
PGR 0.49 0.56 0.53 0.50
PLR 0.29 0.36 0.47 0.50
DispEffect 1.73 1.56 1.12 1.00
(ii) Momentum Effect
ERt1 | t  H  1.1295 1.0934 1.0516 1.0386
ERt1 | t  L  1.0158 1.0439 1.0410 1.0386
MomEffect 11.37% 4.95% 1.06% 0.00%
WML 10.91% 4.67% 1.06% 0.00%
(iii) Turnover
CorrRt,Qt  0.52 0.83 0.92 0.00
(iv) Equity Premium
ERt − Rf  3.43% 3.01% 0.82% 0.00%
EH1St  0.43 0.46 0.49 0.50  
To obtain the two conditional moments in equation (24), we simulate a long 
time series  1tt  of 500,000 independent draws from the distribution 
described in equation (1). Then we use the solved functions   ,,f  and   ,,1H  
to calculate tf  and 1tz  and get the time series  1ttS . When we do this, we 
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also compute   12 1, ttSH  and   101 ttG  along the way, using equations (H21) 
and (G10). We compute sample moments from these simulated data to serve 
as approximations of population moments. 
 
Table 2.2 reports the results for different values of  . The case of 1  
corresponds to a linear value function, when investors don't exhibit a 
disposition effect, so that 1DispEffect . As we gradually decrease   from 1  
to 2.0 , the value function becomes more curved along the way, and the value 
of DispEffect  increases monotonically from 1  to 73.1 , giving rise to an even 
stronger disposition effect. The mechanism behind this result is exactly 
Odean's (1998) intuition: risk aversion (risk-seeking) for gains (losses) causes 
an age-2-1 investor more (less) likely to sell the stock. 
 
Figure 2.2 graphs this intuition for the case of 5.0 . Here, from the 
simulated time series of state vectors, we randomly choose a realization of 
   50.0,01.20,1  tt zf , and then graph the possible gains/losses together with 
the associated prospect theory utilities faced by an age-2-1 investor in periods 
t  and 1t .27 The period t  gains/losses as well as prospect theory utilities 
from liquidating the stock [i.e.,   tt GvG 0101 ,  ] are marked with dots, while the 
period 1t  gains/losses and prospect theory utilities from keeping the stock 
[i.e.,   111111 ,  tt GvG ] are marked with circles. 
 
Good dividend news ( Ht   ) will bring an age-2-1 investor to the point of 
                                                 
27The result is robust to the choice of  tt zf ,1 . 
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choosing a sure medium gain ( 5.6 , Point H in the figure) versus a gamble 
which offers either a smaller gain ( 18.1 , Point HL) or a larger gain ( 45.14 , Point 
HH) with some probabilities. Whether an age-2-1 investor will continue to hold 
the stock depends on his one-period-ahead dividend forecast. In this example, 
those age-2-1 investors who believe, with probability higher than 54.0  (i.e., 
      18.145.14 18.15.6 vv vv  ), that the next period dividend growth rate ( 1t ) will take a high 
value ( H ) will continue to hold the risky stock. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Diminishing Sensitivity Drives the Disposition Effect 
Figure 2.2 graphs the possible capital gains/losses, as well as prospect theory 
utilities, faced by an age-2-1 investor. If this investor liquidates his stock, his 
capital gains/losses, together with his prospect theory utilities, are marked with 
dots; if he keeps the stock, then his possible future capital gains/losses and 
his prospect theory utilities are marked with circles. The two endogenous state 
variables are  01.201 tf  and 50.0tz . The parameter values are 2821.1H , 
7628.0L , 0386.1fR , 1  and 5.0 . 
 
What will happen if the dividend news is negative ( Lt   ) at period t ? If an 
age-2-1 investor sells the stock, he experiences a sure loss ( 23.4 , Point L); if 
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he continues to hold the stock, he faces the gamble of a smaller loss (−0.28 , 
Point LH) or an even larger loss ( 18.8 , Point LL). In this example, those age-
2-1 investors who believe that Ht  1  with probability lower than 35.0  (i.e., 
      18.828.0 18.823.4   vv vv ), will liquidate their stocks. Note that the cutoff probability in the 
low dividend realization case, 35.0 , is lower than that in the high dividend 
realization, 54.0 . This precisely supports the informal argument, which relies 
on prospect theory to explain the disposition effect: the investor's belief about 
expected return must fall further to motivate the sale of a stock that has 
already declined than one that has appreciated (Odean, 1998, p. 1777). 
 
Table 2.2 suggests that PGR and PLR respond to a change in   differently: 
as   falls from 1  to 2.0 , PGR first goes up from 50.0  to 56.0  and then goes 
down to 49.0 , while PLR continuously decreases from 50.0  to 29.0 . There 
are two forces at work here. As   becomes smaller, the value function is 
more concave for gains and more convex for losses, causing the investor to 
be more likely to sell winners and hold losers, and hence generating a higher 
PGR and a lower PLR. However, as   falls, the expected stock return rises 
and the stock becomes more attractive to the investor, which will be discussed 
shortly; this decreases the investor's propensity to sell the stock no matter 
whether he is facing gains or losses, and therefore leads to both a lower PGR 
and a lower PLR. In sum, as   decreases, both forces tend to lower PLR, 
while the first force tends to raise PGR and the second to lower PGR. As   
falls slightly below 1 , the first force dominates, and we observe a higher PGR, 
but once   falls sufficiently, the second force catches up and we obtain a 
lower PGR. 
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2.4.2.2 Momentum  
Following Barberis et al. (1998), who also rely on a model with one risky asset 
to explain the cross-section of stock returns, we measure momentum as  
 
   ,|| 11 LttHtt REREMomEffect     (25) 
 
i.e., the difference in the expected return following a positive shock and 
following a negative shock. If 0MomEffect , then we claim that there is 
momentum in the stock returns. The two moments in equation (25) are 
obtained using simulations. The results are also reported in Table 2.2. Since 
0MomEffect  for 1 , our model shows that the concavity/convexity feature 
of prospect theory preferences generates momentum in stock returns. 
Moreover, the momentum effect becomes stronger as we increase the 
curvature of the value function, i.e., decrease the value of  . For example, 
MomEffect  increases from %06.1  to %37.11  as   decreases from 88.0  to 2.0 . 
The underlying reason for this momentum effect is simple. Following a positive 
shock ( Ht   ), stock prices will rise, moving age-2-1 investors into their 
capital gain domain. Due to the concavity of the value function of prospect 
theory in the gain region, age-2-1 investors tend to close their stock positions, 
which depresses the stock price, generating higher subsequent returns. On 
the other hand, a negative shock ( Lt   ) will decrease the stock price, driving 
age-2-1 investors into their capital loss domain. Convexity in the region of 
losses means that they are less likely to sell the stock absent a price premium; 
the stock price is therefore initially inflated, generating lower subsequent 
returns. 
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We also conduct a cross-section analysis and replicate the momentum effect 
in the empirical literature (e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Liu and Zhang, 
2008). As discussed in the end of Section 2.2, we can extend our model to an 
economy with N  stocks. We simulate dividend data on 000,2N  
independent stocks over 000,10T  time periods, and then compute the 
resulting equilibrium return sequence for each stock. We create the winners-
minus-losers zero cost portfolios as follows. In each period, we sort stocks into 
two equal-sized groups based on their last period returns and record the 
equal-weighted return of each group over the next period; in particular, winnertR  
( losertR ) is the return on the portfolio containing stocks with better (worse) 
performance. Repeating this each period produces long time series of returns 
on the winner and loser portfolios, namely  TtwinnertR 1  and  TtlosertR 1 . Our second 
measure of momentum is the difference in the average returns on these two 
portfolios: 
 
 .1 1 losertwinnertTt RRTWML      (26) 
 
Table 2.2 also reports the results for this alternative measure. We find that the 
two measures for momentum are almost identical, so that they behave in 
precisely the same way: both MomEffect  and WML are greater than 0  for 
1 , and both decrease with  .  
 
2.4.2.3 Turnover 
Empirical studies show that there is more trading in rising markets than in 
falling markets (Statman et al., 2006; Griffin et al., 2007). In our model, the 
age-2-1 investors have a much greater propensity to sell stocks facing good 
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news ( Ht   ) than facing bad news ( Lt   ). This will contribute to a positive 
correlation between turnover and stock returns. Let  1,1 2 tt SHQ   be the 
turnover or aggregate selling in period t . In Table 2.2, we report the simulated 
correlations between stock returns and turnovers,  tt QRCorr , . Indeed, we 
have   0, tt QRCorr  so long as 1 . This demonstrates that diminishing 
sensitivity drives a positive correlation between returns and volume. 
 
As we gradually decrease   from 88.0  to 2.0 ,  tt QRCorr ,  decreases from 
92.0  to 52.0 . The stock distributions ( tz ) and price-dividend ratios ( 1tf ) 
combine to contribute to this relationship, but they work in different ways when 
  varies. When   is close to 1 , both tz  and 1tf  are almost constant at their 
values in the benchmark economy (i.e., 1 ), so that the state of the 
economy is captured only by dividend growth rates ( t ). Since the disposition 
effect causes returns and turnovers to vary with t  in the same direction, there 
is an almost perfect correlation between returns and volume. On the other 
hand, as   gets close to 0 , both tz  and 1tf  will change over time and 
influence trading behavior. However, returns and volumes respond to the 
variation in tz  and 1tf  in opposite ways. For example, a larger tz  implies that 
more stocks are held by age-2-1 investors and fewer by age-3 investors; after 
trading, all age-3 investors will have to close their positions, even though this 
is not the case for age-2-1 investors; as a result, stock selling (i.e., trading 
volumes tQ ) will decrease with tz , but at the same time, the decreasing selling 
pressure causes stock returns tR  to rise with tz . The variation in tz  and 1tf  
will therefore attenuate the positive correlation between returns and volume 
generated by t . As a result, for 10   , a lower   implies a lower 
 tt QRCorr , . 
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2.4.2.4 Equity Premiums 
Our model also demonstrates that the S-shaped value function of prospect 
theory can help explain the equity premium puzzle. Table 2.2 reports the 
simulated equity premiums,  ft RRE  , as well as average stock purchases 
by young people,   tSHE 1 . As   gets smaller, the curvature of the value 
function becomes larger, and equity premiums become higher. Note that the 
positive equity premium is not due to loss aversion, since we have set 1  in 
this section. Notably, a low   is also associated with a low   tSHE 1 , 
suggesting that equity premiums are driven by the behavior of young people. 
The young investor makes investment decisions by comparing the expected 
utility from buying the stock to that from not buying. These utility levels are 
determined by his belief tiq ,  (current belief about 1t ), and by how he 
evaluates his future reactions to 1, tiq  (future belief about 2t ). Those who are 
extremely optimistic (pessimistic), i.e., those with extremely high (low) values 
of tiq , , always buy (not buy) the stock. It is those who have intermediate 
values of tiq ,  that care more about their future reactions to 1, tiq . It turns out 
that only high realizations of 1, tiq  will matter, because there will be no extra 
benefit of holding a stock from middle-aged till old when 1, tiq  is low. Only 
when 1, tiq  is high will holding the stock from middle-aged till old bring an extra 
benefit: a young investor who buys a stock now will enjoy a further gain if he 
keeps the stock, and one who doesn't buy now will enjoy a new gain if he buys 
the stock when middle-aged. 
 
How does this extra gain associated with high 1, tiq  relate to the current 
purchasing decision and the value function's curvature  ? Not buying now 
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means that when evaluating this gain, the young investor will stay in the origin 
of the value function, where the marginal utility is the highest; the more curved 
the value function, the higher is this marginal utility. In contrast, if he buys now, 
he will be pushed away from the origin because this gain has to be appended 
to an existing gain or loss, namely the one generated by holding the stock 
from young until middle-aged. In this case, the marginal utility is much smaller 
compared to that in the origin; the more curved the value function, the smaller 
is this marginal utility. 
 
To summarize, the higher the curvature of the value function, the less a young 
investor will value the potential gain associated with high realizations of 1, tiq , 
and the less they want to buy now, thereby depressing stock prices and 
raising equity premiums. 
 
2.4.3 Implications of Loss Aversion 
To obtain the implications of loss aversion, we conduct comparative static 
analysis with respect to the parameter  . In Table 2.3, we present the results 
for a variety of values of :  1 , 25.2 , 3  and 4 . In particular, 1  is still our 
benchmark economy when the investor is risk neutral. The value of   25.2  
is the number estimated by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). To guarantee that 
our results are solely due to the loss aversion component, we always set 
parameter 1  to remove the curvature feature of the prospect theory value 
function. Table 2.3 demonstrates that loss aversion drives a reversed 
disposition effect and reversal in the cross-section of stock returns, as well as 
a negative correlation between returns and volume. In addition, Table 2.3 
produces a well-known result in the asset pricing literature: loss aversion can 
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raise equity premiums, such as Benartzi and Thaler (1995) and Barberis et al. 
(2001). 
 
2.4.3.1 Reversed Disposition Effects 
Again, when investors are risk neutral, i.e., when 1 , they don't exhibit a 
disposition effect, so that 1DispEffect . When investors are loss averse, i.e., 
when 1 , we obtain a reversed disposition effect, since 1DispEffect . 
Moreover, as we gradually increase   from 1  to 4 , investors become more 
loss averse, and the value of DispEffect  decreases monotonically from 1  
to 83.0 , giving rise to an even stronger reversed disposition effect. 
 
What's the intuition behind this result? The mechanism works through a 
combination of two forces: one is the kink at the origin of the value function, 
which is a direct implication of loss aversion; the other is the positive equity 
premium, which is an indirect equilibrium implication of loss aversion 
preferences. Roughly speaking, when investors are close to (far from) the kink, 
they are reluctant (inclined) to take risk, and want to sell (keep) the stock; 
when the average stock returns are higher than the risk free rate, bad (good) 
dividend news will bring investors relatively close to (far from) the kink, so that 
they are more (less) likely to liquidate the stock. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  100
Table 2.3   Implications of Loss Aversion 
 
PGR and PLR are the simulated proportion of gains realized and proportion of 
losses realized. We define PLRPGRDispEffect  , and if 1DispEffect , then a reversed 
disposition effect exists.    LREHREMomEffect tttt    || 11 . WML  is the 
simulated average momentum portfolio return in the multi-stock setting. If 
0MomEffect  and 0WML , then there is reversal in the cross-section of stock 
returns.  Qt 1 −H2St , 1  is the turnover, or aggregate selling, in period t . 
Technology parameter values are fixed at the values in Table 2.1: 2821.1H , 
7628.0L   and 0386.1fR . Preference parameter  controls the curvature of 
the value function. In this table, we deliberately set   to be1 , so that the value 
function is piecewise linear. 
 
  1   2.25   3   4
(i) Disposition Effect
PGR 0.50 0.39 0.35 0.31
PLR 0.50 0.41 0.39 0.38
DispEffect 1.00 0.97 0.91 0.83
(ii) Momentum Effect
ERt1 | t  H  1.0386 1.1000 1.1255 1.1519
ERt1 | t  L  1.0386 1.1006 1.1311 1.1632
MomEffect 0.00% −0.06% −0.56% −1.13%
WML 0.00% −0.23% −0.85% −1.48%
(iii) Turnover
CorrRt,Qt  0.00 −0.70 −0.91 −0.94
(iv) Equity Premium
ERt − Rf  0.00% 6.17% 8.97% 11.89%
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Figure 2.3 conducts an exercise to confirm this intuition for the case of 4 . 
Now that we assumed 1  to remove the curvature, the investor's value 
function becomes piecewise linear with a kink at the origin due to loss 
aversion. Similar to the exercise in Figure 2.2, we randomly choose a 
realization of  tt zf ,1 , which is  48.0,75.7  in this case, from the simulated time 
series of state vectors. We then graph an age-2-1 investor's period t  
gains/losses as well as prospect theory utilities from liquidating the stock [i.e. 
  tt GvG 0101 ,  ] with dots, and the period 1t  gains/losses and prospect theory 
utilities from keeping the stock [i.e.   111111 ,  tt GvG ] with circles. 
 
Good dividend news ( Ht   ) will bring the investor to Point H. Bad dividend 
news ( Lt   ) will bring him to Point L, which is closer to the kink relative to 
Point H. That is, the investor is more cautious in holding stocks at Point L than 
at Point H. Specifically, at Point H, if the investor liquidates the stock, he will 
lock in a medium gain of 29.3 ; if he keeps the stock, when he becomes old he 
will arrive either at Point HH, enjoying a large gain of 35.7 , or at Point HL, 
enjoying a small gain of 46.1 . Since both Point HH and Point HL are in the 
gain domain, the investor's behavior at Point H can be described as risk 
neutral. Of course, whether an age-2-1 investor will indeed continue to hold 
the stock depends on his one-period-ahead dividend forecast. In this example, 
those age-2-1 investors who believe that Ht  1  with probability higher than 
31.0  (i.e.,       46.135.7 46.129.3 vv vv  ), will continue to hold the risky stock. 
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Figure 2.3 Loss Aversion Drives the Reversed Disposition Effect 
 
Figure 2.3 graphs the possible capital gains/losses, as well as prospect theory 
utilities, faced by an age-2-1 investor. If this investor liquidates his stock, his 
capital gains/losses, together with his prospect theory utilities, are marked with 
dots; if he keeps the stock, then his possible future capital gains/losses and 
his prospect theory utilities are marked with circles. The two endogenous state 
variables are 75.71 tf  and 48.0tz . The parameter values 
are 2821.1H , 7628.0L , 0386.1fR , 4  and 1 . 
 
At Point L, if the investor sells the stock, he will realize a loss of 48.1 . If he 
keeps the stock, then he will arrive either at Point LH, enjoying a small gain of 
01.1 , or at Point LL, facing a large loss of 52.2 . Because Point LH and Point 
LL straddle over the kink, the investor is reluctant to take a risk at Point L 
relative to Point H, at which point his behavior resembles risk neutrality. In this 
example, those age-2-1 investors who believe that Ht  1  with probability 
lower than 37.0  (i.e.,       52.201.1 52.248.1   vv vv ), will liquidate their stocks. 
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In Table 2.3, we also observe that both PGR and PLR decrease with  . This 
is because loss aversion raises equity premiums, making the investor less 
likely to sell stocks, whether facing good news or bad news. We also observe 
PGR decreases at a faster rate than PLR due to the reversed disposition 
effect. 
 
2.4.3.2 Reversal 
As discussed above, when 1 , the investor is risk neutral, and there is no 
momentum effect in the cross-section of stock returns, because both 
measures capturing momentum, MomEffect  and WML , are equal to zero. But 
as long as 1 , i.e., as long as the investor is loss averse, we obtain reversal 
in the cross-section of stock returns, since both MomEffect  and WML  are 
negative. In particular, as we increase   from 1  to 4 , reversal gets stronger. 
This result demonstrates that the loss aversion feature of prospect theory has 
implications for return predictability. 
 
The underlying reason for this result is similar to Grinblatt and Han's (2005). 
For example, facing good dividend news, age-2-1 investors are more likely to 
hold stocks according to the reversed disposition effect. This generates extra 
buying pressure, which will inflate stock prices and lead to lower stock returns 
later. Similarly, facing bad dividend news, those investors are likely to sell 
stocks and depress prices, generating higher subsequent returns. 
 
2.4.3.3 Turnover 
Table 2.3 also shows that loss aversion can generate a negative correlation 
between returns and volumes:   0, tt QRCorr  as long as 1 . This result is 
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also driven by trading by age-2-1 investors, who, due to the reversed 
disposition effect, have a much greater propensity to sell stocks in down 
markets ( Lt   ) than in up markets ( Ht   ), contributing to a negative 
correlation between turnover and stock returns. 
 
As we gradually increase   from 1  to 4 ,  tt QRCorr ,  monotonically decreases 
from 0  to 94.0 . This pattern is different from the relationship between 
 tt QRCorr ,  and   in Table 2.2 and can be understood as follows. In Table 
2.2, when we vary   while fixing  , dividend news t  contributes to a positive 
 tt QRCorr ,  via the disposition effect, while the other endogenous state 
variables, stock distributions ( tz ) and price-dividend ratios ( 1tf ), tend to 
generate a negative  tt QRCorr , . These two forces are counteracting. On the 
other hand, in Table 2.3, when we vary   and fix  , dividend news t  also 
leads to a negative  tt QRCorr ,  through the reversed disposition effect, which 
strengthens the impact of the two endogenous state variables on  tt QRCorr , . 
 
2.4.3.4 Equity Premiums 
Table 2.3 also reproduces the well-known result that loss aversion can raise 
equity premiums (e.g., Benartzi and Thaler,1995; Barberis et al.,2001). As we 
increase   from 1  to 4 , equity premiums rise from 0  to %12 . This result is 
intuitive: loss aversion means that investors are more sensitive to losses than 
to gains, and since stocks often perform poorly and investors often face losses, 
a large premium is required to convince them to hold stocks. The asset pricing 
literature studying loss aversion has focused primarily on its implications for 
the equity premium, that is, the average level of stock returns. Our model, on 
the other hand, shows that loss aversion can lead to reversal in the cross-
  105
section of stock returns, suggesting, in turn, that loss aversion may also be a 
useful ingredient for equilibrium models trying to understand return 
predictability. 
 
2.4.4 Quantitative Analysis and Testable Predictions  
In this Subsection, we conduct further quantitative analysis to examine how 
successful prospect theory is in explaining price momentum and derive 
testable empirical predictions which are either unique to our model or 
consistent with the existing empirical studies. 
 
2.3.4.1 Quantitative Analysis: How Successful is Prospect Theory? 
So far, we have shown that there are two counteracting forces in equilibrium --
- diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion --- driving the disposition effect, the 
momentum effect and the correlation between returns and volumes. In order to 
understand how successful prospect theory is in explaining price momentum, 
we set preference parameters at certain empirical values and examine which 
force will dominate, and to what extent. 
 
What are the empirical values of preference parameters,   and  ? The 
existing evidence concerning parameter   is relatively rich and remarkably 
consistent: both experimental data (e.g., Kahneman et al., 1990; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1991, 1992; Novemsky and Kahneman, 2005) and real data (e.g., 
Putler, 1992; Hardie et al., 1993) suggest a number close to 2 . This is true 
even for monkeys (Chen et al., 2006). So in the following analysis, we fix   at 
25.2 , the value estimated by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). 
 
  106
 
Table 2.4  Quantitative Analysis 
 
PGR and PLR are the simulated proportion of gains realized and proportion of 
losses realized. We define PLRPGRDispEffect   and    LREHREMomEffect tttt    || 11 . WML  is the simulated average 
momentum portfolio return in the multi-stock setting.  121 ,tSHtQ   is the 
turnover, or aggregate selling, in period t . Technology parameter values are 
fixed at the values in Table 2.1: 2821.1H , 7628.0L  and 0386.1fR . Loss 
aversion parameter  is set at 25.2 , the value estimated by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992).The empirical values of PGR/PLR and momentum are 
taken from Dhar and Zhu (2006) and Jegagdeesh and Titman (1993), 
respectively. The empirical values of  tt QRCorr ,  and  ft RRE   are based on 
AMEX/NYSE data from 1926-2006. 
 
  0.37   0.52   0.88 Empirical Value
(i) Disposition Effect
PGR 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.38
PLR 0.18 0.23 0.37 0.17
DispEffect 2.25 1.75 1.10 2.24
(ii) Momentum Effect
ERt1 | t  H  1.1575 1.1431 1.1091 —
ERt1 | t  L  1.0822 1.0927 1.1004 —
MomEffect 7.54% 5.04% 0.87% —
WML 7.20% 4.76% 0.76% 8.60%
(iii) Turnover
CorrRt,Qt  0.84 0.88 0.91 0.28
(iv) Equity Premium
ERt − Rf  8.14% 7.94% 6.62% 7.84%
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But there is not much evidence as to the value of  . As far as we know, only 
two studies have estimated this parameter, and the results differ markedly in 
the data sets used. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) estimate 88.0  by 
offering subjects isolated gambles in experimental settings. Wu and Gonzalez 
(1996) use a different experimental data set and estimate 52.0 , but when 
they apply Camerer and Ho's (1994) data, they find 37.0 . Due to the small 
sample size in the experiments, none of those studies can estimate   with 
great precision. So our strategy is to report results for all these three possible 
values of   in Table 2.4. 
 
Table 2.4 also presents the historical values for the disposition effect, the 
momentum effect and the correlation between returns and volumes. Unlike 
Odean (1998), who studies the disposition effect by aggregating across 
investors, Dhar and Zhu (2006) examine the disposition effect at the level of 
the individual. They report, in their Table 2.2, that the means of PGR and PLR 
for all individuals are 38.0  and 17.0 , respectively. We adopt these numbers as 
the empirical values of PGR and PLR. Regarding the momentum effect, we 
use Jegagdeesh and Titman's (1993) estimate, that is, %60.8 , on an annual 
basis. Using AMEX/NYSE data from 1926-2006 from CRSP, we find that the 
correlation between returns and volumes,  tt QRCorr , , and the equity 
premium,  ft RRE  , for a typical firm, are 28.0  and %84.7 , respectively.28 
                                                 
28More precisely, we take all stocks in the CRSP database for which at least 
11 consecutive years of return and volume data are recorded, compute the 
correlation between real returns and volume as well as the mean returns in 
excess of the 30-day T-bill rate for each, and then calculate the medians. 
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Those historical values help us to evaluate how well our model matches the 
data. Even though, because we are not confident of the actual value of   
among real investors, this evaluation should be interpreted with caution, our 
quantitative analysis makes a methodological contribution: a general 
equilibrium model, such as the one provided in the present paper, is the only 
way to link prospect theory preference to momentum, thereby explaining how 
much prospect theory preference can contribute to price momentum. 
 
Table 2.4 demonstrates that, for all the three possible values of  , the 
diminishing sensitivity component of prospect theory dominates the loss 
aversion component. In particular, when 37.0 , our model matches the 
historical data well, except for the dimension of the correlation between returns 
and volumes. To be specific, for 37.0 , our model predicts that 
25.2DispEffect , %20.7WML  and   %14.8 ft RRE , while the historical 
counterparts for these variables are 24.2 , %60.8  and %84.7 , respectively. 
The model predicts too high a correlation between returns and volumes, i.e., 
  84.0, tt QRCorr , but the empirical value is 28.0 . 
 
2.4.4.2 Testable Predictions 
One testable prediction emerges from Table 2.4, which suggests that prospect 
theory simultaneously predicts momentum and a positive correlation between 
returns and volumes. So we expect the momentum effect to be stronger 
among those stocks whose returns are positively correlated with their own 
trading volumes.29 This empirical prediction is unique to our mechanism and is 
                                                 
29Note that we don't claim that momentum profits are monotonically increasing 
in  CorrRt,Qt   . Actually, Table 4 suggests that the opposite is true. 
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easy to test. We can rely on this prediction to differentiate our story from other 
explanations of price momentum, such as the belief-based models proposed 
by Barberis et al. (1998), Daniel et al. (1998) or Hong and Stein (1999). Note 
that our prediction is different from that of Lee and Swaminathan (2000), who 
show that price momentum is more pronounced among those stocks with 
higher levels of trading volumes, while our predictions relates momentum to 
the sensitivity of returns to volumes. 
 
Besides the above new prediction, our model also makes certain predictions 
which are consistent with the existing studies. For example, we do not expect 
prospect theory utility to be equally important for all investors, expecting it to 
matter more for individual investors than for institutional investors. Indeed, 
some empirical studies find that mutual fund managers are less prone to the 
disposition effect than individual investors: the difference between PGR and 
PLR is %3  for managers, and %5  for retail investors (c.f. Shefrin, 2008). 
Since our results on momentum are completely driven by prospect theory, one 
prediction of our model is that a stronger momentum effect will exist among 
stocks with greater individual investor ownership. Hur et al. (2008) test 
precisely this prediction with a large sample of NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks 
between 1981 and 2005 and find strong evidence for this hypothesis. Further 
evidence comes from Hong et al. (2000) and Fama and French (2008), who 
find that the profitability of momentum strategies declines sharply with market 
capitalization; since small firms are traded more heavily by individuals, this 
finding is consistent with our prediction. 
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Table 2.5   Sensitivity Analysis w.r.t Dividend Growth Rate Volatility   t1   
 
PGR and PLR are the simulated proportion of gains realized and proportion of 
losses realized. We define PLRPGRDispEffect   and    LREHREMomEffect tttt    || 11 . WML  is the simulated average 
momentum portfolio return in the multi-stock setting.  121 ,tSHtQ   is the 
turnover, or aggregate selling, in period t . The risk-free rate is set at 
0386.1fR . The preference parameters are 52.0  and 25.2 . 
 
L  0.81586
H  1.2289
L  0.7628
H  1.2821
L  0.70865
H  1.3362
(i) Disposition Effect
PGR 0.41 0.41 0.41
PLR 0.24 0.23 0.23
DispEffect 1.71 1.75 1.79
(ii) Momentum Effect
MomEffect 3.83% 5.04% 6.28%
WML 3.62% 4.76% 5.94%
(iii) Turnover
CorrRt,Qt  0.88 0.88 0.88
(iv) Equity Premium
ERt − Rf  6.13% 7.94% 9.96%
 
 
 
Our model can also relate momentum to the volatility of cash flow. Table 2.5 
examines the effect of varying the volatility of the dividend growth rate. For a 
binary distribution given by equation (1), the dividend growth rate has a mean 
equal to   21 LHtE    , and a volatility equal to   21 LHt    . In Table 2.5, we 
maintain   11 tE   at %24.2  and change  1t  from %21  to %26  to %31 .30 
                                                 
30Barberis and Huang (2001) use COMPUSTAT data to estimate the 
dispersion in firm-level dividend growth volatilities to be 5  percent. So, we 
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The preference parameters are set at 52.0  and 25.2 . Table 2.5 
suggests that increasing  1t  generates stronger momentum effects and 
higher equity premiums. Since a higher  1t  is also associated with a higher 
return volatility, the momentum effect is expected to be stronger among stocks 
both with higher dividend volatility and with higher return volatility. This 
observation is in fact consistent with Zhang's (2006) finding that momentum 
profits are higher among firms with higher cash flow volatility or return volatility. 
 
2.5 Conclusion  
In this paper, we propose a general equilibrium model to study the implications 
of prospect theory for individual trading, security prices and trading volume. 
We show that, in a general equilibrium setting, different components of 
prospect theory make very different predictions. The diminishing sensitivity 
component drives a disposition effect, which in turn leads to momentum in the 
cross-section of stock returns and a positive correlation between returns and 
volumes. On the other hand, the loss aversion component predicts exactly the 
opposite, namely a reversed disposition effect and reversal in the cross-
section of stock returns, as well as a negative correlation between returns and 
volume. In a calibrated economy, when prospect theory preference 
parameters are set at the values estimated by the previous studies, our model 
can generate price momentum of up to %7  on an annual basis. One testable 
empirical prediction unique to our model is that the momentum strategy is 
most profitable, all else equal, among stocks whose returns are positively 
correlated with their trading volumes. 
                                                                                                                                            
choose  %5   as a step. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix 2.A.1 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
We have mentioned that generations in our model should be understood as 
generations of trades, so that one period corresponds to six months to one 
year. So far in our analysis, we have taken one period to be one year. Table 
2.A1 analyzes the effect of changing this assumption, by assuming the 
decision interval of an investor to be six months. We recalibrate dividend 
parameters as 19.1H  and 83.0L , so that the time-aggregated annual 
growth rate of dividends has the same mean and volatility as the data. We 
also reset 1fR  to be 91.1  percent to maintain a net annual risk-free rate of  
86.3   percent. The loss aversion parameter is still set at 25.2 , and the 
diminishing sensitivity parameter   can take three values: 37.0 , 52.0 and 
88.0 . The variable 2WML  is the simulated average cumulative annualized 
momentum portfolio returns: 
 
 .12 111 losertlosertwinnertwinnertTt RRRRTWML    
 
Comparing Table 2.A1 with Table 2.4, where one period is assumed to be one 
year, we find that changing the length of the decision interval affects the 
momentum effect and the equity premium. When the decision interval 
becomes shorter, a typical investor will experience more losses in one year, 
and since he is averse to losses, he will demand a higher premium. The higher 
equilibrium equity premium or, equivalently, the lower price-dividend ratio, 
means that the disposition effect, i.e., age-2-1 investors' different behavior 
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facing good news versus bad news, will have a higher impact on the stock 
return predictability, thereby generating higher returns to the winners-minus-
losers portfolio. 
 
As described in Section 2.2, we suppose that investor i  uses ifWR ,1
2  as a 
reference level of wealth when calculating gains and losses. Odean (1998) 
and Genesove and Mayer (2001) assume that the investor uses the original 
purchase price as a reference point. That is, if an investor buys a stock at 
price BP  and sells at price SP , he calculates gains/losses X  as follows: if he 
holds the stock one period and receives a dividend D , then he perceives 
BS PDPX  ; if he holds the stock two periods and collects dividends D  
and D  , then he perceives BS PDDPX  . Table 2.A2 presents the 
results for this specification of gains/losses. We still take one period as one 
year, and the parameter values are fixed at 28.1H , 76.0L , 0386.1fR  
and 25.2 .  Comparing Table 2.A2 with Table 2.4, we find that this 
alternative definition of gains/losses has virtually no effect on our results 
except to deliver a lower equity premium. The reason for the low equity 
premium is that stock returns don't need to beat the risk-free rate to be 
counted as gain, which in turn makes the investor more willing to purchase a 
stock. 
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Table 2.A1   Results for a Decision Interval of Six Months 
 
The decision interval of the investor is assumed to be six months. Dividend 
parameters are recalibrated as 1913.1H  and 8309.0L , so that the 
annualized dividend growth rate has a mean of %24.2  and a volatility of %97.25 . 
The risk-free rate is set as %91.11 fR . Loss aversion parameter   is set at 
25.2 . PGR and PLR are the simulated proportion of gains realized and 
proportion of losses realized. We define PLRPGRDispEffect  . 2WML is the simulated 
average cumulative annualized momentum portfolio return. 

  21 fRRRE tt  is 
the annualized equity premium.  121 ,tSHtQ   is the turnover, or aggregate 
selling, in period t. 
 
  0.37   0.52   0.88
(i) Disposition Effect
PGR 0.40 0.41 0.40
PLR 0.18 0.24 0.37
DispEffect 2.15 1.68 1.07
(ii) Momentum Effect
WML2 10.33% 6.59% 0.78%
(iii) Turnover
Corr RtRt1 ,
QtQt1
2 0.87 0.88 0.89
(iv) Equity Premium
E RtRt1 − Rf2 11.27% 11.22% 9.69%
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When we extend our model to a multi-stock setting and construct the winners-
minus-losers portfolio, we have assumed that investors engage in narrow-
framing. Is it plausible that people frame individual stocks narrowly? As argued 
by Barberis and Huang (2007), narrow framing is related to non-consumption 
utility such as regret: if one of the investor's stocks performs poorly, he may 
regret the specific decision to buy that stock. So, from a theoretical 
perspective, gains and losses on individual stocks can affect the investor's 
decisions. In addition, the extensive empirical evidence on the disposition 
effect documents that investors, including institutional investors, are reluctant 
to take losses on the level of individual stocks, suggesting that investors 
engage in narrow framing in the real market. Of course, a framework that 
allows the investor to derive utility directly from trading profits on individual 
stocks, but also, as in traditional models, to derive utility from consumption, 
namely a framework that allows for both narrow and traditional broad framing 
at the same time, might fit the data better. Although to construct such a formal 
model poses significant technical challenges and is beyond the scope of our 
current analysis, we believe our intuition will carry over, and our main results 
will survive in this more general setting, so long as the investor's preference 
can be partially captured by narrow framing and prospect theory, which are the 
two main drivers of our results. 
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Table 2.A2   Results for Using Purchase Prices as Reference Points 
 
The investor uses the purchase price as the reference point when calculating 
capital gains or losses. PGR and PLR are the simulated proportion of gains 
realized and proportion of losses realized. We define PLRPGRDispEffect   and    LREHREMomEffect tttt    || 11 . WML  is the simulated average 
momentum portfolio return in the multi-stock setting.  121 ,tSHtQ   is the 
turnover, or aggregate selling, in period t . Technology parameter values are 
fixed at their values in Table 2.1: 2821.1H , 7628.0L  and 0386.1fR . Loss 
aversion parameter  is set at 25.2 , the value estimated by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992). 
 
  0.37   0.52   0.88
(i) Disposition Effect
PGR 0.40 0.41 0.49
PLR 0.18 0.24 0.43
DispEffect 2.24 1.74 1.16
(ii) Momentum Effect
MomEffect 7.39% 4.91% 0.86%
WML 7.07% 4.65% 0.68%
(iii) Turnover
CorrRt,Qt  0.84 0.88 0.95
(iv) Equity Premium
ERt − Rf  3.86% 3.77% 2.76%
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Appendix 2.A.2 Heterogeneity, Aggregation and Price Impacts 
 
In our model, all investors have prospect theory preferences, the preference 
parameters (  and  ) are the same across investors, and the disposition 
investors (age-2-1 investors) frame gains/losses in the same way. In reality, 
investors are likely to be heterogeneous in a number of ways. First, some of 
them might be better described by traditional, risk-averse expected utility 
preferences, for example, the standard power utility representation, and these 
investors might take advantage of prospect theory investors and kill their 
effects on prices. Second, even prospect theory investors may differ in many 
dimensions, and this heterogeneity might somehow cause their aggregate 
behaviors to wash out. So recognizing these heterogeneities raises the 
question of whether the results of our model still hold in this more realistic 
world. 
 
A full analysis of this issue poses significant technical hurdles, but there is 
good reason to believe that a more general model might deliver similar results. 
On the one hand, as pointed out in the limits to arbitrage literature, there might 
be limits to the ability and willingness of traditional expected utility maximizers, 
or arbitrageurs, to offset the pricing effects of prospect theory investors, 
because by exploiting prospect theory investors, arbitrageurs face 
fundamental risk as well as noise trader risk, over and above the significant 
implementation costs they have to bear.31 As a result, arbitrageurs will trade 
                                                 
31See Barberis and Thaler (2003) Section 2.2, Barberis and Huang (2001) 
Section IV B, or Barberis and Huang (2008) Section III F for more detailed 
discussion of this point. 
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cautiously and only partially absorb the impact on prices of prospect theory 
investors, thereby allowing our results to persist. 
 
On the other hand, even though prospect theory investors might be 
heterogeneous in many ways, their disposition related tradings are likely to be 
systematic and have implications for stock prices. For example, empirical 
evidence documents that both institutional investors and individual investors 
exhibit a disposition effect, although the former do so to a smaller extent. This 
suggests that prospect theory can indeed capture the preferences of both type 
of investors, albeit differently. Formally, we can model their preferences as 
prospect theory utility with different parameters (  and  ), or as a 
combination of consumption utility and prospect theory utility with different 
weights. This kind of heterogeneity should not wash out in the aggregate, so 
that prospect theory preferences should have pricing implications. Actually, 
Coval and Shumway (2005) have provided strong evidence that prospect 
theory investors indeed move prices.  
 
Another heterogeneity of prospect theory investors relates to the framing of 
gains/losses. One may argue that different investors might buy into stocks at 
different prices, so that, in a given period, some investors face gains and 
others face losses, causing their disposition related tradings to cancel out in 
aggregate. However, this argument is flawed because it ignores the updating 
of reference points. When the investor has held a stock many periods, it is 
more reasonable for him to think of the reference point as some weighted 
average of the purchase price and other former prices. Once this updating 
process is taken into account, then in a rising (falling) market, most investors 
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holding the stock will accumulate gains (losses), regardless of when they 
bought into the stock or at what price, making their disposition related tradings 
systematic. This idea can be formalized in a setup with more than three 
generations. It will, however, exponentially increase the dimension of state 
vector, making the problem intractable. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DIVIDEND VOLATILITY and ASSET PRICING32 
 
3.1 Introduction  
How does aggregate dividend volatility affect asset prices?33 Until now the 
literature has largely disregarded this question. To the best of our knowledge, 
the only exception is Longstaff and Piazzesi (2004), who demonstrate that 
volatile and procyclical dividends can raise equity premiums in a 
representative agent model with power utility. However, their model explains 
less than half as large as historical equity premiums, and they don't explore 
whether dividend volatility can help explain other puzzling facts in the 
aggregate stock market, such as return predictability and time-varying Sharpe 
ratios. More importantly, their consumption-based model will inevitably predict 
a high correlation between consumption and stock returns, contradicting our 
observation. In this paper, we turn to a narrow-framing approach to 
comprehensively study the pricing implications of dividend volatility, and find 
that our model can explain key asset markets phenomena. 
 
Narrow-framing means that, when people evaluate risk, they often appear to 
pay attention to narrowly defined gains and losses. This behavior is uncovered 
by experimental work on decision-making under risk (e.g., Kahneman and 
                                                 
32This chapter is based on a joint paper with Yan Li.  
 
33Throughout the paper, the term dividend volatility refers to the standard 
deviation of the growth rate of (not the level of) the aggregate dividends paid 
to all stocks. See equation (4) for a technical definition. 
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Lovallo, 1993; Kahneman, 2003). In the context of financial investment, 
narrow-framing states that investors tend to separate their financial wealth 
from their overall wealth, and are inclined to get utility directly from fluctuations 
in the value of their overall portfolio of stocks (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995; 
Barberis and Huang, 2001; Barberis, Huang, and Santos, 2001, henceforth 
BHS; Barberis and Huang, 2007).34 Under this assumption, investors may 
perceive aggregate dividend volatility, which drives fluctuations in the value of 
their financial wealth, as a more appropriate metric to represent risk than 
consumption volatility, a commonly used measure in the literature. This 
immediately implies that dividend volatility has significant implications for asset 
prices. 
 
In this paper, we first provide strong empirical evidence that (i) dividend 
volatility exhibits strong persistence, usually called volatility clustering, 
indicating the tendency of a big (small) change today to be followed by a big 
(small) change tomorrow, (ii) dividend volatility has declined dramatically in the 
postwar period.35 The aggregate dividend time series we use is backed out 
from CRSP stock return data.36 This imputed dividend series has accounted 
for stock repurchases as an increasingly significant component of dividends 
                                                 
34In the literature, narrow-framing is sometimes applied to individual stocks 
that investors own (e.g., Barberis and Huang, 2001). For a deep discussion on 
narrow-framing, see Barberis and Huang (2007). 
 
35Lettau, Ludvigson and Wachter (2008) also mention that the volatility of 
dividend growth has declined since 1990s. But their model assumes that this 
decline affects stock prices through consumption. 
 
36This constructed dividend index is identical to Campbell (2000). The detailed 
data construction is given in the appendix. 
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since 1980. One may argue that the declining trend in dividend volatility is 
partly due to corporate managers' intention to smooth dividend. Whatever the 
reason is, however, an investor in our theoretical model takes the dividend 
process as exogenously given when making her investment decisions, which 
is a standard assumption in the asset pricing literature. 
 
We further propose a theoretical model in which dividend volatility is persistent 
and investors exhibit loss aversion: they dislike fluctuations in their financial 
wealth; and the more persistent the dividend volatility, the more they dislike 
stocks. Loss aversion is a central feature of the prospect theory of Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979), which is based on a variety of experimental evidence and 
has been extensively used in behavioral finance literature (e.g., Benartzi and 
Thaler, 1995; BHS, 2001). 
 
Our model is able to account for many of the stylized facts of asset prices, 
including the high mean and excess volatility of stock prices, predictability of 
stock returns, time-varying Sharpe ratios, a low and stable risk-free rate, and 
the low correlation between consumption and stock returns. Our model shows, 
moreover, the substantial decline in dividend volatility since the 1950s, signals 
a much more stable investment environment, which loss averse investors 
prefer; they therefore require a much lower return on holding stocks, resulting 
in lower equity premiums. This is consistent with Blanchard (1993), Fama and 
French (2002), and Buranavityawut, Freeman and Freeman (2006), who find 
that ex-ante equity premiums have declined in the past fifty years. 
Dividend volatility plays an essential role in explaining the intuitions of our 
model. As the state variable, it completely determines equilibrium price-
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dividend ratios and helps explain the high mean and excess volatility of stock 
returns. In equilibrium, a rise (drop) in dividend volatility lowers (raises) asset 
prices, and hence price-dividend ratios fluctuate with the dividend volatility 
process, generating excess volatility in market returns. The high volatility of 
returns, in turn, means that stocks often perform poorly, causing loss averse 
investors considerable discomfort and leading to low stock prices or high risk 
premiums. Furthermore, dividend volatility tends to be higher in market 
troughs than in booms, which leads to the countercyclical expected excess 
returns observed in financial markets. 
 
The persistence of dividend volatility leads to the persistence of the price-
dividend ratio, producing predictability in stock returns, where the forecasting 
power increases with the forecast horizon. The conditional mean and 
conditional standard deviation of expected returns are driven differently by 
dividend volatility, hence the Sharpe ratio as a measure of the price of risk 
changes over time. Moreover, the model-generated stock returns correlate 
only weakly with consumption, because stock returns are ultimately driven by 
dividend news, which has a low correlation with consumption news. 
 
Many studies have been devoted to explaining these puzzling facts in the 
literature. Our work is closely related to two prominent approaches,37 but also 
differs in a variety of ways. The first approach, including Campbell and 
                                                 
37Besides the two approaches mentioned here, another line of research relies 
on modifying the market and asset structure (e.g., Constantinides and Duffie, 
1996; Heaton and Lucas, 1996). 
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Cochrane (1999) and BHS (2001), relies on stochastic changing risk aversion, 
whereas the second, including Bansal and Yaron (2004, henceforth BY), relies 
on the changing economic environment. 
 
With respect to the first approach, we share with BHS (2001) the use of loss 
aversion to describe investors' preferences. However, we depart from them in 
two ways: we use loss aversion as the only psychological assumption, and our 
result isn't driven by the changing risk aversion of investors. BHS's result 
depends crucially on another psychological assumption, usually labelled the 
house money effect, which refers to the experimental finding that people are 
more (less) willing to bear risks when they have had prior gains (losses). The 
house effect together with loss aversion generates their model's results. 
In terms of the mechanism, our model is similar to BY (2004) in that we all 
require a persistent component in the underlying processes. However, our 
model specification is less stringent than theirs. In BY's model, it's critical to 
model the growth rates of both consumption and dividends as containing a 
long-run predictable component, as well as containing persistent volatility to 
stand for fluctuating economic uncertainty. In conjunction with Epstein and 
Zin's (1989) preferences, they succeed in explaining the financial market 
phenomena. However, as BY have pointed out, since it's econometrically 
difficult to distinguish an i.i.d. process from a process containing a small 
persistent component, it's rather difficult to justify the forecastable persistent 
component in the consumption and dividend growth rates. In our model, we 
need the persistent component only in the volatility of the dividend growth rate, 
which is supported by strong econometric evidence; we don't rely on the 
persistent component in the growth rates per se, which lacks empirical 
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evidence. The consumption growth rate is still maintained to be a white noise 
process in our model. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides extensive 
econometric evidence to show that (i) dividend volatility is persistent over time 
and (ii) it changes with the business cycle and experiences significant declines 
in the postwar period. Section 3.3 presents the model and characterizes the 
equilibrium asset prices. Section 3.4 calibrates the model and solves the price-
dividend ratios, then analyzes model simulation results. Section 3.5 concludes 
the paper. 
 
3.2. Key Features of Historical Dividend Volatility 
3.2.1 Dividend Volatility Clustering 
In this subsection, we provide evidence that dividend volatility displays the 
property of clustering, which, as we will see more clearly later, plays an 
important role in explaining the high mean, excess volatility, as well as the 
predictability of stock returns. We perform a variety of standard econometrics 
tests: first identify whether volatility clustering in dividend in fact exists and, if 
so, run a unit-root test to check how strong this persistence is. 
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Table 3.1   Dividend Volatility Estimates 
 
Panel A reports the test statistics for Box-Pierce-Ljung test and ARCH test for 
lag=4, 8 and 12 on quarterly dividend growth rate from 1926.Q3 to 2006.Q3. 
Panel B models the dividend growth rate, 1, tDg , as AR(1)-EAGRCH(1,1), 
1,101,   tttDtD Zgg  ,   ttttt ZZEZ 112 112 loglog LAG    , where 
2
t  is conditional variance of 1, tDg , and  1,0...1 NdiiZt  . Panel C reports an 
augmented Dicky-Fuller test on the log of the conditional volatility series 
estimated by an AR(1)-EAGRCH(1,1). Panel D models the dividend growth 
rate as a regime-switching process: 11,   tsstD vg tt  ,  1,01 Ntv , where 
},{ 21  ts  and },{ 21  ts  depend on the underlying state ts , which 
follows a Markov chain characterized by transitional probabilities 11p  and 22p . 
In Panels B and D, the standard errors of the estimated parameters are 
reported in parentheses.   and    mean that the estimates are significantly 
different from zero at  %1  and  %5  levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Dividend Volatility Clustering Tests
Lag 4 8 12
Box-Pierce-Ljung Test 32.57∗∗ 93.29∗∗ 101.37∗∗
ARCH Test 24.96∗∗ 66.72∗∗ 73.58∗∗
Panel B: AR(1)-EAGRCH(1,1) Estimation
Parameters ̂0 ̂1 ̂ Ĝ1 Â1 L̂1
Values
0.001 
0.002∗
0.0618 
0.451∗∗
0.109 
−0.224∗
0.014 
0.968∗∗
0.077 
0.423∗∗
0.034 
0.037
Panel C: Augmented Dicky-Fuller Test
Critical Values
Test Statistic 1% 5% 10%
−11.8 −20.3 −14.0 −11.2
Panel D: Regime-switching Estimation
Parameters ̂1 ̂1 ̂2 ̂2 p̂11 p̂22
Values
0.001 
0.007∗∗
0.001 
0.018∗∗
0.013 
−0.013
0.007 
0.078∗∗
0.007 
0.969∗∗
0.046 
0.797∗∗
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Volatility clustering, which characterizes the persistence in volatility, has been 
documented as a standard feature of many financial series. For instance, 
Bollerslev, Engle and Wooldridge (1988) show that conditional variance of 
market return fluctuates across time and is very persistent. For high-frequency 
return data, the ARCH literature finds a very high coefficient in the correlation 
of conditional standard deviations of returns. In our model, we consider 
volatility clustering in the dividend growth rate and examine its impact on 
equilibrium asset prices. Even though our data are at a low-frequency, the 
estimated coefficient is very similar to those found in high-frequncy data. 
Before running the ARCH type tests, we first run two diagnostic tests to see if 
there is volatility clustering in the dividend growth rate, which is constructed 
from the value weighted NYSE/AMEX return data from CRSP. More 
specifically, we use two standard tests in the econometric literature, the Box-
Pierce-Ljung test and ARCH test, to check whether there are strong 
correlations in the second moment of the dividend growth rate. Both tests have 
as the null hypothesis that there's no volatility clustering in the dividend growth 
rate, and under the null, both tests asymptotically follow a Chi square 
distribution. Panel A of Table 3.1 presents the test results. The statistics from 
both tests significantly reject the null hypothesis, indicating strong persistence 
in the volatility of the dividend growth rate. 
 
The preliminary tests make us comfortable using the exponential GARCH 
(EGARCH) model to identify the persistent component in dividend volatility. 
We use EAGRCH for two reasons: first, it matches best with our theoretical 
dividend volatility specification in section 3.3; second, it can capture the 
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asymmetric behaviors in volatility, i.e., larger (smaller) volatility is associated 
with negative (positive) news. Specifically, we consider the following 
regression: 
 
          
 ,1,0...
,loglog
,
1
11
2
11
2
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ttttt
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
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

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

                          (1) 
 
where 1, tDg  is the dividend growth rate, 
2
t  is the conditional variance of 
1, tDg , and 1110 ,,,, AG  and 1L   are coefficients.38 Panel B of Table 3.1 
reports the estimation result. In addition to this EGARCH specification, we also 
try the specifications in Bansal, Khatchatrian and Yaron (2005) and get similar 
results not reported here. 
 
The coefficient for dividend volatility is ,968.0ˆ 1 G   indicating that persistent 
dividend volatility indeed exists, which is consistent with the standard findings 
in the ARCH literature. However, the coefficient that measures the persistence 
in the dividend growth rate per se is much smaller ( 451.0ˆ 1  ). In the long-run 
risk literature (e.g., BY, 2004; Bansal, Kiku and Yaron, 2007), it is crucial to 
have the persistence in both the mean and the volatility of the dividend growth 
rate to explain the high equity premium, in other words, both 1Gˆ  and 1ˆ  are 
assumed to be close to one. In contrast, our model requires persistence only 
in the volatility, but not in the mean of the dividend growth rate process. The 
                                                 
38In what follows, we report results based on this AR(1)-EGARCH(1,1) 
specification. We also tried AR(2)-EGARCH(1,1) and other specifications, and 
the main results remain unchanged. 
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current estimation result shows that the econometric evidence is weak for the 
persistence in the dividend growth rate, but that the persistence in dividend 
volatility is strong, providing strong econometric evidence for our model. 
 
To further confirm that the persistence of dividend volatility is indeed very high, 
we resort to the augmented Dicky-Fuller unit root test by running the following 
regression:39 
 
      tttt e  12110 ˆlogˆlogˆlog    
 
where tˆ  is conditional dividend volatility obtained from the EGARCH 
estimation (equation [1]), and 10 , and 2  are coefficients. Panel C of Table 
3.1 reports the test statistics together with the critical values at 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels. We can hardly reject the null hypothesis of 11   at the 10% 
critical level, which implies that dividend volatility is indeed very persistent.40 
For comparison, we also run the unit root test in the dividend growth rate, and 
the unreported result strongly rejects the unit root hypothesis at any critical 
level, which is not surprising given that 1ˆ  is only 451.0  in Panel B of Table 3.1. 
                                                 
39An IGARCH (integrated GARCH) model will be able to nest the EGARCH 
estimation and the unit root estimation. However, we don't use IGARCH for 
two reasons: first, IGARCH is not stationary because it assumes a unit root in 
the volatility process; second, EGARCH fits more with our theoretical dividend 
volatility specification. We dispense with long memory GARCH models for 
similar reasons. 
 
40The persistence of dividend volatility is going to generate important model 
results. Therefore,   has to be sufficiently high although it need not be close 
to 1.  
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Given the strong econometric evidence, we believe that dividend volatility 
clustering is an important feature of the actual dividend data. Our theoretical 
model incorporates this feature when we specify the dividend growth rate 
process.41 
 
3.2.2 Time-Varying Dividend Volatility 
In this subsection, we examine the evolution of dividend volatility by asking 
two questions. How does dividend volatility vary with the business cycle? Is 
there any remarkable change in dividend volatility over the years? Since 
dividend volatility is the state variable in our model, the answer to the first 
question will enable us to analyze the procyclical stock prices through the 
model. The answer to the second question can relate our measure of 
macroeconomic risk to the measures in other papers, and provide empirical 
support for our model to explain the dynamics of equity premiums. 
 
To see how dividend volatility varies with the business cycle, Figure 3.1 plots 
dividend volatility, the real GDP growth rate, and the recession periods 
identified using NBER's business cycle chronology. In this figure, dividend 
volatility is the conditional standard deviation estimated from the EGARCH 
model (equation [1]); the real GDP growth rates are obtained from the website 
of the Bureau of Economic Analysis and start from the second quarter of 1947; 
and the shaded areas correspond to the economic recession periods 
according to NBER's business cycle chronology. 
                                                 
41That is, we require a high   in equation (5). 
 
 
  137
 
We see that dividend volatility changes over time, with the highest values 
appearing in the 1930's. Comparing dividend volatility with GDP growth rates, 
we see roughly a negative relationship: high dividend volatility usually 
coincides with lower GDP growth rates. This pattern makes sense, because 
it's usually the case that more uncertainty is present when the economy is in a 
trough. Further comparing it with NBER identified recessions, we find that 
dividend volatility tends to be very high during most recessions. The evidence 
suggests that dividend volatility evolves in a counter-cyclical way, which can 
potentially generate procyclical stock prices as well as counter-cyclical equity 
premiums and Sharpe ratios. Although this direction is promising, this 
evidence is weak. We thus take a conservative view in next section, assuming 
that the dividend volatility process is uncorrelated with the consumption growth 
process.42 
 
Observing the data through time, Figure 3.1 also shows that dividend volatility 
was relatively high before 1952 and became much smoother thereafter, except 
for a spike around 1989. Therefore, dividend volatility seems to have 
undergone a significant decline in the postwar years, which suggests that 
investors' perceived43 financial risk, as an inseparable part of macroeconomic 
risk, has experienced a significant decline since the 1950s. 
                                                 
42That is we assume   0, tt uCov   in equation (6). 
 
43Here, perceived is used to emphasize the notion that investors treat the 
dividend process as exogenous, although firms tend to smooth dividends in 
reality. 
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Figure 3.1 Dividend Volatility, GDP Growth and Recessions 
 
Figure 3.1 plots quarterly consumption growth rates for period 1947.Q1-
2006.Q3, and conditional dividend volatility for period 1926.Q3-2006.Q3. The 
dividend volatility t  is estimated from an AR(1)-EGARCH(1,1) regression. 
The shaded bars indicate the recessions according to NBER's website data. 
 
To characterize the decline in dividend volatility more formally, we follow 
Hamilton (1989) to estimate a regime-switching model. The basic idea is to 
model the dividend growth rate as deriving from one of two regimes, a regime 
with a high dividend volatility or one with a low dividend volatility. The 
parameter values in each regime, together with the transitional probability can 
be obtained through maximum likelihood estimation. These parameter 
estimates can then be used to infer which regime the process was in at any 
historical date. Specifically, the dividend growth rate, 1, tDg , is generated 
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according to: 
 
 ,1,0, 111, N  ttsstD vvg tt   
 
where },{ 21  ts  is the mean, and },{ 21  ts  is the volatility in state ts  . 
Thus, when 1ts , the observed dividend growth rate, 1, tDg , is presumed to 
have been drawn from a  11,N  distribution, whereas when 2ts , 1, tDg , is 
drawn from another distribution  22 ,N . The state evolves according to a 
Markov process, and we denote the transitional probability of the Markov 
chains 
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The parameter values and their standard deviations are reported in Panel D of 
Table 3.1. The estimated two regimes are characterized as follows: the high-
mean, low-volatility regime has an average growth rate of %65.0  per quarter, 
with a low standard deviation of 018.0 ; the low-mean, high-volatility regime 
has an average growth rate of %3.1  per quarter, with a very high standard 
deviation 078.0 . In addition, the high-mean, low-volatility regime seems more 
persistent, because its transitional probability is higher, 969.0ˆ 11 p . 
 
Figure 3.2 plots the smoothed posterior probability of the dividend growth rate 
being in a low-mean, high-volatility state. The probability is very high in prewar 
data, but exhibits sharp declines after the 1950s. In much of the postwar 
period, the posterior probability of being in a high-mean, low-volatility regime is 
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close to one. 
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Figure 3.2 Smoothed Probability of a High Volatility Regime and Historical 
Dividend Growth Rate 
 
In Figure 3.2, the dividend growth rate is assumed to be generated from a 
regime switching model. The estimation results in Panel D of Table 1 suggests 
that one regime features a positive mean and a low volatility, while the other 
one has a negative mean and a high volatility. The top panel plots the 
posterior probability of dividend growth being in the high volatility regime given 
the observed data process. The bottom panel plots the dividend growth rate 
for period 1926.Q3-2006.Q3. 
 
The reported evidence clearly shows that dividend volatility has been declining 
since 1950s. This is broadly consistent with the findings in Kim, Morley and 
Nelson (2004), who document a similar pattern in stock returns. In Section 
3.4.3.5, we incorporate this finding into our theoretical framework by doing 
comparative statics with respect to the exogenous parameters governing the 
dividend process, and find that the declining dividend volatility helps to explain 
the decreasing equity premiums after WWII. 
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3.3 The Model 
3.3.1 Setup 
Consider an economy populated with a continuum of identical, infinitely lived, 
narrow-framing and loss averse agents. Two assets are available to trade: a 
risk-free asset in zero net supply, paying a gross interest rate tfR , , and one 
unit of risky asset, paying a gross return 1tR , between time t  and 1t . 
 
The loss averse investor chooses consumption tC  and risky asset holdings  St   
to maximize the utility function  
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The first term in the objective function is the standard utility over consumption, 
where  1,0  is the time discount factor; 0  measures the curvature of the 
investor's utility over consumption;44 and tC  is the aggregate per capita 
consumption at time t , which is exogenous to the investor. The exogenous 
scalor tC  is introduced to ensure that consumption utility and prospect utility 
                                                 
44For 1 , we replace    1/1tC with  tClog . 
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are of the same order as aggregate wealth increases over time.45 
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Figure 3.3 Gain and Loss Function 
 
Figure 3.3 plots the gain and loss function  
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The second term deserves more attention, as it captures the direct utility the 
investor derives from fluctuations in the value of her financial wealth. 
Depending on the return of the risky asset, her total portfolio excess return 1tX   
                                                 
45Another tractable preference specification that incorporates narrow-framing 
but doesn't rely on a scaling to ensure stationarity can be found in Barberis 
and Huang (2007). 
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can be either positive or negative, a positive one indicating a financial gain, 
and a negative one a financial loss. The function  1tXv  describes how she 
feels about her investment performance. Since she is loss averse, the pain 
she receives from financial losses outweighs the happiness from financial 
gains. Therefore,  1tXv  takes different functional form with respect to the 
values of 1tX : when 1tX  is positive showing that she makes money,  1tXv  is 
linear in 1tX  with slope one; in contrast, when 1tX  is negative meaning that 
she loses money,  1tXv  amplifies her utility loss by a magnitude of ,  with    
being greater than one. Figure 3.3 plots the function  1tXv . 
 
The dynamics of the economy crucially depends on the value of 0b , which tells 
how much the second utility counts in her total utility. If 00 b , loss aversion 
doesn't play a role in the overall utility, and the model is reduced to a 
traditional asset pricing setting studied by Hansen and Singleton (1983). In this 
case, higher dividend volatility leads to a higher dividend growth rate, resulting 
in a higher price-dividend ratio and a lower equity premium. However, as the 
value of 0b  increases, the investor suffers more utility loss from her financial 
loss and demands a higher risk premium in holding stocks. As will be clearer 
later, the balance of these two utility forces generates the pattern actually 
observed in financial markets. 
 
Both consumption and dividend growth follow lognormal processes, 
 
                          ,/log 111,   tCCtttC gCCg                                               (3)  
                          ,/log 111,   ttDtttD gDDg                                               (4)  
                                 11 loglogloglog   tutt u                             (5)  
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Here 1, tCg  is the growth rate of aggregate consumption tC .  Cg  and  C   are 
the mean and standard deviation of consumption growth. tD  is dividend: its 
growth rate is denoted as ,1, tDg   with mean Dg  and standard deviation t . 
We draw special attention to equation (5), which characterizes the evolution of 
dividend volatility. To ensure the positiveness of t , we model  1log t  
instead of t  as an )1(AR  process. In this sense, the dividend volatility 
equation (5) is very similar to an EGARCH specification (equation [1]). u  
captures the magnitude of the innovation to the conditional volatility t  : a big 
u  will increase dividend volatility. A particular interesting parameter is the 
coefficient ,   which controls the strength of dependence on past volatilities. A 
larger   implies that the impact of a shock to dividend volatility is very 
persistent. As has been shown in Section 3.2, this persistence parameter   is 
very high in actual dividend data. 
 
The innovations to the consumption growth t , the dividend growth t , and the 
dividend volatility tu  are jointly normally distributed as  
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where   is the correlation between consumption shocks and dividend shocks. 
Note that when allowing for persistence in dividend volatility, the unconditional 
correlation between 1, tCg  and 1, tDg  is 
     22 1/5.0 ue . As discussed in 
Section 3.2.2, we assume consumption growth shocks are independent of 
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dividend volatility shocks, i.e.,   0, tt uCov  , although data suggests a weak 
negative correlation between t  and tu , which has important implications for 
the time-variation pattern of the equity premiums. We allow for the interaction 
between shocks to the dividend growth rate t  and shocks to the dividend 
volatility tu , and the interaction of these two shocks are denoted by  . As will 
be shown later,   also plays a role in generating certain model results. 
 
3.3.2 Equilibrium Prices 
This subsection derives the equilibrium asset prices. We first construct a one-
factor Markov equilibrium, in which the risk-free rate is a constant and the 
state variable t  (dividend volatility) determines the distribution of future stock 
returns. Assume that the price-dividend ratio is a function of t : 
 
.)(/ tttt fDPf   
 
We are going to verify that there is indeed an equilibrium satisfying this 
assumption. 
 
Given the one-factor assumption, the stock returns 1tR  can be determined as 
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Intuitively, the change in stock returns can be attributed to either the news 
about dividend growth ,1t  or the financial market uncertainty ,t   or changes 
in the price-dividend ratio .f  Since the dividend process is exogenously given, 
the key to solving 1tR  is to solve the price-dividend ratio .f   
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In equilibrium, the Euler equations fully capture the dynamics of the 
economy46  
 
                               ,/1 1   tttf CCER                             (8) 
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Equation (8) and the i.i.d. assumption on the consumption growth together 
imply a constant risk free rate, 
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After substituting in the respective consumption and dividend processes, 
equation (9) boils down to 
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In equilibrium, the function f must evolve according to equation (11), which 
                                                 
46The Euler equations are both necessary and sufficient to characterize the 
equilibrium. Refer to BHS (2001) for a proof. 
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also verifies the conjectured one-factor Markov equilibrium price function. 
 
3.3.3 Methodology of Numerical Computation 
We solve f numerically on a grid search of the state variable t . We start out 
by guessing a solution to (11),  0f  say. According to (5), the distribution of 
1t  is completely determined by t  and 1tu . Then we get a new candidate 
solution  1f  by the following recursion 
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We continue this process until   ff i  . 
 
3.4 Model Results 
3.4.1 Calibrating Parameter Values 
We calibrate the model at quarterly frequency, such that the model implied 
moments match those of the observed annual data. In reality, many 
companies issue their dividend policies and earning reports at quarterly 
frequency, hence it is reasonable for the investors to re-evaluate their 
investment performance at a quarterly basis. We also calibrate the model at 
monthly and annual frequency, in which cases investors re-evaluate their 
performance more frequently or less frequently. We get qualitatively similar 
results, so we only report the results based on quarterly decision making 
throughout our analysis. 
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Table 3.2 summarizes our choice of parameter values. We choose similar 
values as BHS for the consumption growth parameters and the preference 
parameters. For Cg  and C , the mean and standard deviation of log 
consumption growth, we follow Cecchetti, Lam and Mark (1990) and set 
%46.0Cg  and %90.1C , which corresponds to an annual growth rate of 
%84.1  with volatility of %79.3 . The curvature   of utility over consumption and 
the time discount factor   are set as 0.1  and 995.0  respectively, bringing the 
net annual risk free rate close to 86.3  percent by equation (10) and the values 
of Cg  and C . The loss aversion parameter   is equal to ,25.2  since many 
independent experimental studies have estimated it as being around this level. 
Similar to BHS, the parameter 0b  does not have an empirical counterpart, and 
we present results for a range of values of 0b . 
 
Using NYSE/AMEX data and Fama risk-free rate data from 1926.Q3 to 
2006.Q4 from CRSP, we calibrate the unconditional mean of quarterly 
dividend growth rate as its empirical mean, %39.0Dg . By matching the first 
moment of Equation (4),        11, logloglog   tDtD EggE  , we calibrate 
 log  as 91.3 . The parameter  , who governs the persistence of dividend 
volatility, takes the value 99.0 , close to the estimated value from an EGARCH 
model in Section 3.2. 
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Table 3.2   Calibrated Parameters 
 
This table reports the calibration values for the preference parameters and 
technology parameters in the theoretical model.   is the curvature of utility 
over consumption,   is the time discount factor,   is the loss aversion 
parameter, and 0b  controls the importance of the loss aversion relative to the 
consumption in the utility function. Cg  and Dg  are the means of the 
consumption and dividend growth rate, respectively. C  is the volatility of 
consumption growth.  log  is the mean of the log of conditional volatility of 
dividend growth.   measures the persistence of dividend volatility, while u  
controls the variation in dividend volatility.   is the correlation between 
consumption news and dividend news, and   is the correlation between 
dividend level news and volatility news. The calibration for the dividend 
parameters is based on the dividend sample 1926.Q3-2006.Q3 constructed 
from the value weighted NYSE/AMEX returns from CRSP. 
 
Parameters Calibration Values
Preference
 1.0
 0.995
b0 range
 2.25
Technology
gC 0.46%
gD 0.39%
C 1.90%
log̄ −3.91
 0.15
 0.99
 −0.67
u 0.14  
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The parameter u  is very important since it measures the magnitude of 
dividend volatility. We calibrate this parameter as 14.0 , such that the model 
implied annual dividend growth rate has a volatility equal to its empirical 
counterpart. Compared to BY (2004), the value of u  appears large. However, 
this is an artifact of our specification of the volatility process in equation (5), 
where the logarithm of dividend volatility rather than its square follows an AR(1) 
process. Indeed, given 1 , taking a first order approximation of (5), we have 
1
22
1   twtt u , where   42 102.82  utw E  , close to the value in BY 
(2004). 
 
Two more model parameters remain to be calibrated:  , which captures the 
interaction between innovations in dividend growth rate and dividend volatility; 
and  , the correlation between consumption and dividend. By equations (4) 
and (5), we calibrate   at 67.0 . Following Campbell (2000), we set 15.0 , 
which implies an unconditional correlation of 1.0  between consumption and 
dividend growth processes. 
 
3.4.2 Price-dividend Ratio Function f   
Figure 3.4 plots the price-dividend ratio f  as a function of  tlog  for 7.00 b , 
20 b  and 60 b . We also try a variety of other values for 0b , for example, 
1.00 b  , 200 b , 2000 b , etc. The essential pattern, however, is fully 
depicted by Figure 3.4. 
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Figure 3.4 Price-Dividend Functions f 
 
Figure 3.4 plots the equilibrium price-dividend ratios against the log of the 
conditional dividend volatility,  log( t ),  for b0 = 0.7, 2 and 6. 
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Investors in our model care not only about consumption, the standard 
expected log utility term in (2), but also about fluctuations in the value of their 
investments, the additional prospect utility term in (2). These two forces jointly 
determine the shape of the function f . Without loss aversion, a higher 
dividend volatility implies a higher dividend growth rate in the future, and thus 
higher expected cash flows from holding stocks. Since the stochastic discount 
factor depends on the consumption process, which is weakly correlated with 
dividend, it is relatively unchanged. Therefore, stocks are more attractive and 
their prices are higher. The standard consumption utility contributes to a 
positive relationship between t  and the price-dividend ratio  tf  . 
 
The presence of loss aversion, in contrast, contributes to a negative 
relationship between dividend volatility t  and the price-dividend ratio  tf  . 
For a fixed 0b , the more volatile the dividend process, the more volatile the 
returns, therefore, the more likely investors are to suffer financial losses. This 
causes loss averse investors great pains, and makes stocks less desirable. As 
a result, they require more compensations when faced with more volatile 
dividend processes, causing lower stock prices or higher equity premiums. 
 
The negative slope of f function is consistent with BY (2004) and Bansal, 
Khatchatrian and Yaron (2005), who find that asset prices drop as economic 
uncertainty rises, although their measure of economic uncertainty is 
conditional consumption volatility rather than dividend volatility. It is rather 
difficult to justify this negative relationship within the standard power utility 
framework, where, as we have discussed before, a higher dividend volatility is 
associated with higher expected dividend growth, hence price-dividend ratios 
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always vary positively with dividend volatility. However, it can be easily 
understood with the introduction of loss aversion preferences. 
 
The overall shape of f  can now be summarized as follows. For low values of 
t , the impact of loss aversion is dominant, hence the function f  is downward 
sloping. As t  becomes larger, the impact of log utility catches up, and the 
function f eventually becomes upward sloping. That is, f  is U-shaped, as 
shown in Figure 3.4. The smaller is 0b , the earlier f  achieves its minimum. 
Moreover, larger values of 0b  say that investors care more about their wealth 
fluctuations, in which case the risk premiums for holding stocks are higher. 
Therefore, as 0b  increases, the function f  will move downward. 
 
How does f  look like in the data? According to our calibration,  tlog  is 
normally distributed with mean 91.3  and standard deviation 99.0 . Therefore, 
just reading from Figure 3.4, we will expect to see a negative relationship 
between price-dividend ratios and dividend volatility for most of the time. To 
see this more formally, we run an AR(1)-EGARCH(1,1) estimation on the 
quarterly dividend growth for 1926.Q3-2006.Q4 and plot the price-dividend 
ratios against the estimated conditional dividend volatilities tˆ  in Figure 3.5. 
Indeed, more than 80 percent of the observed data display a negative 
relationship. In addition, we also notice an interesting positive relationship 
between price-dividend ratios and dividend volatility, which occurs for some 
extremely high realizations of tˆ . For instance, when the logarithm of dividend 
volatility is larger than 05.0 , price-dividend ratios actually rise with dividend 
volatility. Therefore, the data display a similar U-shaped pattern as predicted 
by our model. 
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Figure 3.5 Historical Price-Dividend Ratios v.s. 
Conditional Dividend Volatility 
 
Figure 3.5 plots the historical price-dividend ratios against the conditional 
dividend volatility estimated from an AR(2)-EGARCH(1,1) regression for 
period 1926.Q3-2006.Q3. 
 
 
3.4.3 Simulation Results 
In this subsection, we generate artificial data under the parameter 
configuration in Table 3.2, and show that the model-simulated data replicate 
the interesting patterns found in actual data. 
 
In order to facilitate a comparison with historical data, we simulate the model 
at a quarterly frequency and time-aggregate them to get annual data. We do 
10,000 simulations each with 320 quarterly observations. We then calculate 
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the interested statistics and report their sample moments. Given that the 
simulation number is large enough, the sample moments should serve as 
good approximations to population moments. 
 
3.4.3.1 Stock Returns and Stock Volatility 
Table 3.3 reports a variety of statistics calculated from model simulated data 
and the corresponding statistics from historical data. It is noteworthy that the 
model can match the mean and standard deviations of excess stock returns 
pretty well. When ,60 b  the model generates a sizable premium of %75.6  
per annum, which is slightly higher than the empirical value %90.5 ; the model 
also generates a standard deviation of %49.19 , which is almost equal to the 
corresponding value of %17.19  in the data. 
 
We notice that as 0b  grows, both the mean and standard deviations from 
model simulated excess returns increase. This is because when 0b  increases, 
loss aversion becomes a more important feature of investors' preference, so 
investors become more and more fearful of risky assets, pushing down stock 
prices. 
 
We also report the mean and standard deviation of the simulated annual price-
dividend ratios,  atat DPE /  and  atat DP / .47 The empirical value 
  %43.12/ atat DP  is relatively high to those found in other papers (BHS, 2001; 
BY, 2004; Campbell and Cochrane, 1999). This is due to the relatively high 
price-dividend ratios from 1996 to 2006, which includes the high-tech bubble 
                                                 
47The superscript a indicates annualized variables. 
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period. 
 
Table 3.3 Asset Prices and Annual Returns (1926-2006) 
 
This table provides information regarding stock returns for the simulated data 
and historical data. The historical data correspond to the period 1926-2006. 
The entries for the model are based on 10,000 simulations each with 320 
quarterly observations that are time-aggregated to an annual frequency. The 
parameter configuration in simulation follows that in table 3.2. The expressions  a tfat rrE ,1   and  a tfat rr ,1   are, respectively, the mean and volatility of the 
annualized continuously compounded returns.  a tCat grCorr 1,1,   is the correlation 
between the annual stock return and annual growth rate.  atat DPE /  and  atat DP /  are the mean and volatility of the annualized price-dividend ratios. 
 
Empirical Value Model
Variables (1926-2006) b0  0.7 b0  2 b0  6
Annual Excess Stock Return
E rt1a − rf,ta 5.90 2.68 4.98 6.75
 rt1a − rf,ta 19.17 16.18 18.44 19.49
E rt1a − rf,ta / rt1a − rf,ta 0.31 0.16 0.27 0.35
Corrrt1a ,gC,t1a  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Annual Price-Dividend Ratio
EPta /Dta  29.08 19.01 13.47 11.06
Pta /Dta  12.43 2.56 2.62 2.47
 
 
 
We are able to match stock returns volatility even though the volatility of price-
dividend ratios is lower than their empirical counterparts, a common problem 
with one factor models. The reason to achieve excess volatility in stock returns 
is due to the positive relationship between price-dividend ratios and dividend 
innovations. To see this more clearly, consider the following approximate 
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relationship (Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay, 1997): 
 
     ,/log 111   ttttt ffAr   
 
where A  is a constant. The excess volatility of market return relative to that of 
the dividend growth (or the fundamental),    11   ttt VarrVar  , comes from 
two sources: the volatility of price-dividend ratios,  
t
t
f
fVar 1log  , and the 
covariance between the price-dividend ratios and the news to the dividends, 
 1,log 1  ttff ttCov  . In actual data, since 0  in (6), good dividend news 
(positive 1t ) tends to be associated with negative dividend volatility shock 
(negative 1tu ), implying that next period price-dividend ratios will increase 
(see Figure 3.4). Therefore, the covariance term  1,log 1  ttff ttCov   is positive. 
 
The model is also able to generate the low correlation between stock returns 
and consumption growth,   1.0, 1,1  a tCat grCorr . This happens because the 
variation in stock returns is completely driven by the innovations in the 
dividend process, which is only weakly correlated with the consumption 
process. 
 
3.4.3.2 Autocorrelations of Returns and Price-Dividend Ratios 
Table 3.4 presents autocorrelations in returns and price-dividend ratios. Our 
model predicts negative autocorrelations in stock returns, as documented by 
Poterba and Summers (1988) and Fama and French (1988a). This negative 
correlation comes from the fact that returns and price-dividend ratios depend 
solely on a persistent AR(1) dividend volatility process. Moreover, our model 
closely matches the highly positively correlated price-dividend ratios in the 
data. 
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Table 3.4 Autocorrelations of Returns and Price-Dividend Ratios 
 
This table reports the autocorrelations of annualized stock returns and price-
dividend ratios for the simulated data and historical data. The historical data 
correspond to the period 1926-2006. The entries for the model are based on 
10,000 simulations each with 320 quarterly observations that are time-
aggregated to an annual frequency. The parameter configuration in simulation 
follows that in table 3.2. The expressions  a jtat rrCorr ,  and  a jta jtatat DPDPCorr  /,/  are, respectively, the autocorrelations of the annualized 
compound equity returns and P/D ratios. 
 
Empirical Value Model
(1926-2006) b0  0.7 b0  2 b0  6
Corr rta , rt−ja
j  1 0.09 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
j  2 −0.17 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02
j  3 −0.06 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02
j  4 −0.12 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02
j  5 −0.06 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02
Corr Pta /Dta ,Pt−ja /Dt−ja
j  1 0.90 0.68 0.79 0.82
j  2 0.81 0.61 0.71 0.74
j  3 0.75 0.56 0.64 0.66
j  4 0.68 0.50 0.58 0.60
j  5 0.60 0.45 0.51 0.53
 
 
3.4.3.3 Return Predictability 
To analyze the predictability pattern of returns, we run the following regression 
on both simulated and historical data: 
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  ,/... ,21 tjatatjja jtatat PDrrr     
 
where a jtr   refers to the annual cumulative log returns from year 1 jt  to 
jt   . Table 3.5 presents the regression result for different values of 0b . This 
estimation result from model-simulated data resembles the classic pattern 
documented by Campbell and Shiller (1988) and Fama and French (1988b). 
The coefficients are significant and negative, indicating that high prices tend to 
predict low expected returns. Moreover, the forecasting power increases with 
forecasting horizons, as reflected by the increasing coefficients and 2R 's. 
 
The pattern of return predictability generated by our model can be understood 
through the volatility test in Cochrane (1992). Starting from the accounting 
identity 1
1
11 

 tt RR  with tttt PDPR /)( 111   , the log-linearization around the 
average price-dividend ratios, DP / , implies that, in the absence of rational 
asset price bubbles, 
 
),(),()(
1
,
1
jttt
j
jtDtt
j
tt rdpCovhgdpCovhdpVar jj 





   
 
where lower case indicates log values and )/1/(/ DPDPh  . This suggests 
that the variation in the price-dividend ratio will forecast either the change in 
expected dividend growth rate, or the discount rate, or both. 
 
In our model, even though dividend volatility is time varying, the dividend 
growth rate per se is still a white noise, meaning 0),( ,   jtDtt gdpCov . Given 
that the risk-free rate is maintained as a constant, the only thing remaining for 
the price-dividend ratio to predict is the excess return. A high price-dividend 
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ratio is associated with a decline in dividend volatility, so the required expected 
return will be lower. Therefore, our model implies an extreme version of the 
volatility test results. 
 
 
 
Table 3.5 Return Predictability Regressions (1926-2006) 
 
This table provides evidence of predictability of future excess returns by price-
dividend ratios. The entries correspond to regressing   tjatatjja jtatat PDrrr ,21 /...    , where a jtr   refers to the annual 
cumulative log returns from year 1 jt  to jt  . The historical data 
correspond to the period 1926-2006. The entries for the model are based on 
10,000 simulations each with 320 quarterly observations that are time-
aggregated to an annual frequency. The parameter configuration in simulation 
follows that in table 3.2. 
 
Empirical Value Model
(1926-2006) b0  0.7 b0  2 b0  6
1 2.55 2.42 2.08 1.83
2 5.99 4.90 4.08 3.58
3 8.28 7.23 5.95 5.20
4 11.26 9.44 7.71 6.69
R21 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.06
R22 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.11
R23 0.13 0.07 0.13 0.16
R24 0.18 0.09 0.16 0.20
 
 
It's worth noting that a central fact driving predictability of returns is the 
persistence of dividend volatility. As shown in Cochrane (2005), both the 
estimated coefficients and  R2′s   increase with the persistence of the price-
dividend ratio, which depends on dividend volatility. 
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3.4.3.4 Time-varying Sharpe Ratios 
Empirical evidence suggests that estimates of both conditional means and 
conditional standard deviations of returns change through time, but they do 
not move one for one. Hence Sharpe ratios are time-varying. Figure 3.6 
presents the conditional means and conditional standard deviations as 
functions of the state variable )log( t . Overall, as t  increases, the dividend 
growth becomes more volatile; thus both the means and the standard 
deviations of expected returns increase. 
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Figure 3.6 Conditional Moments of Stock Returns 
 
Panel (a) and (b) plot the conditional expected stock return  1tt RE  and 
conditional volatility of return  1tt R  for the case b0=6. 
 
Comparing the conditional means,  1tt RE , and conditional standard 
deviations,  1tt R , of expected returns, we see that they are different 
functions of dividend volatility. Most noticeably, for those values of 
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 tlog smaller than   91.3log  , the conditional standard deviation is 
almost a constant, whereas the conditional mean has more variations and 
increases with  tlog . Therefore, the Sharpe ratio of conditional mean to 
conditional standard deviation varies over time, with its variation due to the 
difference between  1tt RE  and  1tt R . 
 
More formally, according to (4)-(7), the conditional mean and conditional 
variance of 1tR  are respectively, 
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To get a clearer picture of the distribution of Sharpe ratios, we numerically 
calculate the conditional Sharpe ratios from the above formula. Specifically, 
we make 160,000 random draws of 1t  and 1tu , calculate the conditional 
mean and conditional standard deviation of expected returns by numerical 
integration, and then obtain the conditional Sharpe ratios as a function of 
)log( t  when 60 b . Figure 3.7 presents the histogram of the simulated 
conditional Sharpe ratios, showing that the price of risk is changing over time. 
The unconditional mean and standard deviation of simulated Sharpe ratios are 
0.14 and 0.05, matching their empirical values. 
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Figure 3.7 Distribution of the Conditional Sharpe Ratios 
 
The distribution is based on a simulation for the case b0=6. 
 
 
3.4.3.5 Structural Break and Equity Premiums 
Recent empirical evidence shows that the macroeconomic risk has declined 
over the past fifty years. It still remains an open question how this reduced risk 
affects ex-ante equity premiums, which are identified to have declined since 
WWII, by Blanchard (1993), Fama and French (2002), Freeman (2004), and 
Buranavityawut, Freeman and Freeman (2006). We use dividend volatility to 
stand for risk and study how this risk is priced in financial markets. 
 
The econometric evidence in Section 3.2 suggests that dividend volatility has 
decreased dramatically since the 1950s. According to our model, lower 
dividend volatility means that stocks are less likely to perform poorly; thus loss 
averse investors are less worried about fluctuations in their financial wealth. 
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As a result, they are more willing to hold risky stocks, pushing up stock prices 
and driving down expected returns. To test our model performance in the 
postwar period with declined dividend volatility, we re-calibrate the model 
according to the data for 1954-2006. The new parameter values are provided 
in Table 3.6. Comparing the new values with those calibrated from all data, we 
find that the mean dividend growth rate doesn't change a lot, however, the 
standard deviation of  tlog  decreased from 14.0  to 10.0 , a decline of 
roughly %30 . Consistent with our intuition, the model-simulated data match 
the actual data very well in excess returns, in the standard deviation of excess 
returns, as well as in Sharpe ratios. 
 
Our model suggests that the decline in equity premiums is a direct result of 
declining macroeconomic risk, which is characterized by dividend volatility. 
The existing literature has focused on other measures of macroeconomic risk. 
Pastor and Stambaugh (2001) and Kim, Morley and Nelson (2004, 2005) have 
examined structural changes in market volatility and argue that, if the market 
price of risk does not vary greatly, then falls in market volatility should be 
associated with a decline in the required rate of return for equity. Lettau, 
Ludvigson and Wachter (2008) use consumption volatility to measure 
economic risk, and argue that this reduced macroeconomic risk contributed to 
the recent run-up in price-dividend ratios. We prefer dividend volatility to other 
measures of macroeconomic risk because dividend volatility is an important 
feature of the underlying endowment process, which determines market 
volatility in equilibrium. More importantly, as in the data, stock returns are only 
weakly correlated with consumption, therefore, a model relying on 
consumption volatility will inevitably generate a high correlation between stock 
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returns and consumption, contradicting our observation. 
 
Table 3.6 Structural Break and Asset Prices 
 
This table reports the mean and volatility of stock returns for the simulated 
data for two sets of dividend parameter configurations. Calibration I is based 
on the dividend sample 1926.Q3-2006.Q3; Calibration II is based on the 
dividend sample 1954.Q3-2006.Q3. The preference parameters and 
consumption parameters are the same as table 3.2 for both configurations. 
The expressions  a tfat rrE ,1   and  a tfat rr ,1   are, respectively, the mean and 
volatility of the annualized continuously compounded returns. 
 
Dividend Parameter Configuration
Parameters u gD log̄ 
Calibration I 0. 14 0.39% −3.91 −0.67
Calibration II 0. 10 0.35% −4.16 −0.34
Annual Excess Returns
Variables E rt1a − rf,ta  rt1a − rf,ta
E rt1
a −rf,ta
 rt1a −rf,ta
Empirical Value
1926–2006 5. 90 19.17 0.31
1954–2006 4. 87 15.35 0.32
Model (b0  6)
Calibration I 6. 75 19.49 0.35
Calibration II 4. 71 16.54 0.28
 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This paper proposes a model in which dividend volatility is used to represent 
fluctuating economic uncertainty, and investors are loss averse over 
fluctuations in their financial wealth. Experimental and psychological evidence 
supports the behavioral assumption of loss aversion. Our empirical analysis of 
the aggregate dividend (including all distributions) establishes that dividend 
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volatility is highly persistent and has experienced a remarkable decline in the 
postwar period. 
 
Our model-simulated data exhibit similar patterns to those observed in actual 
return data: stock returns have a high mean, high volatility and a low 
correlation with consumption; they are predicted by price-dividend ratios; the 
Sharpe ratios are time-varying. 
 
To address the dynamic evolution of equity premiums, we also calibrate the 
models according to postwar data, in which dividend volatility is shown to be 
substantially lower than in prewar data. Based on the new calibrated 
parameter values, the model can generate much lower equity premiums 
(higher price-dividend ratios) thanks to a more stable economic environment. 
 
In essence, this paper highlights the significant effect of dividend volatility on 
asset prices when investors are narrow-framing, i.e., they derive direct utility 
from their financial investments. In the face of an uncertain investment 
environment captured by dividend volatility, loss averse investors are fearful of 
holding risky assets; if this uncertainty is persistent, their fears are stronger. 
This mechanism can generate important asset price behaviors in financial 
markets. 
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APPENDIX 
 
We follow Bansal, Khatchatrian and Yaron (2005) to impute the dividend time 
series from CRSP database. This appendix describes the details. The data 
covers quarterly sample from 1926.Q3 till 2006.Q3. In order to construct the 
quarterly dividend variable, the following series are used: 
 indxP  : Monthly stock price index on NYSE/AMEX. The price index for 
month j  is calculated as   1,, 1  jindxjjindx PVWRETXP , where VWRETX  is 
the value weighted return on NYSE/AMEX excluding dividends, taken from 
CRSP. 
 indxD : Monthly dividend index on NYSE/AMEX. The dividend for month j  is 
calculated as   jindxVWRETXVWRETDjindx PD jj ,11, 1   , where VWRETD  and VWRETX  are, 
correspondingly, the value weighted return on NYSE/AMEX including and 
excluding dividends, taken from CRSP. 
 indxD : Quarterly dividend index on NYSE/AMEX. The dividend for a quarter 
is the sum of the monthly dividend indices for the 3 months comprising the 
quarter. Then a four period backward moving average is taken to remove 
seasonality. That is,       jtindxjtindxjtindxjtindx DDDD   3,13,23,3 041, , where 
t  indexes quarters. 
 Inflation : Quarterly inflation index. The inflation index for a quarter is the 
inflation index in the last month of the quarter, taken from CRSP. 
 
The resulting quarterly dividend series and dividend growth rate series are 
calculated as follows: 
.log ,
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